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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with international strategic alliances involving New 
Zealand companies. By Western standards, even the largest New Zealand company is 
relatively small. New Zealand is also of interest because of its Western culture and 
close trading relationships with Asia. The research investigates the affect on alliance 
performance of each of three influences: partner asymmetry; formation of shared 
objectives; and the role of contracts in alliance management. The methodology 
involved both a postal survey of 300 major businesses and multi-case study design 
covering a range of industries. Contrary to other studies, findings here indicate that 
firms can have positive experiences of partner asymmetries and seek partners on this 
basis. The process by which alliance objectives are set and the role of management 
contracts geared to these objectives are also shown to have an influence of alliance 
performance. 
1.1 AIM OF THE THESIS 
CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research is to develop empirically-based conceptual 
frameworks on international strategic alliance management and performance. Even 
though an extensive strategic alliance literature exists, the review of the literature 
identifies research questions based on gaps in our understanding ofthe persistence of 
asymmetric alliances; and what factors influence their management and performance. 
These research questions are used to guide the overall research, and they are as 
follows: 
Partner Asymmetries: 
1) Why are so many international alliances between well-intentioned partners 
unsuccessful? 
Strategic Alliance Objectives: 
2) How do strategic alliance objectives affect alliance performance? 
Strategic Alliance Contracts: 
3) How do formal strategic alliance contracts affect alliance perfonnance? 
An extensive literature exists on both international and domestic strategic 
alliances, but most studies focus on larger companies from the triad of Europe, the 
United States and Japan. This study deviates from this mainstream by focusing on 
international strategic alliances involving New Zealand companies. Even the largest 
companies in New Zealand are relatively small by international standards. 
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New Zealand, being a small economy, depends heavily on international 
business, mostly in the form of exporting (Akoorie and Enderwick 1992). At the same 
time, the substantialliberalisation of the New Zealand economy since 1984 has 
according to Akoorie and Enderwick (1992, p51) "accelerated the integration of New 
Zealand within the world economy." More and more New Zealand firms have come to 
recognise that, as a result of the increased competition in the domestic market, they 
need to enter foreign markets. According to Ohmae (1993, p36) "globalization 
mandates alliances, makes them absolutely essential to strategy." 
While this thesis focuses on international strategic alliances involving New 
Zealand companies, the research questions pursued are identified and justified from a 
review of the strategic alliance literature. The findings of this study are therefore 
relevant not only for New Zealand companies, but also for companies from other parts 
of the world. 
This study should be viewed in light of the fact that a large number of 
companies report limited success with strategic alliances (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991, 
1995). Bleeke and Ernst (1995, p97) claim that "the median life span for alliances is 
only about seven years, and nearly 80% of joint ventures - one of the most common 
alliance structures - ultimately end in a sale by one of the partners." Along similar 
lines, Spekman et al. (1995) suggest that as many as 60% of all alliances fail. Even so, 
more and more companies are entering into various forms of strategic alliances such as 
joint ventures, co-marketing agreements, licensing agreements, research and 
3 
development agreements and consortiums both with international as well as with 
domestic partners. Strategic alliances are likely to be particularly important for 
companies from a small and isolated country like New Zealand where the domestic 
market is small and where major foreign markets are remote. Ohmae (1993, p36) 
suggests that "alliances are not tools of convenience. They are important, even critical, 
instruments of serving customers in a global environment." 
The figure overleaf shows how the three research questions identified earlier in 
this chapter fit in with the core theoretical dimensions of strategic alliance research. 
Partner 
Asymmetries 
Figure 1 
Core Theoretical Dimensions of Strategic Alliance Research 
Motives for Strategic 
Alliance Formation 
1 Alliance 
r---------------~ ~ _. O __ bJ_·e_c_ti_ve_s~ 
Partner Selection! _____ 
Partner Characteristics ~ ,--..,,-_1 __ ---. 
~ Controll 
/ '--C_o_n_fl_i_ct-----1 
Strategic Alliance 
Performance 
Adapted from Parkhe (1993a, p230). 
.. 
Alliance 
Contracts 
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This study employs a mixed research methodology of a postal survey followed 
by case studies. The postal survey involved 300 New Zealand companies, and was 
followed by case studies of 14 firms selected from the respondents. The selection of 
the 14 case studies was based on extreme cases (Patton 1990, p169; Pettigrew 1988), 
and the case studies represent a variety of industries. By combining the more general 
data from a large number of firms with the more detailed data from a few firms, the 
researcher is able to draw a more extensive picture of the phenomena under 
investigation than if only one research methodology had been used. 
1.2 DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
The definition ofthe word international is straight forward. It is usually 
understood to mean "involving two or more nations". The meaning ofthe Latin word 
"cooperare" is a goal-oriented joint activity of two or more persons (Gerybadze 1994, 
p 15), but even so, there is no consensus in the literature on the definition of a strategic 
alliance (The Alliance Analyst 1996, Faullmer 1995, p7, Gordon 1995, Smith et al. 
1995). Here are three examples: 
... any governance structure involving an incomplete contract between 
separate firms and in which each partner has limited control. (Gomes-
Casseres 1996, p34) 
... we define a strategic alliance as possessing simultaneously the following 
three necessary and sufficient characteristics: 
- The two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed upon 
goals remain independent subsequent to the formation of the 
alliance. 
- The partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control 
over the performance of assigned tasks. 
- The partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or 
more key strategic areas, e.g. technology, products and so forth. 
(Yoshino and Rangan 1995, p5) 
... a close, long-term, mutually beneficial agreement between two or more 
partners in which resources, lmowledge and capabilities are shared with the 
objective of enhancing the competitive position of each partner. 
(Spekman et aL 1995, p4) 
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It follows that because of the differences in the definition of strategic alliance, a given 
business relationship may be seen as a strategic alliance by some researchers, but not 
by others (Gordon 1995). It can be seen from the definitions given above that applying 
the definition provided by Yoshino and Rangan (1995, p5) will result in relatively few 
business relationships being classified as strategic alliances, while on the other hand, 
applying each of the other two definitions will result in a much larger number of 
business relationships being classified as strategic alliances. 
Spekman et al. (1995, p4) suggest that despite the lack of an agreed upon 
strategic alliance definition in the literature, it is possible to identify some prominent 
themes among the various definitions used by authors. In particular, they identify three 
such themes: 
1) The alliance has goals that are both compatible and directly related 
to the partners' strategic intent. 
2) The alliance has the commitment of, and access to, the resources of 
its partners. 
3) The alliance represents an opportunity for organizational learning. 
These themes are reflected in their own definition given above. 
So far we have been concerned with how academic researchers define 
international strategic alliances. However, in order for researchers and strategic 
alliance practitioners to communicate in a meaningful way, it is also necessary to ask 
how strategic alliance practitioners define the tenn. Gordon (1995) found that there 
seems to be little consensus among alliance practitioners as well. However, most of 
the practitioners she interviewed agreed that licensing agreements, co~marketing 
agreements, research and development agreements and joint ventures are all fonns of 
strategic alliances. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of strategic alliances proposed by 
Spekman et al. (1995, p4), (" ... a close, long-tenn, mutually beneficial agreement 
between two or more partners in which resources, knowledge and capabilities are 
shared with the objective of enhancing the competitive position of each partner"), will 
be adopted. Furthennore, the following cooperative business relationships will be 
considered as strategic alliances: licensing agreements, co~marketing agreements, 
research and development agreements, joint ventures and consortiums. Finally, the 
adjective international means that at least two of the alliance partners are of different 
nationality. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This section provides a brief introduction to the three main research areas 
focused on in this study. These are partner asymmetries, alliance objectives and 
alliance contracts. 
1.3.1 PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
8 
Faulkner (1995, p33) holds that "the choice of partner is clearly likely to be the 
main issue in the success of a joint enterprise," and partner differences (asymmetries) 
are an integral part ofthis issue. Furthermore, Parkhe (1991) suggests that there are 
two types of interfirm diversity present among the partners in international strategic 
alliances, and he refers to these as type I and type II diversity. Type I diversity 
includes the interfirm differences that international strategic alliances are specifically 
formed to take advantage of. According to Parkhe (1991, p580), "these differences 
form the underlying strategic motivations for entering into alliances." On the other 
hand, type II diversity refers to the differences in partner characteristics that may have 
a negative effect on strategic alliance performance. Parkhe (1991, p580) suggest that 
"type II differences, though inevitably present at the initiation of an alliance, may be 
overcome by iterative cycles of learning that strengthen the partnership." This study 
addresses the research question of how partner asymmetries influence partner 
behaviour and strategic alliance outcome. 
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1.3.2 ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES 
Several managers with extensive experience of international strategic 
alliances focus on alliance objectives during the alliance formation process. This is the 
view on alliance objectives of a New Zealand firm with considerable experience of 
international strategic alliances: 
You have to agree where the joint venture is going. One ofthe things is really 
definition of individual and mutual objectives. It must be clear, don't hide the 
fact that you want to actually get a higher transfer price for your ingredients 
going in for example. You may have to offset some arrangements in markets 
against that, but you are better off with these things out in the open, rather than 
having hidden agendas. So that is pretty critica1.lndividuals' objectives are 
always different. You can't have a partner who says that it is my objective to 
increase the wealth of the New Zealand dairy fanner. It is our objective. Or the 
other way around, it is his objective to increase the wealth of his shareholders, 
it may be himself or his family or a whole group of public shareholders. It is 
our objective to increase the wealth of our shareholders. You need to do that 
right up front rather than say that we will fix it later on, none of these things 
are fixed later on, they fall over. 
The management literature seems to agree with the alliance managers that it is 
important for the alliance partners to agree on alliance objectives, and some authors 
point out that to do so is not easy. However, none of the authors seem to offer any 
suggestions on how the challenge can be managed. This study explores the question of 
how strategic alliance objectives affect alliance performance. 
1.3.3 ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
Some experienced alliance managers warned against attempting to run 
strategic alliances by contracts alone, and this is how one manager expressed his 
expenence: 
10 
If it [a strategic alliance] needs a long contract, then I think you are on the 
wrong track. So my final principle there is that the agreements are almost 
worthless, they [strategic alliances] really only work when both parties have a 
mutual benefit and shake hands and the principals are actively supporting it. 
The academic research literature has not involved itself with the topic of 
alliance contracts and their role in the strategic alliance formation process to any large 
extent. One could argue that this is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that many 
companies spend considerable resources on alliance contracts and agreements during 
the strategic alliance formation process. 
1.3.4 ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
The alliance literature report high failure rates of strategic alliances. For 
example, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) hold that cross-border alliances have roughly a 50% 
rate of success. However, Gomes-Casseres (1987) suggests that termination occurs 
with about the same frequency both for joint ventures and for wholly owned 
subsidiaries. The difference for joint ventures is the tendency for one partner to 
increase its position at the expense ofthe other. Furthermore, it is important to point 
out that not all terminated alliances suffer from poor performance. Some alliances are 
terminated because they have fulfilled their objectives or because they have come to 
the end of their useful life. 
Anderson (1990, p29) claims that "many parent firms evaluate immature 
ventures too formally, with too much emphasis on financial criteria and not enough 
emphasis on input measures. The results are likely to be premature termination or a 
cutback in commitment before a venture has had time to realize its potential." 
The two terms "alliance outcome" and "alliance performance" are used 
11 
interchangeably in this thesis. Both terms are understood to have the same meaning. 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis includes seven chapters which fall into two distinct parts. The first 
part, involving chapters 2,3 and 4, is an aggregate quantitative study, while the second 
part, involving chapters 5 and 6, draws on the experiences of selected companies. 
Chapter two reviews the international strategic alliance literature and 
demonstrates a necessity for research in the main topic areas. Chapter three develops 
an appropriate research method to handle the research questions developed in chapter 
two. The research method developed involves a mixed methodology consisting of 
survey research followed by case study research. Chapter four presents and discusses 
the results obtained from the analysis of the data acquired from the postal survey 
which is stage one ofthe mixed research methodology. Chapter five then goes on to 
present and discuss the results from stage two of the research design, the case studies. 
Chapter six compares the findings from the case studies developed in chapter five with 
the management literature on strategic alliances. The chapter aims to establish whether 
or not current alliance practices are in line with those prescribed in the management 
literature. Chapter seven is the final chapter of the thesis. It is divided into four main 
sections: a summary of overall findings, managerial implications, research limitations 
and suggestions for future research. 
12 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
International strategic alliances are being fonned at an increasing rate 
worldwide (Bleeke and Ernst 1995). However, New Zealand companies involved in 
international strategic alliances have received relatively little attention from 
researchers. The few published studies which are available have tended to be either 
country or industry specific, or concerned with foreign market entry strategies. 
Cockroft (1990) found that international joint ventures (one fonn of an international 
strategic alliance) were being used successfully by New Zealand companies as a 
means of gaining entry to a foreign market. French (1993) established that New 
Zealand construction companies have been involved in international joint ventures for 
some 30 years. Initially these ventures enabled the New Zealand companies to gain 
knowledge from their foreign partners while jointly undertaking projects in New 
Zealand. The New Zealand companies then ventured overseas with their newly 
acquired knowledge and entered into joint ventures with domestic firms in foreign 
markets. Kai Ming Au and Enderwick (1994) studied New Zealand companies 
involved in joint ventures in China. They concluded that the New Zealand joint 
ventures had a high casualty rate. Two contributing factors were offered: 1) New 
Zealand companies have limited international investment experience, and 2) New 
Zealand companies are small (and so especially prone to problems due to partner 
asymmetry). Coviello and Munro (1995) studied international market development by 
New Zealand software exporters and found various forms of international strategic 
alliances to be common modes of achieving foreign market entry. 
This chapter reviews the following three major topic areas within the general 
context of international strategic alliances: 
(a) internationalizing the firm; 
(b) explanations of international strategic alliances; and 
(c) partner asymmetries 
The literature review will summarise the relevant literatures and demonstrate a 
necessity for further research in the topic areas. Most strategic alliance research has 
primarily used large sample survey methods. There is therefore a need for case study 
research, ie. research designed to answer 'how' type questions. New Zealand is a 
small and isolated country and the domestic market is therefore small. At the same 
time, the physical distance to all foreign markets is considerable. As such, the 
formation of international strategic alliances as a mode of internationalizing New 
Zealand firms is seen as a timely and relevant research area. Another factor 
contributing to this is the liberalisation of trade implemented by New Zealand 
governments particularly since 1984. Furthermore, while the topic of partner 
asymmetries has received considerable empirical interest from international 
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researchers, the research seems to be fragmented in that many different dimensions of 
partner asymmetries have been considered. 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE FIRM 
The purpose of this section is to locate the strategic alliance within the theories 
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of international business development. Internationalization is the process of increasing 
involvement in international operations across borders (Welch and Luostarinen 1988). 
In terms of the relevance of internationalizing the firm as a research area, Lyles 
(1990) surveyed academic researchers in strategic management and found that 
multinational and global strategies was seen as the area having the most impact on 
strategic research in the next ten years. Furthermore, Dunning (1995, p481) suggests 
that "the growing significance of inter-firm partnering and of networking is 
demanding a reexamination of traditional approaches to our understanding of the 
extent and form of international business activity." 
McKiernan (1992, pp110-111) holds that the theories of internationalization 
can be divided into four general categories as set out in the table below: 
Table 1 
Theories of Internationalization 
International Trade and International 
Trade Theories Investment Investment Network Theory 
Theory Theories 
• Mercantilism • Based on Product • Foreign Direct • The Firm is at the 
• Classical Theory Life Cycle Model Investment Based Centre of a Web 
• Absolute on Market of Business 
Costs Imperfections: Relationships 
• Comparative • Structural 
Costs • Transaction 
• Hecksher-Olin Costs 
Theory of • Foreign Direct 
Factor Investment Based 
Endowments on Product Life 
Cycle Model 
• Stage Models of 
Internationa-
lization 
Adapted from McKiernan (1992, ppllO-1l1). 
The international trade theories are concerned with the country as the unit of analysis 
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and this is also the case for trade and investment theory which is based on Vemon's 
(1966) product life cycle model. On the other hand, the intemational investment 
theories use the finn as the unit of analysis. However, the product life cycle model 
(Vemon 1966) can also according to McKieman (1992, plIO) be considered as an 
intemational investment theory. Along the same lines, Melin (1992) argues that the 
product life cycle model takes both the company level and the country level into 
account, although it has its main focus on the country level. Since this thesis is mainly 
concemed with the finn as unit of analysis, the focus ofthe remainder of this section 
will be on the intemational investment theories and the network theory. 
Foreign Direct Investment Theory 
Foreign direct investment is the movement between countries of the resources 
needed for production of goods and services (McKieman 1992, p90). The resources in 
question are finn-specific assets such as capital, labour, managerial skills, and 
technological and production know-how. The focus of foreign direct investment 
theory is primarily to explain how organizations pursue investments in order to 
increase return, decrease costs and decrease risks. 
One foreign direct investment theory is based on market imperfections. There 
are two fonns of market imperfections: structural imperfections (Hymer 1976), and 
transaction costs (Williamson 1975). Another theory of foreign direct investment is 
based on Vernon's (1966) product life cycle model. 
In tenns of explaining international strategic alliances, foreign direct 
investment theory seems to suffer from an important limitation in that it does not 
explain the different fonns of foreign direct investment like wholly owned subsidiaries 
and j oint venture (a type of strategic alliance) companies. 
Stage Models of Internationalization 
Stage models of internationalization have been referred to by researchers as 
internationalization process models (Melin 1992) and theory of internationalization 
(Fina and Rugman 1996). The stage model of internationalization briefly discussed 
here is the model developed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977,1990) and referred to as 
the Uppsala Internationalization Model. In this model, the internationalization ofthe 
firm is seen as a process in which the firm gradually and in stages increases its 
international involvement. The firm goes through a number of logical stages of 
international behaviour based on its gradual acquisition, integration and use of 
knowledge about the foreign market and operations in that market. The firm will 
successively increase the commitment of resources to the foreign market. 
As for foreign direct investment theory, the stage models of 
internationalization does not explain the different forms of foreign direct investment 
like wholly owned subsidiaries and joint venture (a type of strategic alliance) 
companies. The theory is therefore restricted in explaining international strategic 
alliances. 
Network Theory 
A relatively new perspective on the internationalization process of the firm is 
that of network theory. The theory is also referred to as industrial networks theory. 
According to Easton (1992) the general picture is of a firm at the centre of a web of 
business relationships which both constrain it and provide opportunities. These 
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business relationships are fonned with stakeholders like for example customers, 
competitors, suppliers, distributors, agents and consultants as well as with regulatory 
and public agencies. Along the same lines, industries can be seen as networks of 
business relationships comprising a number of different business actors. It is also 
possible to distinguish the different industrial networks at the country level (Johanson 
and Vahlne 1990). Furthennore, the actors are tied to each other through a number of 
different types of bonds like for example technical, social, cognitive, administrative, 
legal and economic (Johanson and Vahlne 1990). 
HMcansson (1992) holds that networks are always changing, never complete or 
in equilibrium. Along the same lines, Johanson and Vahlne (1992) state that networks 
are not transparent. It is therefore difficult for outside observers to fully understand 
what goes on within a specific network. However, all actors have a fairly clear view of 
their own relationships. Furthennore, Hakansson and Johanson (1988) suggest that 
networks are not designed by any single actor according to a master plan or strategic 
decision. Rather, networks emerge and develop as a consequence ofinteraction 
between semiautonomous interdependent actors. 
Intemationalisation ofthe finn, according to the industrial network approach, 
means that the finn establishes and develops network positions in foreign markets. 
Axelsson and Johanson (1992) hold that this can be done in three different ways: 
1) Through establishment of positions in relation to counterparts in 
country-based networks that are new to the finn, for example by 
international extension of foreign market entry. 
2) By further developing positions in those country-based networks in 
which the fum already has a position, i.e. penetration. 
3) By increasing coordination between positions in different country-
based networks, i.e. international integration. 
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It follows that the finn's progress towards internationalization is, to a large extent, 
dependent on its current network positions. Johanson and Vahlne (1990) suggest that 
the internationalizing finn is initially part of a network that is primarily domestic, and 
the finn seeks to internationalize its operations by developing business relationships in 
networks in other countries. 
There is a strong link between network theory and international strategic 
alliances. According to network theory the finn can be seen at the centre of a web of 
business relationships (Easton 1992). Many of these relationships can be considered as 
cooperative in nature, for example in the fonn of exchanges of infonnation. However, 
the cooperation is of an infonnal nature since the relationships tend not to be 
fonnalised in the fonn of legal contracts or explicit understandings. Instead, the actors 
are tied to each other through a number of different types of bonds like for example 
technical, social, cognitive, administrative, legal and economic (Johanson and Vahlne 
1990). Furthennore, networks are always changing, never complete or in equilibrium 
(HMmnsson 1992). On the other hand, strategic alliances can be considered as 
cooperative relationships which have been fonnalised in the fonn oflegal contracts or 
explicit understandings. Both fonnal and infonnal cooperation is shown in the figure 
on the next page. 
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Adapted from Easton et al. (1993, p218). 
Hakansson and Johanson (1988, p377) state that there is a tendency among 
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firms to use formal cooperation, in other words strategic alliances, instead of informal 
cooperation in international business because "there are fewer developed channels for 
informal market communication between countries than within countries". 
Furthermore, Hakansson and Johanson (1988) suggest that formal cooperation will be 
used in situations where the firm wants to clearly demonstrate its presence in the 
network ofthe firm's foreign partner. The message can be directed at competitors 
("this market is nothing for you") or at a number of other stakeholders like customers, 
suppliers or authorities. On the other hand, informal cooperation can be used in 
situations where the firm wants to avoid visibility for example in order to avoid 
competitive moves by competitors. 
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2.3 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Several other theoretical frameworks can be used to explain the formation of 
strategic alliances, and it is unlikely that any single theory can fully explain the 
complexities of strategic alliances (Ahem 1991, p52, Glaister and Buckley 1996, 
Kogut 1988, Parkhe 1993b, and Smith et aL 1995). The three theoretical frameworks 
of strategic alliances that are most often referred to in the strategic alliance literature 
are listed in Table 2 below. These three theories as well as two other theories which 
have also been used to explain the formation of strategic alliances will be overviewed 
next. 
Table 2 
Theoretical Frameworks of Strategic Alliances 
• Transaction Cost Theory 
• Resource Dependence Theory 
• Resource Based View of the Firm Theory 
• Other Theoretical Frameworks 
2.3.1 TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) state that the principal theoretical 
approach used by researchers to understand strategic alliances is transaction cost 
theory. The transaction cost framework has to a large extent been developed by 
Williamson (1975, 1985). A major building block in Willamson's work is that of 
Coase (1937) who, in his effort to explain the existence of firms, suggests that the 
market and the firm are alternative forms of coordination of activities. Furthermore, 
the economic transaction itself, and not the firm, is seen as the fundamental unit of 
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analysis in the transaction cost literature. The central question is, according to Glaister 
(1996), whether any given transaction can be undertaken at a lower cost via a market 
or within a hierarchy (firm). If the costs of undertaking the transaction via the market 
are high, then the firm can gain economic benefits by internalising the transaction 
within its own organisation. Williamson (1975) states that there are a set of 
environmental factors as well as a set of human factors that may influence the firm to 
by-pass the market and instead undertake the transaction within its own organisation. 
Yet another critical dimension in transaction cost economics is that of asset 
specificity. To summarise transaction cost theory in a few words, according to Kogut 
(1988, p320), "simply stated, Williamson proposes that firms choose how to transact 
according to the criterion of minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs." 
From a transaction cost perspective, strategic alliances are seen as governance 
structures that fall in between the market and the firm (hierarchy). A firm may enter 
into a strategic alliance in order to undertake a particular activity when that activity 
can not be efficiently carried out within the firm, and at the same time, a purchase in 
the market is too expensive or even impossible. 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) are somewhat critical of transaction cost 
economics as an explanation for strategic alliance formation. They find the framework 
effective in explaining vertical integration among suppliers and buyers in mature 
industries, like for example automobile manufacturing, but the authors also claim that 
"the logic of transaction cost minimization does not capture many of the strategic 
advantages of alliances such as learning, creation of legitimacy, and fast market 
entry." 
This view is to a large extent shared by Spekman and Sawhney (1990) as well as by 
Zajac and Olsen (1993). FurthelIDore, Thorelli (1986) sees a weakness with 
transaction cost economics itself, rather than with the issue of the theory as an 
explanation for strategic alliance fOlIDation. Thorelli (1986, p44) suggests that 
transaction cost economics "may be overly polarized in that it deals somewhat 
skimpily with the rich institutional arrangements in the many types of markets 
encountered between the spot transaction and total intemalisation." 
2.3.2 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
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The most important premise of resource dependence theory is that an 
organisation's ability to survive is dependant upon its ability to acquire and maintain 
the resources it needs (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In that sense, organisations depend 
on their environments. Ahem (1991, pp57-58) suggests that the two focal issues in 
resource dependence theory are the way the environment constrains the filID, and the 
filID'S response to its environment. In a broad sense, according to Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), an organisation's environment is the total of organisations and individuals that 
are related to it in any way. How well a filID responds to changes in its environment, 
like for example increased competition, will to a large extent detelIDine whether or not 
the filID survives. It follows therefore that filIDS, in order to be effective, will try to 
reduce environmental uncertainty. FurthelIDore, Glaister and Buckley (1996, p307) 
suggest that "the central thrust of resource dependency explanations is to extend the 
filID'S domain of control - this can be proxied by vertical links and risk sharing." 
From a resource dependence perspective, the fOlIDation of a strategic alliance 
can be explained as an effort to reduce environmental uncertainty and to gain control 
over resources that are important to the organisation. 
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One weakness with resource dependence theory as an explanation for strategic 
alliances is that the theory does not seem to capture the motive oftechnology transfer. 
2.3.3 RESOIJRCE BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM THEORY 
The resource based view of the firm theory sees firms as bundles of resources 
(Wernerfelt 1984, Peteraf 1993), and these resources are varied in composition 
(Mahoney and Pandian 1992). Firms gain competitive advantage by managing their 
resources (Harrison et al. 1993, Peteraf 1993). The potential for resources to result in 
sustained competitive advantage is according to Barney (1991) a function of their 
value, rareness, inimitability and nonsubstitutability. These qualities of a firm's 
resources are briefly explained below. 
Barney (1991) uses the word value to mean that a firm resource which is 
valuable exploits opportunities andlor neutralizes threats in a firm's environment. This 
view, according to Barney, is in line with the "strengths-wealmesses-opportunities-
threats" model of firms performance. This model holds that firms are able to better 
their performance only when their strategies exploit opportunities or neutralize threats. 
It follows that valuable firm resources held by many competing firms cannot 
be sources of competitive advantage. This is so because these firms will then have the 
ability to exploit that resource in the same way. A firm resource must therefore be rare 
among a firm's competitors in order to be a possible source of competitive advantage. 
In addition to being valuable and rare, a firm resource must also be imperfectly 
imitable. In other words, a firm that do not possess the resource cannot obtain it. 
Barney (1991) suggests that firm resources can be imperfectly imitable for one or a 
combination of 3 reasons. These are (a) the ability of a firm to obtain a resource is 
dependent upon unique historical conditions, (b) the lillie between the resources 
possessed by a firm and a firm's sustained competitive advantage is causally 
ambiguous, or (c) the resource generating a firm's advantage is socially complex. 
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The fourth and final requirement for a firm resource to be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage is, according to Barney (1991, p.1l1), that "there must be no 
strategically equivalent valuable resources that are themselves either not rare or 
imitable." Barney suggests that two firm resources are strategically equal in value 
when each can be exploited separately to implement the same strategies. 
The resource based view of the firm perspective is the most useful theory to 
use to explain the formation of strategic alliances because the logic behind strategic 
alliance formation is for the partners to take advantage of each others resources. The 
resource base is increased by the formation of strategic alliances. By taking advantage 
of each others resources, the total resource base available to each alliance partner 
becomes greater. It follows that with a greater resource base, the higher is the potential 
for one or more of these firm resources to become, or continue to be, a source of 
sustained competitive advantage. There are a number of ways this could take place. 
One situation is where a firm possessing a firm resource giving it sustained 
competitive advantage in its home market uses this firm resource to exploit 
opportunities in a foreign market by entering into an alliance with a foreign firm 
having superior lmowledge of or exclusive access to this market. Since the foreign 
firm has superior lmowledge of or exclusive access to (through local legislation for 
example) its home market, the other firm would not be able to access this market on 
its own. 
There are support from a number of studies, like Faullmer (1995) and Gordon 
and Berg (1996), for using the resource based view of the firm theory to explain the 
formation of strategic alliances. 
This thesis is not only focusing on alliance formation. There is also an 
emphasis on the reasons for alliance failure and alliance termination. The resource 
based view of the firm theory does not help us to understand why strategic alliances 
fail or are short-lived. These matters are explored later in the thesis. 
2.3.4 OTHER THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
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The three theoretical frameworks of strategic alliances overviewed above are 
the three frameworks most often referred to in the strategic alliance literature. 
However, other theories have also been used to explain the formation of strategic 
alliances. Parkhe (1993b, p320) suggests that "the deductive power of game theory 
can potentially contribute extremely useful insights into enhancing the stability, 
longevity, and performance levels of strategic alliances." Furthermore, Hamel (1991) 
and Kogut (1988) suggest that organisational learning is a suitable framework for 
explaining why firms enter into strategic alliances. In particular, Kogut (1988, p330) 
says that "organisational learning should apply reasonably well to explain [joint] 
ventures in industries undergoing rapid structural change, whether due to emergent 
technologies which affect industry boundaries or the entry of new (and perhaps 
foreign) firms." 
2.4 WHY FIRMS FORM INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
The alliance literature has addressed the issue of why firms enter into 
international strategic alliances from two different angles. First, by looking at the 
alliance partners' alliance motives (see for example Contractor and Lorange 1988), 
and second, by considering theoretical explanations of strategic alliances (see for 
example Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). 
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Glaister and Buckley (1996) suggest that alliance partners' alliance motives or 
objectives tend not to map neatly on to strategic alliance theory. The two authors 
(Glaister and Buckley 1996, p303 ) suggest that "the transition from overall theoretical 
perspective to the firm's strategic motives is not a straightforward one as the 
theoretical approaches do not map directly on to strategic motive." Furthermore, 
Glaister and Buckley (1996) maintain that researchers building theory are mainly 
concerned with issues other than the firm's motivation. It is therefore necessary to 
discuss both motives for strategic alliance formation and theoretical explanations of 
strategic alliances. 
2.4.1 MOTIVES FOR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE FORMATION 
Th_~r~seems to be some consensus in the~tra!egic alliance literature that one 
oftge n:J.aj0l'"_clri"ers, on a_ll1~cro level, of strategic alliance formatiojlsj~14e_ 
globalization of markets and technologies which is leading to inte!l~~gloQal 
competition. This is taking place at a rapid rate in many are(i13 of the world. See for 
example Gomes-Casseres (1996, pI), Faulkner (1995, p3), Yoshino and Rangan 
(1995, pSI), Bleeke and Ernst (1991), Dunning (1993, p203), Gilroy (1993, p38), 
Jarillo (1993, p7), Ohmae (1993), Lorange and Roos (1992, pI6), and Contractor and 
Lorange (1988). 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) suggest that, on a micro level, there are several 
more or less overlapping objectives which strategic alliances can achieve. No 
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distinction is made by the researchers between domestic and international strategic 
alliances. The objectives are set out in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 
Benefits of Strategic Alliances 
• Risk Reduction 
• Economies of Scale and Production Rationalization 
• Exchanges of Complementary Technologies and Patents 
• Co-opting or Blocking Competition 
• Overcoming Government-mandated Investment or 
Trade Barriers 
• Initial International Expansion 
• Vertical Quasi Integration 
• Restructuring 
Adapted from Contractor and Lorange (1988, pIO). 
Risk Reduction 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) hold that strategic alliances can reduce a 
partner's risk by (1) spreading the risk of a large project over more than one finn, (2) 
enabling diversification in a product portfolio sense, (3) enabling faster entry and 
payback, and (4) cost sub additivity. 
New product development, particularly in high technology industries, is an 
example of an activity where finns fonn strategic alliances in order to spread the risk 
of the project over more than one finn (Deeds and Hi111996, Kotabe and Swan 1995). 
For example, Boeing, by many considered to be the world's premier manufacturer of 
commercial jets, teamed up with three Japanese partners to develop the recent Boeing 
777 commercial jet aircraft (Main 1990). 
The fonnation of strategic alliances may enable diversification in a product 
portfolio sense. The finn reduces market risks associated with being reliant on only 
one product or service. An example is oil and gas exploration consortia which are 
common in the oil and gas industry. 
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By fonning a strategic alliance with one or more firms with strong local 
market presence, a firm may be able to enter a specific market and establish a presence 
in that market faster. By doing so, the firm may be able to achieve a shorter pay~back­
period of the investment than if the firm decided to take on the total investment alone. 
In the example of the Boeing 777 mentioned earlier, Boeing's three Japanese partners 
will, beside manufacturing about 20 percent of the airframe, assist Boeing with the 
marketing of the 777 in Japan (Main 1990). Another potential benefit of having a local 
partner has to do with political risk (Contractor and Lorange 1988). If a local partner 
has sufficient political influence, he or she may be able to make sure that the local 
operation does not become the target for local government action or interference. This 
may be of particular importance in some developing countries. 
The total cost of a particular project undertaken by a strategic alliance may be 
less to the strategic alliance as a whole than it would be if each paliner firm should 
undertake the project alone. This is referred to as the cost sub additivity factor. A 
strategic alliance may be in a position to lower the total investment cost of a particular 
project by combining the partners' expertise or take advantage of slack facilities in the 
parent firms (Glaister and Buckley 1996). 
Some researchers do not see risk reduction as an important motivating factor 
for strategic alliance formation. Glaister and Buckley (1996) studied the motives for 
international strategic alliance formation by United Kingdom firms, and concluded 
that risk reduction associated with new proj ects did not appear to be important 
motivating factors for international strategic alliance formation. Gerybadze (1994, 
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p31) holds that risk itself consists of two components: (1) the probability of failure 
(original risk), and (2) the size of potential losses incurred in case of failure 
(consequences). Furthermore, an alliance can not reduce the original risk. "Quite 
contrary, it often works in the opposite direction: through pooling activities, 
independent partners often create additional coordination problems which affect the 
probability of failure in a detrimental way" says Gerybadze (1994, p31). On the other 
hand, collaboration is helpful in affecting the second component of risk, consequences 
(Gerybadze 1994, p31). 
Ring and Van De Ven (1992), in their conceptual paper, discuss what effect the 
level of risk in a deal and reliance on trust between organisations which cooperate 
have on governance structure. Varying combinations of risk and reliance on trust will 
direct the organisations to choose from four different forms of governance structures. 
These are markets, hierarchies, recurrent contracts and relational contracts. Levels of 
risk in deals and reliance on trust between firms tend to change over time. As this 
happens, the firms will change their selection of governance structure. 
Economies of Scale and Production Rationalization 
Strategic alliances allow firms in the same industry to rationalize production 
and thereby reduce costs through economies of scale and learning by doing (Glaister 
and Buckley 1996). Also, the partners in a strategic alliance can benefit from the 
comparative advantage of each partner. For example, if each partner is producing 
product components, production can be transferred to the location with the greatest 
comparative advantage, and thereby lower the cost. The higher component volume 
produced in the location with the highest comparative advantage may lead to a further 
31 
decrease in average unit costs due to economies of large-scale production. These types 
of cooperative arrangements are common in the automobile assembly and automobile 
component industries (Contractor and Lorange 1988). However, Glaister and Buckley 
(1996), in their study of the motives for international strategic alliance formation by 
United Kingdom firms, stated that economies of scale and production rationalization 
did not appear to be important motivating factors for international strategic alliance 
formation. 
Exchanges of Conwlementary Technologies and Patents 
Strategic alliances may be formed in order for the partners to pool their 
complementary technologies. Harrigan (1985, p28) holds that the partners forming a 
strategic alliance may be able to obtain strategic benefits from the exploitation of . 
synergies, technology or other skills transfers. An example of a strategic alliance 
where the partners have pooled their complementary technologies is the joint venture 
formed by General Electric's jet engine subsidiary and Snecma, a French 
manufacturer of military jet engines (Lewis 1990, pp2-3). The joint venture, which is 
owned equally by the two partners, is called CFM International, and it makes engines 
for large commercial jets like those made by Boeing and Airbus. Furthermore, some 
strategic alliances involve one partner with strong technical skills joining forces with a 
partner with strong manufacturing or global marketing skills (Glaister and Bucldey 
1996). The company with the strong technical skills is, in many cases, a smaller firm 
unable to fully exploit their technology on their own due to insufficient manufacturing 
or marketing skills. It is common for smaller firms in the biotechnology industry to 
form strategic alliances with larger counterparts for this reason (Forrest 1990). 
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Co-opting or Blocking Competition 
The formation of a strategic alliance can be used by a company either as a 
defensive or offensive strategy (Glaister and Buckley 1996). The defensive strategy 
involves an effort to reduce competition by, for example, co-opting potential or 
existing competitors into a strategic alliance. However, Gomes-Casseres (1996, p201) 
states that strategic alliances are not well suited to reduce competition since they are 
too fragile and tend to quickly fall apart due to internal conflict. As an alternative, 
Gomes-Casseres (1996, p20l) proposes mergers. Furthermore, as an offensive 
strategy, a strategic alliance can be used by two or more partners in an effort to put 
pressure on the profits and market share of a common competitor. According to 
Contractor and Lorange (1988), this is exactly what Caterpillar and Mitsubishi did in 
Japan. Both wanted to put pressure on the profits and market share of their common 
competitor Komatsu, in Komatsu's important home market, Japan. By doing so, 
Caterpillar was hoping to reduce the competitiveness of Komatsu outside of Japan. 
Overcoming Government-mandated Investment or Trade Barriers 
Beamish (1988, pp11-12) claims that one of the oldest and still most common 
motives for strategic alliance formations is accommodating host government policy. 
Many governments, particularly those in developing countries, will only give a foreign 
company access to their local market if the foreign company enters into a strategic 
alliance (often ajoint venture) with a local partner. One example is China, where some 
industries, including retailing, is blocked for foreign companies without a local partner 
(The Economist 1997b). However, government protectionist policies are not only 
practised by governments in developing countries. According to The Economist 
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(1997a) the main motive behind the 400 or so strategic alliances currently in operation 
(most of these are co-marketing agreements) among the world's airlines is local 
government imposed laws preventing takeovers of airline companies. The Economist 
states that without these laws, these strategic alliances would not exist. 
Initial International Expansion 
This motive has to some extent been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Hill et al. (1990) suggest that there are three distinct modes of foreign market entry 
which dominate the international business literature. These three modes are licensing 
or franchising, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, for the purposes of this thesis, both licensing agreements and joint 
ventures are considered to be forms of strategic alliances. Contractor and Lorange . 
(1988) argue that international expansion is an expensive, difficult and time-
consuming activity, and that in this respect strategic alliances offer considerable time 
savings. In other words, in situations where speed of foreign market entry 
considerations are of importance, the formation of an international strategic alliance 
compared to establishing a wholly owned subsidiary may offer time savings. 
However, not all researchers share this view. For example, Vanhonacker (1997) 
claims that it is faster for a foreign company to establish a wholly owned subsidiary in 
China than it is to enter into a joint venture with a local Chinese company. According 
to Vanhonacker (1997, p136) " ... joint ventures can take years of negotiations to get up 
and running." Furthermore, Glaister and Buckley (1996) suggest that, while 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) propose strategic alliance formation as an entry mode 
for firms undertaking international expansion for the first time, the same argument 
also seems to apply for firms with overseas experience since speed of foreign market 
entry considerations also may be of importance to these firms. 
Vertical Quasi Integration 
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With vertical integration is understood that a firms owns or controls more than 
one stage of the production and distribution chain. It follows that strategic alliances 
can constitute a form of vertical quasi integration in situations where the alliance 
partners each contribute one or more different elements in the production and 
distribution chain (Contractor and Lorange 1988). By doing so, the strategic alliance 
partners may be able to benefit from some of the advantages of vertical integration, 
and, at the same time, avoid some of the disadvantages because each partner 
contributes to the alliance its distinctive competencies. There is a considerable 
literature on vertical integration, and a review of this literature falls outside of the 
scope ofthis thesis. However, some of the major advantages and disadvantages will be 
mentioned briefly. In terms of advantages, Contractor and Lorange (1988) propose 
five major advantages, and these are: (1) avoidance of interfirm contracting, 
transactions, and negotiations costs, (2) cost reductions by way of economies of scale, 
(3) internalizing technological or administrative abilities and secrets within a single 
firm, (4) better understanding ofthe industry as a whole, and (5) technological 
flexibility. On the other hand, some of the major disadvantages to vertical integration 
are: (1) potentially high capital investment costs for one company to bear, (2) an 
increase of fixed costs leading to higher break-even point, (3) lack of marketing or 
technical know how from outsiders, and (4) reduced flexibility to technological and 
environmental change. 
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Nanda and Williamson (1995) propose yet another benefit of strategic 
alliances. In particular, the authors are concerned with joint ventures, and they suggest 
that a joint venture can be used as a vehicle for selling basically sound but 
underperforming businesses that do not fit with a firm's core business. They refer to 
these joint ventures as restructuring joint ventures. One important issue facing the 
seller of an underperforming business is how to convey the worth of the business to 
potential buyers in light of its recent underperformance, and this issue makes an 
outright sale less attractive to the seller. A restructuring joint venture is actually a 
phased sale and is meant to be transitory. The main objective of the j oint venture is to 
restructure the business. Furthermore, the potential buyer will, after the joint venture 
has been entered into, have the right to buyout the seller at a price contingent on the 
joint venture's performance. It follows that the buyer does not have to pay a high price 
for the joint venture if it continues to perform poorly even after restructuring. Hence, 
the main advantage to the seller is that they obtain a higher price than at an outright 
sale, given that the joint venture partners have been able to successfully restructure the 
business. Moreover, the main advantage to the buyer is that they may avoid paying an 
excessive price for the business. Another advantage for the buyer is that the joint 
venture allows them to learn from their j oint venture partner and thereby gain an 
understanding of the business prior to running it by themselves. However, Bleeke & 
Ernst (1995) argue that there may potentially be some important disadvantages for the 
seller as well. They hold that it may be difficult to sell the business to other parties 
than the joint venture partner since other potential buyers are likely to be deterred by 
the difficulty of unwinding the alliance, so the seller is usually unable to orchestrate a 
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bidding process to drive up the acquisition price. 
2.5 PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
This section will be concerned with the issue of partner asymmetries 
(differences) and their implications for international strategic alliance performance. 
Faulkner (1995, p33) suggests that "the choice ofpartner is clearly likely to be the 
main issue in the success of a joint enterprise," and partner differences are an integral 
part of this issue. Faullmer (1995, p33) also argues that the choice ofpartner "is an 
area very difficult to research by means of interviews or questionnaires, since the 
partners in an alliance feel duty bound to assert to an interviewer that they have chosen 
the right partner, even when, in their innermost thoughts, they have real doubts." 
Furthermore, Killing (1983, p56) finds that "making recommendations about 
choosing a partner is a little like advising your daughter on the kind of man she should 
marry. Everyone's taste is different, and the ideal partner for one marriage may be a 
disaster in another." 
Figure 3 on the next page shows the core theoretical dimensions of strategic 
alliance research and their interconnections. The issue of partner asymmetries has 
been added to Parkhe's (1993a) original model in order to show how this issue fits in 
with the overall alliance literature. 
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Figure 3 
Core Theoretical Dimensions of Strategic Alliance Research and Partner Asymmetries 
Partner 
Asymmetries 
Motives for Strategic 
Alliance Formation 
Partner Selection! 
-----+~ Partner Characteristics 
\ 
Strategic Alliance 
Performance 
Adapted from Parldle (1993a, p230). 
~ I Control/Conflict I 
The theoretical dimensions of motives for strategic alliance formation and strategic 
alliance performance have been reviewed earlier in this chapter. 
The remainder of this section is divided into two parts. The first part provides 
an overview of the different forms of partner differences (asymmetries) and explains 
how these differences may influence the performance of a strategic alliance. The 
second part reviews previous research on partner asymmetries and develops several 
hypotheses which will be empirically tested later in the thesis. 
2.5.1 FORMS OF PARTNER ASYNIMETRIES 
Parldle (1991) suggests that there are two types of interfirm asymmetry present 
among the partners in international strategic alliances, and he refers to these two types 
as type I and type II asymmetry. Type I asymmetry includes the interfirm differences 
that international strategic alliances are specifically formed to take advantage of. 
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According to Parkhe (1991, p580), "these differences form the underlying strategic 
motivations for entering into alliances." On the other hand, type II asymmetry refers to 
the differences in partner characteristics that may have a negative effect on strategic 
alliance performance. Parkhe (1991, p580) suggest that "type II differences, though 
inevitably present at the initiation of an alliance, may be overcome by iterative cycles 
of learning that strengthen the partnership." 
The issue of intra-alliance learning is dealt with in the recent conceptual paper 
by Khanna et al. (1998). These authors ascribe alliance failure to a poor understanding 
of the learning dynamics taking place within an alliance. In effect, Khanna et al. are 
seeking to shift the blame for alliance failure away from Parkhe's Type II 
asymmetries. The real cause is the different rate oflearning that one partner can bring 
to assimilating the perceived Type I benefits of the alliance. Such benefits can be 
technology-based but could also include the understanding of a particular market 
segment or territory. As these authors point out, "significantly greater benefits might 
accrue to the firm that finishes learning from its partners before the latter can do the 
same" (Khanna et aI., 1998, p 194). The faster learner can then quit the alliance and 
deny its ally the opportunity to learn from it. The incentive to learn fast depends on the 
proportion of a firm's trading activities that are 'private' i.e., not included in the 
activities that are 'common' to the alliance. It follows that the greatest likelihood of 
disappointing outcomes is when parties to an alliance each have a high proportion of 
their business outside of the alliance. Here each partner has the scope to apply what 
they can learn from the alliance: they each have a strong incentive to be the faster 
learner (at the expense of the other). The least likelihood of disappointment arises 
when most of the benefits of an alliance are' common' to the alliance. This means that 
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the benefits can only accrue to all parties once they have each learned enough to 
synthesise their knowledge bases. So learning in pursuit of common benefits is ajoint 
process with the same rewards for all and no special prize for the winner. 
Table 4 below lists several forms of partner asymmetries. These issues are to 
some extent inter-related. A brief overview of each issue follows next. 
Table 4 
Forms of Partner Asymmetries (Differences) 
• Nationality 
• Corporate Culture 
• Firm Size 
• Core Business 
• Alliance Experience Level 
• Time Perspective 
• Strategic Direction 
• Others 
Differences in nationality or home country is obviously an inherent partner 
difference in international strategic alliances, and as such not a difference experienced 
in domestic strategic alliances. As will be seen in the review of the literature, this issue 
has received considerable attention from researchers. Different partner nationalities 
can be a source oftension and therefore hamper effective collaboration between the 
partners in a number of ways. Examples include differences in languages, social 
customs, business customs, and government policies. Furthermore, Parkhe (1991) 
points out that companies from some countries, like Japan, have a long domestic 
history of cooperating in some areas while competing in others. On the other hand, 
companies from some other countries, like the United States for example, have 
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traditionally been discouraged by their governments from cooperating with each other 
in domestic markets. Moreover, Adler and Graham (1989) conducted a negotiation 
simulation exercise with 462 business executives from the United States, Canada and 
Japan focusing on cross-cultural differences. They concluded that cross-cultural 
negotiations are more difficult than intra-cultural negotiations. 
An issue related to partner nationality is that of corporate culture. Differences 
in corporate culture are not restricted to international strategic alliances alone. Parkhe 
(1991) holds that corporate culture includes those ideologies and values that 
characterize particular organizations. Aspects of corporate culture that can be a source 
oftension in strategic alliances includes decision-making processes and organizational 
structures. 
Another form of partner difference experienced in some strategic alliances is 
firm size. It has been established that small and large firms tend to differ in terms of 
management practices and organizational structures. Small firms tend to be less 
bureaucratic than larger firms, and this could impede the communication process 
between the partners. Furthermore, any partiCUlar strategic alliance may have relative 
little importance to the large partner overall, but at the same time, the strategic alliance 
could be of great importance to the small partner. The small partner may only be 
involved in one strategic alliance, and this alliance could be of great importance in 
terms ofthe small firm's success or even survival. Another issue is access to 
resources. A small partner may not have access to sufficient resources for rapid 
expansion of the strategic alliance should this be necessary. 
Partners from different industries or core businesses may join forces in order to 
undertake research and development. Strategic alliances formed for this purpose are 
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common in the computer, semiconductor and aerospace industries (Olk 1997). 
However, certain practises, such as the level of spending on research and 
development, may be more or less established within an industry, but differ from 
industry to industry. The variation in practises like these could be a source of conflict 
or misunderstanding between the partners. 
Yet another potential source of conflict or misunderstanding between strategic 
alliance partners is the partners' strategic alliance experience level. Harrigan (1985, 
pp356-357) observes that "having experience with previous joint ventures ... the 
experienced managers understood what joint ventures could (or could not) do 
better... the more willing they were for a little give and take to occur in their efforts to 
hammer out a satisfactory joint venture compromise." 
It is well established in the management literature that firms have different 
time perspectives. Corporations from the United States may tend to focus on quarterly 
earnings, while Japanese firms may take a longer view and focus on establishing brand 
names or marketing channels and less on short term earnings. In other words, a 
Japanese partner may allow a newly formed international strategic alliance a longer 
period to establish itself before showing profitability than a United States partner 
typically would. 
Another area of potential conflict between the partners in a strategic alliance is 
the partners' strategic direction. Harrigan (1985, p14) suggests that "asymmetries in 
the speed with which parent firms want to exploit an opportunity, the direction in 
which they want to move, or in other strategic matters are destabilizing to joint 
ventures." 
Some other forms of partner asymmetries (differences) that can have a 
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negative impact on the perfonnance of strategic alliance perfonnance that have been 
mentioned in the strategic alliance literature includes financial and functional strength 
(Bleeke and Ernst 1991, 1995), technical contribution (Olk 1997), and location of the 
strategic alliance (Olk 1997). 
Next follows a review of previous research on the effect of partner 
asymmetries on strategic alliance perfonnance. 
2.5.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
This section will review previous research on the effect of partner asymmetries 
on strategic alliance perfonnance and develop some hypotheses that will be 
empirically tested later in the thesis. 
Partner asymmetry as an explanation for strategic alliance outcome has 
received considerable attention in the literature, and a brief overview is presented in 
Table 5 on the next page. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Studies Examining How Partner Asymmetries (Differences) Affect Alliance Outcome 
Form of Asymmetry (Partner Difference) 
Corporate National Core lIome ~turing Financial Functional Time Technical Research Industry 
Author Culture Culture Firm Size Business Couutry erience Strength Strength Perspective Contribution Location 
Killing Negative Negative Negative (1983) 
Perlmutter Negative & Heenan 
(1986) 
Doz Negative Negative Negative (1988) 
Geringer Negative (1988) 
Harrigan Negative Negative Negative Negative (1988) 
Gomes- Does not specifY any particular forms of asymmetry, but the potential for joint gains is greater the more dissimilar the partners are. 
Casseres 
(1989) 
Bleeke & 
Ernst Negative Negative (1991, 
1995) 
Ganitsky Negative 
et aL 
(1991) 
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Table 5 
( continued) 
Form of Asymmetry (Partner Difference) 
Corporate National Core Home Venturing Financial Functional Time Technical Research Industry 
Author Culture Culture Firm Size Business Country Experience Strength Strength Perspective Contribution Location 
Parkhe There are two types of interfinn asymmetry. ~: Interdependencies (reasons for alliances) and~: Differences that often negatively affect the longevity and 
(1991) effective functioning of alliances 
Forrest & Positive 
Martin 
(1992) 
Depalma Negative Negative (1994) 
Faulkner Positive Negative (1995) 
Gordon & Negative Negative Positive 
Berg 
(1996) 
Fedor & Positive or Positive or Werther Negative Negative (1995) 
Tully Negative Negative (1996) 
Olk Positive Positive Negative Positive (1997) 
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Killing (1983) studied 37 international joint ventures across several industries 
and put forward the hypothesis that partner differences in terms of corporate culture, 
national culture and firm size all will have a negative impact on the performance of a 
strategic alliance. Perlmutter and Heenan (1986) were also concerned with the 
performance of international strategic alliances, but they only considered one form of 
partner differences, national culture. They suggested, like Killing (1983), that a 
difference in national culture will have a negative effect on alliance outcome. Doz 
(1988) also holds a negative view of partner differences in strategic alliances. In his 
study, Doz (1988) found that the odds for a successful outcome are against those 
strategic alliances between larger and smaller firms, as well as those between firms 
that differ in terms of corporate and national cultures. 
Geringer (1988), who studied 90 joint ventures across several industries in 
developed countries, agreed with the earlier researchers in that partner asymmetry in 
terms of firm size tend to have a negative effect on the outcome of the strategic 
alliance. The most extensive study on partner asymmetries to date is that of Harrigan 
(1988). She studied 895 strategic alliances in 23 industries and concluded that 
strategic alliances are more successful when partners are related (in products, markets 
and/or technologies) and also that strategic alliances seem to last longer between 
partners of similar cultures, asset sizes and levels of venturing experience. To 
summarise the research on partner asymmetries reviewed so far, all researchers have 
suggested that all forms of partner differences have a negative influence on strategic 
alliance performance. However, Gomes-Casseres (1989) disagrees with this view, and 
instead suggests that the potential for joint gains in a strategic alliance is greater the 
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more dissimilar the partners are. 
Bleeke and Ernst (1991, 1995), who are management consultants with 
McKinsey & Company, disagree with Gomes-Casseres (1989), and instead suggest 
that strategic alliances between strong and weak companies seldom work. In their 
research, which involved 49 international alliances across several industries, strong 
and weak companies were defined in terms of financial performance and functional 
strengths. Ganitsky et al. (1991) introduce a new form of partner asymmetry into the 
debate, namely that of time perspective. The researchers suggest that partner 
differences in terms oftime perspective will have a negative effect on alliance 
outcome. Like mentioned earlier, Parkhe (1991) suggests that there are two types of 
interfirm asymmetry present among the partners in international strategic alliances, 
type I and type II asymmetry. Type I asymmetry includes the interfirm differences'that 
international strategic alliances are specifically formed to take advantage of. On the 
other hand, type II asymmetry refers to the differences in partner characteristics that 
may have a negative effect on strategic alliance performance. However, type II 
asymmetry may be overcome. In a very simplified way, Parkhe (1991) maintains that 
partner differences may have both a positive and a negative effect on strategic alliance 
performance. 
Forrest and Martin (1992) studied 70 small biotechnology firms in USA and 
Canada involved in co-operative ventures with larger partners. They found that 83% of 
the smaller companies ranked their alliances as moderately to very successful despite 
the difference in firm size. In line with the earlier studies on national and corporate 
culture, Depalma (1994), who only studied one international joint venture, found that 
the joint venture failed because the two partners were unable to bridge the gap 
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between their different national and corporate cultures. Faulkner (1995, pp34-35) has a 
mixed view on partner asymmetries and strategic alliance performance. He proposes 
that firm size difference will have a negative effect on alliance outcome, while on the 
other hand, corporate culture asymmetry will have a positive effect. 
Another study with a mixed outcome is that of Gordon and Berg (1996). They 
studied 35 strategic alliances in the prescription pharmaceutical market in the United 
States. They found that partner asymmetry in terms of home country has a positive 
influence on alliance outcome, while partner asymmetry in terms of both core business 
and firm size has a negative influence on alliance outcome. Fedor and Werther (1995) 
share the view ofParkhe (1991) that inherent partner differences, particularly with 
respect to corporate and national cultures, are potential sources of both unique 
strengths and tensions. 
Tully (1996) studied the strategic alliance between two international airlines, 
KLM from the Netherlands and Northwest from the United States. According to The 
Economist (1997a) this strategic alliance is, from a financial perspective, the most 
successful strategic alliance in the airline industry. However, Tully (1996) claims that 
there are immense differences between the top management of the two partners in 
terms of corporate and national cultures, and that these differences are so severe that 
they may ultimately undermine the whole alliance. Tully (1996, p49) asserts that the 
top management of the two partners do not talk to each other, and he quotes one 
American top executive as saying that "this relationship is dysfunctional." He (Tully 
1996, p49) goes on to quote KLM's President as saying that in terms of philosophies 
of doing business, "it's the European way vs. the American way." 
The most recent study covered in this review is that of Olk (1997). He studied 
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81 strategic alliances fonned in the United States to undertake research and 
development work. Some of the alliances had foreign partners. 01le (1997) concludes 
that partner differences in tenns of technical contribution (skills), industry (core 
business) and nationality all have a positive effect on the perfonnance of the strategic 
alliance. On the other hand, different research locations (i.e. whether or not the 
combined research was perfonned in one central location) were found to be negatively 
associated with alliance perfonnance. 
There are three over-all findings in the literature. First, in tenns of international 
strategic alliances and the internationalization ofthe finn, there is a strong linle 
between network theory and international strategic alliances. According to network 
theory the finn can be seen at the centre of a web of business relationships (Easton 
1992). Many of these relationships can be considered as cooperative in nature. 
The second over-all finding in the literature involves theoretical explanations 
of strategic alliances. The three main theoretical frameworks of strategic alliances are 
transaction cost theory, resource dependence theory and resource based view ofthe 
finn theory. The resource based view ofthe finn perspective is the most useful theory 
to use to explain the fonnation of strategic alliances. This claim is justified earlier in 
this chapter. 
The third over-all finding in the literature involves partner asymmetries. The 
review of previous research on the effect of partner asymmetries on strategic alliance 
perfonnance shows that there are two main over-all findings in the literature. First, 
most prior research has shown that partner asymmetries may negatively impact 
alliance outcomes. Second, the literature is somewhat fragmented in that many 
dimensions of partner differences have been considered. As a result, it is difficult to 
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compare the various studies with each other since they often focus on different forms 
of partner differences. 
The most significant study on partner asymmetries is probably the study by 
Harrigan (1988). In her major study of alliance outcomes, Harrigan (1988) studied 
cross-section data on 895 alliances in 23 industries and issued a general caution 
against forming alliances with partners where there were marked asymmetries in 
cultures, asset sizes, and venturing experiences. There are two points to be made here. 
First, ifpartner asymmetries were so detrimental for alliance outcome, why would so 
many experienced managers continue to enter into such strategic alliances? It is 
something of a paradox oflarge cross-section studies such as Harrigan's can only 
reach their prescriptive conclusions because a sufficiently large number of these 
managers act counter to these prescriptions. Second, it is difficult to envisage how all 
partner asymmetries can be removed from international strategic alliances. In the case 
of a New Zealand firm seeking to ally itself with a technologically superior foreign 
company, the desired partner asymmetry (technology) can only be gained if other 
asymmetries (e.g., culture, asset size, and venturing experience) are accepted. 
The following two hypotheses are put forward as a possible next step for 
researching this area: 
Hypothesis 1: The more similar in size the alliance partners, the better the alliance 
outcome. 
Hypothesis 2: The closer the national cultures of the alliance partners, the better 
the alliance outcome. 
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The issue of the literature being somewhat fragmented is addressed in the above 
hypotheses by focusing on the two major forms of partner asymmetries which are firm 
size and national culture. 
The issue of the alliance partners' national culture is discussed further in the 
next subsection leading to the deVelopment of a third hypothesis. 
2.5.2.1 ALLIANCE FORMATION BY COUNTRY 
From the literature review earlier in this chapter, we have seen that from a 
stage model of internationalization view, the internationalization process of a firm is 
seen as a gradual development taking place in distinct stages and over a relatively long 
period of time (Melin 1992). One often cited model is that developed by Johanson' and 
Vahlne (1977) in which each firm goes through a number oflogical steps of 
internationalizing behaviour. These steps are based on the firm's gradual acquisition, 
integration and use oflrnowledge about foreign markets and operations, and on its 
successively increasing commitment to foreign markets. According to these authors, 
the firm enters new markets with successively greater psychic distance, this being 
defined as the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and to the 
market. Examples of such factors are differences in language, education, business 
practices, culture, and industrial development. Firms therefore typically start their 
internationalization by exporting from their home base to markets they can rather 
easily understand, often in neighbouring countries. 
Since the formation of an international strategic alliance tends to involve a 
larger and more permanent commitment of resources than merely exporting, it is 
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likely that companies will enter into alliances involving those countries with which 
they already have an exporting relationship. This of course applies to each partner and 
leads us to expect that the pattern of international strategic alliances involving a New 
Zealand firm wi11 reflect a high trade flow with New Zealand (exports and/or imports) 
and low psychic distance. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3: The closer the psychic distance and the higher the level of trade with 
a particular country, the more strategic alliances will be entered into with partners 
from that country. 
It is generally accepted that a large number of companies have difficulty in 
maintaining successful international strategic alliances to the mutual benefit of the 
partners involved. We intend to use case studies to better understand both the 
formation and the termination of international strategic alliances. The study of alliance 
failure and alliance termination is exploratory in nature. 
The main contributions of this study are the dual focus on alliance formation 
and alliance failure and termination as well as the dual research methods of survey and 
case studies. 
2.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed the following three major topic areas within the 
general context of international strategic alliances: 
(a) internationalizing the firm; 
(b) explanations of international strategic alliances; and 
(c) partner asymmetries 
The literature review was not limited to international strategic alliances alone as the 
literature on domestic strategic alliances was also reviewed. The review summarised 
the relevant literatures and demonstrated a necessity for further research in the topic 
areas. Three hypotheses were developed to this end. 
The next task is to establish an appropriate research method, and such a 
research method will be outlined in the next chapter. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter develops an appropriate research method to handle the three 
hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. The chapter is divided into four 
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sections. The first section reiterates the three hypotheses. The second section develops 
an appropriate research method, while subsequent sections discuss the research 
method in detail. 
3.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This section reiterates the three hypotheses developed in the literature review. 
The remainder ofthis chapter then focuses on developing an appropriate research 
method. The flow of the research process is outlined in Figure 4 on the next page. 
Figure 4 
Flow of the Research Process 
Research Area 
Identified From 
Personal Interest and 
Experience 
1 
Literature Review 
1 
Research Opportunities 
Identified 
! 
Research Questions 
Developed 
1 
Appropriate Research 
Method Determined 
Adapted from Coviello (1994, p8S). 
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The literature review identified an research opportunity from the international 
strategic alliance literature. This research opportunity involves identifYing how partner 
asymmetries influence the performance of the international strategic alliance. This 
issue has received considerable attention from researchers, but the research seems to 
be inconclusive in that researchers do not agree on what effect partner differences 
have on alliance performance. Furthermore, the research also seems to be somewhat 
fragmented in that the researchers do not necessarily consider the same forms of 
partner differences. The following three hypotheses were developed in the previous 
chapter: 
Hypothesis 1: The more similar in size the alliance partners, the better the 
alliance outcome. 
Hypothesis 2: The closer the national cultures ofthe alliance partners, the 
better the alliance outcome. 
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Hypothesis 3: The closer the psychic distance and the higher the level of trade 
with a particular country, the more strategic alliances will be entered into 
with partners from that country. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on developing an appropriate research 
method to handle the three hypotheses. 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section develops an appropriate research method for this study. Previous 
empirical work on strategic alliances are based on both quantitative (see for example 
Harrigan 1988) and qualitative methodologies (see for example Hamel 1991). On the 
other hand, some researchers have also applied mixed methodologies (see for example 
Ahem 1991 and Coviello 1994). Furthermore, Patton (1990, plO) suggests that "recent 
developments in the evaluation profession have led to an increase in the use of 
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multiple methods, including combinations of qualitative and quantitative data." Patton 
(1990, p193) goes on to say that "using triangulation is recognition that the researcher 
needs to be open to more than one way of looking at things." 
This study employs a mixed research methodology consisting of survey 
research followed by case study research. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
by combining the more general data from a large number of firms with the more 
detailed data from a few firms, a richer picture of the phenomena under investigation 
can be drawn. This point is illustrated in Figure 5 on the next page. 
Figure 5 
Two Stages ofInvestigation 
Population: 
All New Zealand Companies with 
Experience from International 
Strategic Alliances 
1 
Mail Survey: Breadth with Little Depth 
1 
Case 
Studies: 
Depth with 
Little 
Breadth 
The second reason for choosing a mixed research methodology is that by doing the 
investigation in stages, the ftrst research stage assists the second stage. By analysing 
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the data obtained from stage one before entering stage two, the results from stage one 
can be used as a basis for selecting information-rich cases relative to the phenomena 
being studied. This point will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
3.4 STAGE ONE 
Stage one of the investigation involved a mail survey. The survey 
methodology will be discussed in detail in this section. The discussion is divided into 
five subsections: sample, survey response, non-respondents, measures and analytical 
procedures. The discussion of the sample follows next. 
3.4.1 SAMPLE 
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A questionnaire was mailed to 300 New Zealand companies. A copy of the 
questionnaire is attached in the appendix. The sample of 300 was generated by 
combining the 200 largest companies, in terms of turnover, in New Zealand in 1994 
(Management 1994), and all the New Zealand Export Award winnersl. The New 
Zealand Export Award scheme has been in place for a number of years, and it was 
therefore not possible to track down all award winners. Some of the earlier winners 
may have changed name, merged with other company or gone out of business. 
However, we were able to aggregate a mailing list of 100 New Zealand Export Award 
winners. Many of the Export Award winners are small companies even by New 
Zealand standards, so by combining these companies with the 200 largest companies 
in New Zealand, we obtained a sample of companies varying widely in size. The 300 
companies contacted were located all over New Zealand. 
Three measures were taken to encourage companies to take part in the survey. 
First of all, the questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter addressed to an 
individual, either the chief executive officer, the managing director or the general 
manager. Care was taken to make sure that all names were correct, in many cases 
companies were contacted via telephone in order to obtain or verify a person's name 
and title. A copy ofthe cover letter is attached in the appendix. Second, the 
questionnaire was accompanied by a stamped return envelope. Finally, the firms were 
1 Data provided by the New Zealand Trade Development Board 
given an incentive to respond in that they were given the opportunity to receive a 
summary ofthe results of the study. 
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By numbering the questionnaires we were able to identify companies from 
their responses, and this was made clear in the covering letter. Those companies which 
had not responded by the due date set out in the original cover letter received a follow 
up letter asking them to complete the questionnaire. A copy of the follow up letter is 
attached in the appendix. 
As can be seen in the questionnaire, managers were asked to report in detail on 
two of their current international strategic alliances. The two alliances were those with 
the largest and the smallest (in terms of turnover) foreign paliner. If a firm was 
currently involved in only one international strategic alliance, then the firm was asked 
to report on this alliance. 
3 .4.2 SURVEY RESPONSE 
We received a total of 154 (51 %) responses to the survey, and 140 (47%) of 
these were useable providing data on a total of 259 international strategic alliances. 
Most of the 14 responses which were not useable involved companies responding back 
that they did not want to take part in the survey. Of the 140 respondents completing 
the questionnaire, 55 (39%) firms were currently involved in one or more international 
strategic alliance. 
3.4.3 NON-RESPONDENTS 
In order to gain some insight into the non-respondents, fifty of the firms which 
had not taken part in the survey, even after receiving a follow up letter asking them to 
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complete the questionnaire, were randomly selected and sent a third letter. The letter 
simply asked the main reason(s) for their non-response. A copy ofthis letter is 
attached in the appendix. In all 31 ofthe 50 companies responded to this request. The 
main reasons for not responding were 1) lack oftime (49%), 2) company policy not to 
take part in surveys (23 %), and 3) never been involved in a strategic alliance (20%). 
3.5 STAGE TWO 
Stage two involves case studies. The case study methodology will be discussed 
in detail in this section. The discussion is divided into four subsections: key features of 
the case study method, choice of firms, data collection procedures and analytical 
procedures. The discussion of the key features of the case study method follows next. 
3.5.1 KEY FEATURES OF THE CASE STUDY METHOD 
Yin (1994, p 13) has developed a two part defmition of a case study where the 
second part builds on the first part. Here is the first part: 
"A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." 
Furthermore, Yin (1994, p13) goes on to say that 
"The case study inquiry 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulation fashion, and as another result 
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• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis." 
Each of these points will be overviewed next. The first point and the second point are 
related. The first point is that a case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context. This is in contrast with some other research strategies, such 
as experiments (Yin 1994, p13). Researchers performing experiments will often 
attempt to separate a phenomenon from its natural context in order to focus the 
attention on a few variables only. As far as surveys are concerned, Yin (1994, p13) 
suggests that "surveys can try to deal with phenomenon and context, but their ability 
to investigate the context is extremely limited." Furthermore, the second point, which 
in effect is the second part of the first point, is " ... the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident." Yin (1994, p13) holds that most real-life 
situations are characterised by the fact that phenomenon and context can't be easily 
separated. 
The third point is that "the case study inquiry copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data 
points." In effect, this would mean that most statistical methods can't be used. 
The fourth point is that "the case study inquiry relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation fashion." Patton (1990, 
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p187) suggests that "triangUlation is ideal." He is not only referring to data 
triangulation, but also to investigator, methodological and theory triangulation. As far 
as data triangulation is concerned, studies which use different types of data will 
strengthen the validity ofthe findings in that the different types of data provide cross-
data validity checks. In other words, a way of data collection quality control (Romano 
1989). Yin (1994, p79) claims that there are six major types of data: documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical 
artifacts. This thesis will be concerned mainly with interviews. Documentation and 
archival records have been used in preparation for the interviews. 
The fifth and final point is that the case study inquiry "benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis." Yin 
(1994, p27) holds that "for case studies, theory development as part ofthe design . 
phase is essential, whether the ensuing case study's purpose is to develop or to test 
theory." The cases are used to test theory in this thesis. Furthermore, Patton (1990, 
p163) suggests that a review ofthe literature is a good tool for focusing the case study. 
The importance of research focus is also stressed by other researchers like Mintzberg 
(1979) and Eisenhardt (1989). Without a research focus, the researcher risks becoming 
overwhelmed by the volume of data. 
According to Chetty (1996), a weakness ofthe case study method often 
mentioned by researchers is that it provides little basis for scientific generalisation. 
Yin's (1994, plO) response to this is that " ... case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes." Yin 
(1994, plO) also suggests that the case study does not represent a "sample", and the 
researcher's aim "is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not 
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to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)." Furthermore, Chetty (1996, p74) 
also holds that "the strengths of the case study method outweigh its weaknesses." 
Other researchers have also pointed to some limitations of the case study method. Yin 
(1994, p3) and Eisenhardt (1989) both suggest that, as all research strategies, the case 
study method also has limitations. Yin (1994, p7) suggests that the case study method 
is not suitable for certain types of research questions, in particular questions in the 
form of a "how many" or "how much" line of inquiry. Surveys and analysis of 
archival records are likely to be better research strategies for these types of research 
questions. Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989, p547) sees two weaknesses in terms of using 
case study research to build theory. First, the extensive use of empirical evidence may 
result in theory which is overly complex. Second, "building theory from cases may 
result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory." 
The next section discusses the choice of firms for the case studies. 
3.5.2 CHOICE OF FIRMS 
There are no specific rules for how many cases to include using the case study 
method (Eisenhardt 1989; Patton 1990, p184; Yin 1994, p50). Eisenhardt (1989) 
suggests that a number between four and ten cases in most cases works well. She 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p545) finds that it can be difficult to generate theory with less than 
four cases, and on the other hand, with more than ten cases it "quickly becomes 
difficult to cope with the complexity and volume of the data." Moreover, Patton 
(1990, P 184) proposes that the number of cases depends on a number of factors like 
what you want to know, the purpose of the study, what's at stake, what will be useful, 
what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources. 
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Patton (1990, pl86) goes on to say that the ideal is sampling to the point of 
redundancy, but that this may be difficult in reality due to resource constrains. As a 
solution, Patton (1990, p 186) suggests use of judgement and negotiation. Finally, Yin 
(1994, p50) says that the researcher should be concerned with the number of case 
replications he or she wants to have in the study rather than with the typical criteria 
regarding sample size since the concept of sampling logic is not relevant to the case 
study method. Yin (1994, p50) holds that "the selection of the number of replications 
depends upon the certainty you want to have about your multiple-case results, as with 
the higher criterion for establishing statistical significance, the greater certainty lies 
with the larger number of cases." The selection of cases included in this study will be 
discussed next. 
The selection of cases included in this study were based on extreme cases 
(Patton 1990, p169; Pettigrew 1990). The rationale, according to Patton, for focusing 
on extreme cases is that these cases are rich in information because they are unusual or 
special in some way. Obviously, the term "extreme case" can take on several 
meanings. For the purposes of this study, the responses to the postal survey were used 
as a means for selecting extreme cases. As can be seen from the questionnaire in the 
appendix, the respondents were asked "to what extent is the international strategic 
alliance(s) meeting the most important objective?" They were asked to respond on a 
seven point Likert-type scale with one being "much worse than expected" and seven 
being "much better than expected". The question was asked both for current as well as 
for past (terminated) international strategic alliances. Extreme cases were then 
considered to be those international strategic alliances which fell into either the "1,2 or 
3" category or the "5,6 or 7" category. 
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We decided to focus on the extreme cases in two ways. We looked fIrst at 
companies with varied international strategic alliance experiences meaning that they 
had at least one alliance in both of the extreme groups. In other words, the company 
had at least one alliance performing better than expected, and also at the same time, at 
least one alliance performing worse than expected. The second way of looking at the 
extreme cases involved an effort to establish matched fIrms. The idea was to compare 
fIrms having only "better than expected" experience(s) from one or more alliances 
with other fIrms from the same industry having only "worse than expected" 
experience(s) from one or more strategic alliances. After considering all the 55 fIrms 
from the mail survey that were currently involved in at least one international strategic 
alliance, seven fIrms were classifIed as having varied alliance experiences. At the 
same time, four matched fIrm studies were also identifIed. In addition, one possible 
matched fIrm study was identifIed between two companies having diametrically 
opposite experiences from joint ventures established in the same country in Asia at the 
same time, although these companies were operating in different industries. 
Based on the above selection of extreme cases, a total of 17 fIrms were 
approached, and 14 of these were willing to be interviewed. Of the three which 
declined, two declined due to the managing director's busy schedule, while one 
declined giving the reason that "our licensing agreements are insignifIcant and of little 
benefIt to us. There is very little we can tell you about them .... 45 seconds not 45 
minutes is all it would take to tallc about them." Of the fIrms which declined to be 
interviewed, one belonged in the varied alliance experience category, thereby leaving 
that category with six fIrms. The two other fIrms belonged to the matched fIrm 
studies, thereby leaving that category with eight fIrms. However, since the two fIrms 
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declining to participate belonged to different matched firm groups, these two groups 
were broken up, and we were therefore left with three matched firm groups as well as 
with two unattached firms. Incidentally, during the interview process it turned out that 
the firms in one of the matched firms groups did not really belong together after all. 
This was so because the businesses the international strategic alliances were involved 
in were quite different even though both belong to the broad category of agriculture. 
However, one of these firms could be included in another matched firm group since all 
the international strategic alliances formed by the three firms in the group were in the 
same type of business. The case study selection process is set out in the figure below. 
Figure 6 
Selection of Firms for Case Studies 
Mail survey identified 55 firms 
currently involved in at least one 
international strategic alliance 
I 7 "varied experience" firms I 5 "matched" firm studies in-
volving 10 firms in total 
1 
6 firms agreed to 
be interviewed 
1 
6 "varied experience" 
firm case studies 
2 "matched" firm case 
studies involving 5 
firms in total 
8 firms agreed to 
be interviewed 
\ 
3 "unattached" firm 
case studies 
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In summary, the 14 finns to be studied in detail could be considered to fall 
into three different categories. The first category includes six finns with varied 
experiences from international strategic alliances where some alliances are perfonning 
better than expected while others are performing worse than expected. The second 
category includes two matched finn groups, one group including two finns and the 
other group including three finns. The last category includes three unattached finns. 
One finn has experiences from two international strategic alliances perfonning much 
better than expected while the two other finns have experiences from one international 
strategic alliance perfonning worse than expected. A short description of each of the 
finns can be found in the appendix. Furthennore, the finns participating in the case 
studies were located all over New Zealand, and the industries represented are set out in 
table 6 below. 
Table 6 
Industries Represented in the Case Studies 
Industries Number of Firms 
Brewing 1 
Cement 1 
Agricultural Seeds 3 
Dairy Products 1 
Fishing and Fish Processing 1 
Skin Tanning 1 
Electrical Equipment 1 
Automotive Parts 1 
Medical Equipment 1 
Ship Repairs 1 
Food Products 2 
Plastics 1 
Engineering Services 1 
Trading of Agricultural Products and Services 1 
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The number of industries represented in the case studies does not add up since some of 
the New Zealand firms are involved in international strategic alliances in more than 
one industry. 
The number of cases included in this study, 14, is a little higher than the 
maximum number of cases, 10, recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). However, we are 
confident that we will be able to handle the volume of data, particularly since the case 
studies can be considered to fall into three separate subgroups as described above. 
Next follows a discussion ofthe data collection procedures used for this study. 
3.5.3 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
This study will take advantage of three different sources of evidence, and 
thereby obtain data triangulation. As discussed earlier, Patton (1990, pI8?) suggests 
that "triangulation is ideal." Studies which use different types of data will strengthen 
the validity of the findings in that the different types of data provide cross-data 
validity checks. In other words, a way of data collection quality control (Romano 
1989). The three different sources of evidence to be used in this study are interviews, 
documentation and archival records. Each of these will be discussed next. 
The primary type of evidence used for this study is interviews based on open-
ended type questions. A copy of the interview guide is attached in the appendix. We 
sought to interview the person in the New Zealand organisation with the most 
knowledge of their international strategic alliance activities. In all cases this turned out 
to be either the managing director, general manger or chief executive officer, except in 
two cases where the chief operating officer and the group general manager marketing 
were interviewed. In all but three cases only one person from the New Zealand 
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organisation was interviewed. In the remaining three cases two people were 
interviewed, and this was after initiatives from the companies themselves. All 
companies were promised confidentiality in that no material that could identifY their 
identity would be published in any reports. All interviews took place at the firm's 
premises, and the interviews were all recorded on tape. Each interview was followed 
up with either a telephone conversation or a telefax message in order to clarify points 
made during the interview that were unclear. The average duration of the interviews 
were about one hour, with the shortest interview lasting about 45 minutes and the 
longest lasting about two hours. 
The second type of evidence used for this study is what Yin (1994, p81) refers 
to as documentation. There are several types of documents, and the two types used in 
this study are newspaper clippings and articles from mass media (other than 
newspapers). This evidence turned out to be valuable both prior to the interview stage 
and also after the interviews took place. The data were valuable prior to the interviews 
by giving us an understanding of the nature and the background of the international 
strategic alliances prior to the interview. Furthermore, after the interviews, the 
documents served as a means of cross-data validity checks against the two other types 
of data used for the case studies. 
The third type of evidence used for this study is what Yin (1994, p83) refers to 
as archival records. As for documents there are several types of archival records, and 
the types used in this study are annual and quarterly reports published by public 
companies as well as company newsletters. Four of the companies participating in the 
case studies are publicly listed companies, two companies have recently been delisted, 
and one company is a subsidiary of a listed company. Moreover, as for the document 
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data described earlier, the archival records turned out to be valuable both prior to the 
interview stage and also after the interviews took place. The archival records were 
valuable prior to the interviews in tenns of giving us an understanding of the nature 
and the background of the international strategic alliances prior to the interview. 
Furthennore, after the interviews, the same data served as a means of cross-data 
validity checks against the two other types of data used for the case studies. Moreover, 
one company provided us with a company newsletter having an article on their 
international strategic alliance. 
Some of the case studies concentrate on partner asymmetries and learning 
(Chapter 5) while others are devoted mainly to alliance objectives and contracts 
(Chapter 6). However, the full case profile of all the case studies are in the appendices. 
The next section covers the analytical procedures used to analyse the case 
study data. 
3.5.4 ANAL YTrCAL PROCEDURES 
Unlike hypothesis-testing research, case study research lacks a generally 
accepted model for data analysis (Miles and Hubennan 1984, p 16; Eisenhardt 1989; 
Patton 1990, p372; Yin 1994, pl02). For example, Patton (1990, p372) holds that "in 
short, there are no absolute rules except to do the very best with your full intellect to 
fairly represent the data and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of 
the study." In the absence of an agreed upon standard for analysis of case study 
evidence, we used the following stepwise approach: 1) transcription of interviews, 2) 
analysis of secondary data, 3) development of case descriptions, 4) perfonnance of 
within and cross-case analysis, and 5) development of conclusions and implications. 
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Each of these steps will be overviewed next. 
The first step involved producing verbatim written transcripts from the tape 
recording of each interview. The interviewees were contacted either via telephone or 
via telefax in order to clarify points made during the interview that were unclear. The 
written transcripts were not sent back to the interviewees for verification, but 
permission to quote particular interviewees on particular points were obtained. 
The second step involved analysis of secondary data. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, the secondary data used in this study involved documents and archival 
records. The analysis of the secondary data were helpful in several ways. First of all, 
the documents and archival records were helpful in verifying the correct spelling of 
names mentioned during interviews. Second, and of greater importance, the secondary 
data were used to corroborate information from the interviews. None of the secondary 
data were found to be contradictory to the interview data. Had this been the case, then 
it would have been of great importance to look closely into the area or topic were the 
contradiction were found. 
Based on the first two steps ofthe process, case descriptions were developed 
for each ofthe 14 firms taking part in the case studies. This is the third step. A very 
brief general case description for each firm is attached in the appendix. Much longer 
and much more detailed case descriptions were developed to facilitate within and 
cross-case analysis which is the next step in the process. 
The fourth step involves two parts. The first part is to analyse within-case 
data, and the second part involves searching for cross-case patterns. The overall 
objective of the within-case analysis is for the researcher "to become intimately 
familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity" (Eisenhardt 1989, p540). Furthermore, 
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Eisenhardt (1989, p540) suggests that the within-case analysis process "allows the 
unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to generalize patterns 
across cases." The within-case analysis sets the stage for the search for cross-case 
patterns. (Eisenhardt 1989) puts forward three strategies for searching for cross-case 
patterns, and she suggests that these strategies will help the researcher to go beyond 
his initial impressions by using structured and diverse lenses on the data. The first 
strategy suggested by Eisenhardt (1989, p540) is "to select categories or dimensions, 
and then to look for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences." 
This strategy will be used to search for cross-case patterns by looking at high versus 
low performance international strategic alliances. The second tactic proposed by 
Eisenhardt (1989, p540) is "to select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and 
differences between each pair." As mentioned earlier in this chapter under data 
selection procedures, some of the cases were actually selected on a matched pair basis, 
so this strategy will also be used to analyse the case study data. A third strategy 
proposed by Eisenhardt (1989, p541) is "to divide the data by data source." She says 
that one way of doing this is for one researcher to go over observational data while 
another reviews interviews. This strategy will not be utilised in this study since it does 
not appear to be well suited for the particular circumstances of this study. There are 
two reasons for this. First of all, there is only one main data source, namely 
interviews. Second, and probably of less importance, there is only one researcher 
involved in the study. 
The fifth and fmal step in the case study analysis is development of 
conclusions and implications. It is envisioned that from the within-case and cross-case 
analysis tentative themes, concepts, and maybe relationships between variables will 
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emerge (Eisenhardt 1989). These emergent relationships between variables will have 
to be verified with the evidence from each of the 14 cases making up this study 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989, pS42) says that "cases which confirm 
emergent relationships enhance confidence in the validity ofthe relationships. Cases 
which disconfirm the relationships often can provide an opportunity to refine and 
extend the theory." 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has developed an appropriate research method for handling the 
hypotheses developed in the literature review. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section reiterated the research questions. The second section 
developed an appropriate research method, while the two last sections discussed the 
adopted research method in detail. 
The next chapter presents and discusses the results from the mail survey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose ofthis chapter is to establish how partner asymmetries affect 
alliance performance. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section 
presents the results ofthe analysis of the data obtained by way of the mail survey. This 
will be done by testing the three hypotheses developed in chapter two of this thesis 
using the analytical procedures described in the previous chapter. The second section 
discusses the results of the analysis of the mail survey data. 
4.1.1 MEASURES 
In terms of hypotheses one and two, the dependent variable is strategic alliance 
outcome. There is no consensus in the literature on how to measure alliance success 
(Geringer and Hebert 1991). Various financial indicators including profitability, 
market share and sales have been used, as well as the more general measures such as 
survival and duration (Harrigan 1988). Others have used the subjective measure of 
perceived alliance success. Geringer and Hebert (1991) found a significant positive 
correlation between objective and subjective measures ofintemationaljoint venture 
performance. The question of which party to sample - one partner, both/all partners or 
the alliance itself - was also addressed by Geringer and Hebert (1991). They found that 
there is a positive correlation (correlation coefficient .751, p:S;O.01) between each 
partners' assessment of the venture's performance. On the basis of these findings, and 
due to resource constraints, we surveyed the New Zealand alliance partner only. The 
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survey-participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 being 
"much worse than expected" and 7 being "much better than expected"), to what extent 
their international strategic alliances had met expectations. We were aware from 
preliminary work that some New Zealand companies had a large number of alliances, 
particularly international licensing agreements. This caused two potential problems. 
First, if we assume that this handful of companies had most experience of international 
alliances, then their performance outcomes are likely to be better than the norm. In 
other words, to include all of their alliances would impart some company bias into our 
findings. Second, where there were a very large number of alliances, we felt that it 
would be unreasonable to ask the local partner to rank the performance of all of these 
and, moreover, seeking this amount of information may well have led to a higher non-
response rate, something we wished to avoid. To address these matters, in those cases 
where there were more than two alliances, we only sought information on performance 
and partner size for those alliances involving the largest and the smallest partner. By 
concentrating our data in this way on the extremes of the size range, we have fewer 
observations but a more powerful test ofthe hypothesis relating to partner size 
differences and alliance performance. In other words, if partner asymmetry is shown 
not to be associated with best and worst performing alliances, then this particular 
hypothesis can be rejected with greater confidence because of the composition of the 
sample. 
The independent variable for hypothesis one is alliance partner size 
differences. Respective partner size differences were measured in terms of the reported 
number of employees and so avoided problems involved with converting between 
exchange rates. This posed some difficulties in that some of the foreign companies 
were private and their employment size could not be determined. For this reason this 
hypothesis was tested on a sample size of 52 alliances. 
The independent variable for hypothesis two is the national cultures of the 
strategic alliance partners. Hofstede's (1984, 1991) four indexes of power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity were used to measure national 
culture. 
Power distance is the extent to which a culture accepts that power in 
organizations is distributed unequally. Low power distance cultures endorse 
egalitarianism while high power distance cultures endorse hierarchies. 
Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with risk and uncertainty. High uncertainty avoidance cultures prefer 
rules and set procedures while low uncertainty avoidance cultures tolerate greater· 
ambiguity and prefer more flexibility in their responses. 
76 
Individualism is the extent to which people are supposed to take care of 
themselves and be emotionally independent from others. High individualism cultures 
endorse self-sufficiency while low individualism cultures endorse interdependent roles 
and obligations to the group. 
Masculinity is the value attributed to achievement, assertiveness, and material 
success as opposed to the stereotypical feminine values of relationships, modesty, 
caring and quality of life. High masculinity cultures endorse assertiveness, 
competition and individual success while low masculinity cultures endorse modesty, 
compromise and co-operative success. 
Since we are not concerned with the direction in which such distance may 
exist, on each index we took the absolute value of the difference between Hofstede's 
measure for a country and that for New Zealand. The data for national culture are set 
out in the appendix. 
The dependent variable for hypothesis three is the number of international 
strategic alliances entered into by New Zealand companies with partners from a 
particular foreign country. 
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There are two independent variables for hypothesis three, and these are psychic 
distance and trade. Psychic distance is defined as the sum of factors preventing the 
flow of information from and to the market (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Examples of 
such factors are differences in language, education, business practices, culture and 
industrial development. Some studies have used Hofstede's (1984, 1991) measures of 
culture as a synonym and proxy for psychic distance (O'Grady and Lane 1996). 
We therefore used Hofstede's (1984, 1991) four indexes (power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and masculinity) of national culture as a measure of psychic 
distance as well as a composite of the four. The composite variable (called D) was 
calculated as the sum of each absolute difference between New Zealand's score and 
each country's score across the four indexes. Since we are not concerned with the 
direction in which such distance may exist, on each index we took the absolute value 
ofthe difference between Hofstede's measure for a country and that for New Zealand. 
As a measure of trade we used the sum of exports and imports for each country 
for the period 1991-1994 (Statistics New Zealand 1995). The data for both total trade 
and national culture are set out in the appendix. 
4.1.2 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES 
Hypothesis one was tested using T -tests that compared the mean strategic 
78 
alliance outcomes experienced for three sub-samples which were based on the ratio of 
partner sizes for the 52 alliances in the sample. Regression analysis, in simple and 
semi-logarithmic form, was also carried out. 
Hypothesis two was tested by simple regression analysis. 
To test hypothesis three we regressed the number of alliances per country on 
trade flows and psychic distance (national culture) as independent variables. 
4.2 RESULTS 
This section is divided into five subsections. The first three sections (alliance 
involvement, alliance types and alliance objectives) are of a descriptive nature, while 
the four hypotheses developed earlier in the thesis will be tested in the last two 
sections. 
4.2.1 ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT 
Of the 140 respondents completing the questionnaire, 55 (39.3%) firms were 
currently involved in one or more international strategic alliance. The majority of the 
respondent firms were not involved in any strategic alliances with foreign partners. 
Those companies currently not involved in any strategic alliances with foreign 
partners were asked why they were not currently involved in any international 
strategic alliances. The results are set out in Table 7 on the next page. 
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Table 7 
Reasons for No International Strategic Alliance Involvement at Present 
Reasons for No International Frequency Percentage 
Strategic Alliance Involvement at 
Present 
No reasons why we should 39 57.4 
All strategic alliances are handled by 8 11.8 
parent company overseas 
No suitable foreign partners 8 11.8 
Too busy with other matters 4 5.9 
Focus is only on the domestic market 4 5.9 
Focus on domestic alliances only 2 2.9 
Risk of revealing company secrets too 1 1.5 
high 
Lack of money I 1.5 
Do not require any partners 1 1.5 
Total 68 100 
As seen from the table above, more than half of the companies (57.4%) which are 
currently not involved in any international strategic alliances responded that they 
could see no reason for why they should enter into any such alliances. 
4.2.2 ALLIANCE TYPES 
The 55 firms currently involved in international strategic alliances represent 
259 international strategic alliances in total. The breakdown of the 259 international 
strategic alliances by type is set out in Table 8 below. 
Table 8 
Types of Present International Strategic Alliances 
Type of International Number of 
Strategic Alliance Alliances Percentage 
Licensing Agreement 120 46.3 
Joint Venture 85 32.8 
Rand D Agreement 33 12.7 
Co-Marketing Agreement 15 5.8 
Consortium 6 2.3 
Total 259 100 
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As seen in the table above, licensing agreements (46.3%) are the most common form 
of international strategic alliances followed by joint ventures (32.8%). Of the licensing 
agreements, five companies accounted for some 66% of all such agreements. 
The types of international strategic alliance for 70 terminated alliances are set 
out in the table below. 
Table 9 
Types of Terminated International Strategic Alliances 
Type of International Number of 
Strategic Alliance Alliances Percentage 
Licensing Agreement 40 57.1 
Joint Venture 26 37.1 
R and D Agreement 2 2.9 
Co-Marketing Agreement 1 1.4 
Consortium 1 1.4 
Total 70 100 
4.2.3 ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES 
The survey respondents were asked to state the main objective for forming 
their international strategic alliances, and we obtained information on the main 
objective behind the formation of 59 alliances which are currently in operation. Even 
though the firms taking part in the survey represent 259 current international strategic 
alliances in total, the firms were asked to report in detail on two of their current 
international strategic alliances. We therefore received detailed information on only a 
portion of the 259 alliances. The data on alliance objectives is set out in Table 10 on 
the next page. 
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Table 10 
Main Objectives for International Strategic Alliance Formation 
(Alliances Currently in Operation) 
Main Objective Frequency Percentage 
Market access 32 54.2 
Skills sharing 20 33.9 
Industry 
rationalisation 2 3.4 
Risk sharing 2 3.4 
Cost sharing 1 1.7 
Raw material 1 1.7 
access 
Buying growth 1 1.7 
Total 59 100 
As seen from the table above, the most common main objective for international 
strategic alliance formation were market access followed by skills sharing. 
The main objectives for international strategic alliance formation for 
terminated alliances are set out in the table below. 
Table 11 
Main Objectives for International Strategic 
Alliance Formation for Terminated Alliances 
Main Objective Frequency Percentage 
Market access 17 68.0 
Skills sharing 8 32.0 
Total 25 100 
4.2.4 ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
The survey-participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(1 being "much worse than expected" and 7 being "much better than expected"), to 
what extent both their current and terminated international strategic alliances have 
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been meeting their expectations. The results for 71 current strategic alliances are set 
out in the table below. 
Table 12 
Extent Objectives are Being Met for Current Alliances 
Extent Objectives are Being Met Frequency Percentage 
Much better than expected H 12 16.9 
11 15.5 
5 8 11.3 
As expected 4 27 'iR 0 
3 10 14.1 
2 3 4.2 
Much worse than expected 1 0 0 
Total 71 100 
As seen from the table, 81.7% of all current international strategic alliances are seen 
by the New Zealand partner as performing as expected or better. 
The results for 26 terminated alliances are set out in the table below. 
Table 13 
Extent Objectives were Met for Tenninated Alliances 
Extent Objectives were Met Frequency Percentage 
Before the Alliance was Terminated 
Much better than expected 7 3 11.5 
6 0 0 
5 2 7.7 
As expected 4 6 23.1 
3 5 
2 0 0 
Much worse than expected 1 10 38.5 
Total 26 100 
As seen from the table, 57.7% ofthe alliances performed worse than expected, while 
83 
42.3% performed as expected or better before being terminated. 
To compare the alliance performance for current and terminated alliances we 
used a t-test that compared the mean alliance performance (extent objectives were 
met) experienced in current alliances to that experienced in terminated alliances. The 
difference between the two means was found to be significant at the .01 level. The test 
data are set out in the table below. 
Table 14 
Alliance Performance by Alliance Status 
Alliance Status N Alliance Performance 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Current International Strategic Alliances 71 4.70 1.45 
Terminated International Strategic Alliances 26 3.08 2.02 
T-test T -value = 4.39 prob>T = .000 
Organisational learning theory holds that prior learning facilitates the learning 
and application of new related knowledge (Barkema et a1. 1997). One would therefore 
expect that international strategic alliances formed by firms with experience from prior 
alliances will perform better than those alliances formed by inexperienced strategic 
alliance firms. To test this, we divided the alliance performance data for current 
alliances into two groups. The first group contains alliances formed by New Zealand 
firms with no prior international alliance experience prior to forming the current 
alliance, and the second group contains alliances formed by New Zealand companies 
with prior international alliance experience. In terms of alliance performance, the 
means for the two groups are 4.58 and 4.78 respectively. The two means were then 
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compared in the form of a t-test, and the difference between the two means was found 
not to be significant at the .05 level. The test data are set out in the table below. 
Table 15 
Alliance Performance by New Zealand Partner's Alliance Experience Level 
New Zealand Partner's International Alliance 
Strategic Alliance Experience Level N Performance 
Mean Std. Dev. 
No Prior International Strategic Alliance Experience 26 4.58 1.27 
Prior International Strategic Alliance Experience 45 4.78 1.55 
T-test T-value = -.56 prob>T = .58 
4.2.5 PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
This section is divided into three subsections all dealing with different foms 
of partner asymmetries. The first subsection is concerned with partner differences in 
terms of size. For the purposes of this study, size refers to number of employees. The 
second subsection deals with partner asymmetries in terms of national culture. Finally, 
the last subsection is concerned with psychic distance and level of trade. 
4.2.5.1 PARTNER SIZE 
Hypothesis one states that the more similar in size the international strategic 
alliance partners are, the better the strategic alliance will perform. We measured 
respective partner sizes in terms of the reported number of employees, and the 
hypothesis was tested on a sample size of 52 alliances. 
The basic statistics for this test are set out in Table 16 on the next page. Here 
the 52 alliances are grouped into three sub-samples based on the ratio of partner sizes. 
85 
The mean performance rating and its standard deviation are also reported. Using the 
Student's t test, none of the differences between the means were found to be 
statisticall y significant. 
Table 16 
Alliance Performance by Partner Size Asymmetry 
Relative Number of Mean Standard 
Partner Sizes Alliances Performance Deviation 
0- 3 times 12 5.25 1.22 
4 - 15 times 14 4.43 1.78 
16+ times 26 4.81 1.55 
Note: Relative partner sizes in terms of employees 
Grouping data in the manner of table 16 above does involve some loss of information. 
Therefore, in order to test the same hypothesis in a somewhat more rigorous manner 
we regressed alliance outcome (OJ on the ratio of the larger to smaller partner in each 
alliance (RJ. Ifhypothesis one is true, the estimated regression coefficient will be 
negative, ie., as the ratio of partner sizes increases, alliance outcomes should decline. 
The regression was done in simple and semi-logarithmic form. In each case the 
estimated coefficient on the asymmetry variable had the expected negative sign but in 
neither case was this significant. The semi-logarithmic form produced the better 
results as follows: 
Oa = 5.16 - 0.31logRa R2 = 0.024; R2 0.005 
(t value)(14.69) (1.11) F 1.24 (1,50) 
4.2.5.2 PARTNER NATIONALITY 
Data on the nationality ofthe foreign partner were available for 202 
international strategic alliances and extended to 41 countries. The data are set out in 
Table 17 on the next page. 
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Table 17 - Partner Nationality 
Number of 
Country Alliances Percentage 
United States of America 54 26.7 
Australia 28 13.9 
United Kingdom 23 11.4 
South Africa 11 5.4 
Netherlands 8 4.0 
Germany 8 4.0 
Malaysia 7 3.5 
Japan 6 3.0 
France 4 2.0 
Chile 3 1.5 
Switzerland 3 1.5 
South Korea 3 1.5 
Philippines 3 1.5 
Singapore 3 1.5 
Canada 3 1.5 
Uruguay 3 1.5 
Argentina 2 1.0 
Thailand 2 1.0 
Mexico 2 1.0 
Egypt 2 1.0 
Denmark 2 1.0 
Indonesia 2 1.0 
Hong Kong 2 1.0 
~ea 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 
1 0.5 
Ireland 1 0.5 
Italy 1 0.5 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.5 
United Arab Emirates I 0.5 
Mauritius 1 0.5 
Sri Lanka I 0.5 
Bangladesh 1 0.5 
Jamaica 1 0.5 
Venezuela 1 0.5 
Malta 1 0.5 
Greece 1 0.5 
Peru 1 0.5 
Guatemala 1 0.5 
Taiwan 1 0.5 
Total 202 100 
As seen from the table, most alliance partners (26.7%) are from the United States of 
America followed by Australia (13.9%), the United Kingdom (11.4%), and South 
Africa (5.4%). 
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Hypothesis two states that the closer the country cultures of alliance partners, 
the better the alliance outcome. This hypothesis was, like hypothesis one, also tested 
by simple regression with Oa as the dependent variable and a composite of Hofstede's 
(1984, 1991) indices (please refer to the appendix) as the measure of cultural distance 
(D) from New Zealand. If hypothesis two were true, the estimated coefficient on D 
would be negative. In fact, as reported below, this coefficient is positive but not 
significant: 
Oa = 4.47 + 0.005 D 
(t value) (14.76) (1.29) 
R2 = 0.025; R2 = 0.101 
F = 1.17 (1,64) 
Hence we can reject hypothesis two on the basis of this evidence. 
4.2.5.3 PSYCHIC DISTAJ~CE AND TRADE 
Hypothesis three states that the closer the psychic distance, and the higher the 
level of trade with a particular country, the more strategic alliances will be entered into 
with partners from that country. Hofstede's (1984, 1991) four indexes (power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity) of national culture 
were used as a measure of psychic distance. Since we are not concerned with the 
direction in which such distance may exist, on each index the absolute value of the 
difference between Hofstede's measure for a country and that for New Zealand was 
computed. As a measure of trade we used the sum of exports and imports for each 
country for the period 1991-1994 (Statistics New Zealand 1995). The data for both 
total trade and national culture are set out in the appendix. 
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To test hypothesis three we regressed the number of alliances per country on 
trade flows and psychic distance (national culture) as independent variables. To 
represent national culture we worked with Hofstede's (1984, 1991) four indexes 
(power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity) separately, as 
well as a composite of the four. The composite variable (called D) was calculated as 
the sum of each absolute difference between New Zealand's score and each country's 
score across the four indexes. The results of the multiple regressions are set out in 
Table 18 on the next page. 
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Table 18 
Country Analysis - Regression Results 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 7 
Constant term 1.52 3.78 4.18 4.09 2.83 7.00 
(1.39) (1.53) (2.37) (2.00) (1.80) (2.64) 
Total trade 1.15 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.17 1.03 
(7.10)* (6.53)* (7.04)* (6.71)* (7.17)* (6.40)* 
Power distance -0.05 
(1.04) 
Uncertainty -0.12 
avoidance (1.93)** 
Individualism -0.07 
(1.52) 
Masculinity -0.10 
(1.19) 
Composite -0.04 
index (D) (2.25)* 
R2 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.62 
AdjustedR2 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.60 
F statistic 50.46 26.39 29.46 27.81 226.80 30.39· 
(1,39) (2,38) (2,38) (2,38) (2,38) (2,18) 
Note: Dependent variable is number of alliances per country. Total trade is measnred in NZ$ billions. 
Estimated coefficients are reported with t values in brackets. * or ** indicate coefficients significant at 
the 5% or 10% levels. 
8 
14.82 
(4.30) 
-0.09 
(3.12)* 
0.20 
0.18 
9.73 
(1,39) 
All the estimated coefficients in Table 18 have the expected signs although most of the 
Hofstede measures fail to reach the accepted levels of significance. As hypothesised, 
the value of total trade is a positive and consistently significant determinant of the 
number of alliances formed with each overseas country. In each case this number is 
reduced by the psychic distance from New Zealand although, of Hofstede's individual 
indexes, only that relating to uncertainty avoidance is significant. The composite of 
Hofstede's index is also significant, even when the total trade variable is included in 
the same regression, so there is some limited support for the psychic distance 
component of this hypothesis. 
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4.3 DISCUSSION 
As the previous section on results, this section is also divided into four 
subsections. These are alliance involvement, alliance types, alliance objectives, and 
partner asymmetries. 
4.3.1 ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, of the 140 firms completing the 
questionnaire, 55 (39.3%) firms were currently involved in one or more international 
strategic alliance. In terms of this level of involvement, we note that the Conference 
Board (1994)2 found that about 30% of United States and Canadian firms engage in 
alliance activities outside North America, while about 25% of European firms are 
involved in alliances outside the European Union. It therefore appears that New 
Zealand companies, in comparison with companies from North America and Europe, 
are particularly active entering into strategic alliances with overseas partners. A 
contributing factor is likely to be the New Zealand's small domestic market and its 
geographical isolation from most major markets. 
More than half (57.4%) of the companies which are currently not involved in 
any international strategic alliances responded that they see no reason for why they 
should enter into any such alliances. It is likely that most of these organisations are 
primarily concerned with serving the domestic market. Furthermore, eight (11.8%) 
companies stated that alliance formations were handled by the head office located 
overseas as the reason for why they were presently not involved in any international 
2 Strategic alliance activities were defined to include acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures, limited 
partnerships, marketing alliances, license agreements and technology exchanges 
strategic alliances. Another eight companies (11.8%) said that they were unable to 
identifY any suitable foreign partners. Only one company stated that the risk of 
revealing company secrets is too high as the reason for staying away form 
international strategic alliances. Some researchers (for example Reich and Mankin 
(1986)) have suggested that companies should stay away from strategic alliances for 
this reason. 
4.3.2 ALLIANCE TYPES 
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It was established earlier in this chapter that, for both current and terminated 
alliances, licensing agreements are the most common form of international strategic 
alliances followed by joint ventures. This is in contrast with the literature where joint 
ventures tend to be mentioned as the most common alliance form (Bleeke and ErnSt 
1995). However, Lorange and Roos (1992, p4) hold that a fIrm might wish to start out 
in a less committed mode and then upgrade the type of cooperative relationship over 
time as mutual trust, confIdence and commitment have been developed. In terms of 
conceptualizing trust, we can say that trust exists between two parties when each party 
has confIdence in the other party's reliability and integrity (Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
In terms of conceptualizing commitment, we can say that a commitment exists 
between two parties when each party believes that an ongoing relationship with the 
other party is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994). 
As we will show later in the thesis, relatively few international strategic 
alliances were entered into prior to 1986, so many of these companies have limited 
experience of international strategic alliances. This would also explain why licensing 
agreements, which tend to require less commitment than other forms, are more 
common in the sample of New Zealand companies. 
4.3.3 ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES 
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As mentioned in the earlier section on results, for both current and terminated 
alliances, gaining market access was found to be the most common objective behind 
international strategic alliance formations involving New Zealand companies. This is 
in contrast with EI-Hajjar's (1991) findings of motivations behind British-foreign 
alliances. She concluded that technological complexity and development is the most 
important motivation behind British-foreign alliances. The reason for this difference in 
findings could be that the New Zealand domestic market is much smaller than that in 
the United Kingdom, and also that the physical distance to foreign markets are much 
larger for New Zealand companies than for British companies. According to 
Enderwick and Akoorie (1996, p55), New Zealand and Australia are the only OECD 
nations that do not enjoy immediate access to a market of at least 50 million people. 
4.3.4 ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
We found that 81.7% of current international strategic alliances are performing 
as expected or better. This seems to be in contrast with the alliance literature where 
high failure rates of alliances is reported. For example, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) hold 
that cross-border alliances have roughly a 50.0% rate of success. One reason for the 
high success rates could be that many New Zealand companies, due to the small 
domestic market, are heavily dependent on foreign markets. The international strategic 
alliances therefore become very important to these firms, and they are therefore likely 
to invest considerable resources in the international alliances in order to make them 
work. Along similar lines, most New Zealand companies, being small, have limited 
resources and they are therefore dependent on alliance success to ensure their own 
survival. On the other hand, it could be that the New Zealand firms with positive 
international strategic alliance experiences are more likely to respond to an alliance 
survey than those New Zealand firms with negative alliance experiences. 
That some international strategic alliances performed as expected or better 
before being terminated may indicate that alliance duration as a measure of venture 
performance, as used by some researchers (for example Harrigan 1988), may have 
limitations. It could very well be that some strategic alliances are meant to be in 
operation for a limited period of time only, for example to undertake a specific task, 
and thereafter to be terminated. The termination of such an alliance is therefore not a 
sign of alliance failure. 
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Current international strategic alliances were found to perform better than 
terminated alliances. This would be expected since many terminated alliances are 
terminated due to poor performance. However, it is important to point out that not all 
terminated alliances suffer from poor performance. Some alliances are terminated 
because they have fulfilled their objectives or because they have come to the end of 
their useful life. As an illustration, of the 26 terminated alliances we obtained data on, 
three alliances performed "much better than expected" prior to termination. 
We found no difference in alliance performance comparing alliances formed 
by New Zealand firms with no prior international strategic alliance experience with 
those alliances formed by New Zealand firms with prior international strategic alliance 
experience. One reason for this finding could be that there are obviously a number of 
factors, other than international alliance experience, that influence alliance 
perfonnance, and we were not able to control for any ofthese factors. However, our 
findings are in line with those of Bark em a et al. (1997, p426) who concluded that 
"experience with domestic joint ventures and with international wholly owned 
subsidiaries contributed to the longevity of international joint ventures, but prior 
experience with international joint ventures did not." 
4.3.5 PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
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This section is divided into three subsections all dealing with different fonns 
of partner asymmetries. The first subsection is concerned with partner differences in 
tenns of size. For the purposes of this study, size refers to number of employees. The 
second subsection deals with partner asymmetries in tenns of national culture. Finally, 
the last subsection is concerned with psychic distance and level oftrade. 
4.3.5.1 PARTNER SIZE 
Hypothesis one, stating that the more similar in size the international strategic 
alliance partners are, the better the strategic alliance will perfonn, was not supported 
by the data. This result is in contrast with most previous strategic alliance research 
which has suggested that partner differences in tenns of partner size has negative 
implications for alliance perfonnance. Our findings indicate that asymmetry between 
alliance partners may not always have negative implications for alliance outcomes. 
This view is in line with Parkhe's (1991) suggestion that there are two types of 
interfinn diversity present among the partners in international strategic alliances. Type 
I diversity includes the interfinn differences that international strategic alliances are 
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specifically fonned to take advantage of. On the other hand, type II diversity refers to 
the differences in partner characteristics that may have a negative effect on strategic 
alliance perfonnance. It follows that in strategic alliances where the benefits from type 
I diversity outweigh type II diversity, partner differences may have a positive 
influence on perfonnance. 
Finally, since most prior research has shown that partner asymmetries have a 
negative impact on alliance outcomes, it is suggested that future research in this area is 
warranted. Case study research could be an appropriate research methodology for such 
future research since, according to Eisenhardt (1989, p548), case study research is 
appropriate "to provide freshness in perspective to an already researched topic." The 
next chapter will attempt to do exactly this, to provide a fresh perspective on this 
issue. 
4.3.5.2 PARTNER NATIONALITY 
Hypothesis two, stating that the closer the country cultures of alliance partners, 
the better the alliance outcome, was not supported by the data. As for hypothesis one, 
this result is in contrast with most previous strategic alliance research which has 
suggested that partner differences in tenns of partner nationality has negative 
implications for alliance perfonnance. In line with the findings on partner size, these 
findings indicate that asymmetry between alliance partners may not always have 
negative implications for alliance outcomes. Therefore, as before, this view is in line 
with Parkhe's (1991) suggestion that there are two types of interfinn diversity present 
among the partners in international strategic alliances. Type I diversity includes the 
interfinn differences that international strategic alliances are specifically fonned to 
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take advantage of. On the other hand, type II diversity refers to the differences in 
partner characteristics that may have a negative effect on strategic alliance 
performance. It follows that in strategic alliances where the benefits from type I 
diversity outweigh type II diversity, partner differences may have a positive influence 
on performance. 
Finally, in line with the discussion on partner size above, since most prior 
research has shown that partner differences have a negative impact on alliance 
outcomes, it is suggested that future research in this area is warranted. Case study 
research could be an appropriate research methodology for such future research since, 
according to Eisenhardt (1989, p548), case study research is appropriate "to provide 
freshness in perspective to an already researched topic." The next chapter will attempt 
to do exactly this, to provide a fresh perspective on this issue. 
4.3.5.3 PSYCHIC DISTANCE AND TRADE 
The foreign country involved in New Zealand international strategic alliances 
was explained by psychic distance and the total trade flow with New Zealand. In this 
respect New Zealand is a useful test case because of its predominant Western culture 
and its trading association with a large number of Asian countries. This enabled us to 
test Hofstede's (1984, 1991) indices of psychic distance using alliances formed per 
country as the dependent variable. Generally, while a number of the individual indices 
were not significant, we did find greater psychic distance to be associated with fewer 
alliances. In other words, for the same level of total trade, the greater the psychic 
distance the fewer the number of alliances. To this limited extent, Hofstede's (1984, 
1991) work is endorsed by the findings of this study. 
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The main findings ofthis section can be divided into two parts. First, New 
Zealand companies have a high level of alliance involvement with licensing 
agreements being the most common international alliance type. Gaining market access 
tend to be the most important alliance objective, and New Zealand international 
alliances seem to perform, on average, somewhat better than other international 
alliances. 
There are several explanations for these findings. Contributing factors to the 
high level of alliance involvement are likely to be New Zealand's small domestic 
market and its geographical isolation from most major markets. The high number of 
licensing agreements are likely to be a result of New Zealand's relatively low level of 
research and development spending. By entering into licensing agreements with 
foreign companies local companies gain access to foreign technology. As New 
Zealand's domestic market is small, getting access to international markets becomes 
important and this explains why gaining market access is the most important alliance 
objective. Finally, one reason for the high success rate could be that many New 
Zealand companies, due to the small domestic market, are heavily dependent on 
foreign markets. The international strategic alliances therefore become very important 
to these firms, and they are therefore likely to invest considerable resources in the 
international alliances in order to make them work. Along similar lines, most New 
Zealand companies, being small, have limited resources and they are therefore 
dependent on alliance success to ensure their own survival. 
The second set of findings involves partner asymmetries. We found that 
partner differences in terms of firm size does not have negative implications for 
alliance performance. At the same time, similarity or closeness in terms of alliance 
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partners' country culture does not necessarily lead to better alliance performance. 
Finally, in terms of partner nationality, the foreign country involved in New Zealand 
international strategic alliances was explained by psychic distance and the total trade 
flow with New Zealand. 
The first two findings are in line with Parldle's (1991) suggestion that there are 
two types of interfirm diversity present among the partners in international strategic 
alliances. Type I diversity includes the interfirm differences that international strategic 
alliances are specifically formed to take advantage of. On the other hand, type II 
diversity refers to the differences in partner characteristics that may have a negative 
effect on strategic alliance performance. It follows that in strategic alliances where the 
benefits from type I diversity outweigh type II diversity, partner differences may have 
a positive influence on performance. 
The third finding supports Hofstede's (1984, 1991) work on national culture. 
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish how partner asymmetries affect 
alliance performance. Three hypotheses were tested in order to achieve this. 
Hypothesis one, stating that the more similar in size the international strategic 
alliance partners are, the better the strategic alliance will perform, was not supported 
by the data. This result is in contrast with most previous strategic alliance research 
which has suggested that partner differences in terms of partner size has negative 
implications for alliance performance. 
Hypothesis two, stating that the closer the country cultures of alliance partners, 
the better the alliance outcome, was not supported by the data. As for hypothesis one, 
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this result is in contrast with most previous strategic alliance research which has 
suggested that partner differences in tenns of partner nationality has negative 
implications for alliance perfonnance. 
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Hypothesis three, stating that the closer the psychic distance and the higher the 
level of trade with a particular country, the more strategic alliances will be entered into 
with partners from that country, was only partially supported by the data. However, 
we did find greater psychic distance to be associated with fewer alliances. In other 
words, for the same level of total trade, the greater the psychic distance the fewer the 
number of alliances. 
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PART 2 
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The following two chapters present and discuss the results from the case 
studies. These chapters consider detailed data from selected firms while the previous 
chapter considered general data from a large number of firms. 
The table below gives an overview ofthe 14 case study firms. 
Table 19 
Overview ofthe Case Study Firms 
Number of Number of 
Number of Current Past 
Firm Employees Industry International International 
Alliances Alliances 
VEl 4,100 Automotive Parts 1 2 
Ship Repairs 
Food Products 
VE2 50 Medical Equipment 5 3 
VE3 1,500 Fishing and fish 10 0 
processmg 
VE4 500 Medical Equipment 14 2 
Plastics 
Food Products 
VE5 600 Engineering Services 2 1 
VE6 6,000 Dairy Products 18 17 
···»V •• > •••• U· ••  •••• I/i> .•• < •.......•.• / ....•• < .•....• . ........... t. ··\· ... · ...·..........2>··· .... · .. ···· · .. >.·.U<?/.i • ...•..•••••••••.••..••• > •.•••...•..•••••.•.....••••••  •• •••··.•• .•••  .• U ........•...•..................................... 1./>< ••. /<{ 
UFl 20 Electrical Equipment 4 0 
UF2 520 Skin Tanning 1 0 
UF3 450 Trading of Agricultural 1 0 
Products and Services 
....... iV.·.·S ........... I •••  •• ? i .. · ........ · .... Ir> . .... ·.n ............ i....X··pf .. ·.·. H 
MF1A 580 Cement 1 0 
MF1B 3,600 Brewing 3 0 
MF2A 5 Agricultural Seeds 1 0 
MF2B 23 Agricultural Seeds 5 1 
MF2C 50 Agricultural Seeds 27 11 
TOTAL 93 37 
Of the firms in the table, VEl-VE6 belongs to the varied experience group. These 
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finns have experience from at least two international strategic alliances where at least 
one alliance is perfonning better than expected, and at the same time, at least one other 
alliance is perfonning worse than expected. UFl, UF2 and UF3 belong to the 
unattached finns group. Of these three finns, one finn has experience from two 
international strategic alliances perfonning much better than expected while the two 
other finns each has experience from one international strategic alliance perfonning 
worse than expected. Finally, MFIAIB-MF2AIBIC belong to the matched finns 
group. These finns fonn two matched finn groups, one group including two finns and 
the other group including three finns. The first group is made up of two finns that 
fonned joint ventures in China at about the same time. One of these joint ventures is 
perfonning better than expected while the other is currently perfonning worse than 
expected. The second group is made up of three finns from the agricultural seed 
industry. Collectively, these three finns have experience from a high number of 
international strategic alliances. Some of these alliances are perfonning better than 
expected while others are perfonning worse than expected. 
Some of the case studies concentrate on partner asymmetries and learning 
while others are devoted mainly to alliance objectives and contracts. However, the full 
case profile of all the case studies are in the appendices, and we suggest that the reader 
reviews these appendices before proceeding with chapters five and six. 
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CHAPTERS 
PARTNER ASYMMETRIES AND ALLIANCE OUTCOMES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the question of why international alliances between 
well-intentioned partners are unsuccessful. These cross-border alliances are now a 
common facet of the strategic development of companies all over the world and they 
are likely to remain so (Ohmae, 1993, p 36). Most research in this area has 
concentrated on the large corporates of North America, Europe and Japan. New 
Zealand is a small open economy heavily dependent on the success of its international 
businesses. The domestic market is very competitive, a consequence of the substantial 
liberalisation that has taken place since the mid-1980s. This compels growth-oriented 
firms to find ways of either moving into foreign markets without all the cost 
economies that scale can provide or enhancing their domestic offerings to more 
effectively combat imports. Against this background there are two sets of reasons 
why international alliances should be of particular importance to New Zealand 
companies. First, even the largest businesses operating from New Zealand are small 
by international standards. Hence, on their own, New Zealand firms are unlikely to 
achieve the volumes required to produce product at the world price. Second, New 
Zealand is a low technology country in terms of its ratio of R&D to GNP and so the 
locally-owned companies do not benefit as much as they might from ready access to 
the highest high technology that is available. The importance oftechnology for 
sustained competitive strategy again leads New Zealand firms to look favourably at 
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the benefits of international strategic alliances with more sophisticated foreign 
companies. However, internationally at least half of all alliances fail to meet the 
expectations of all partners (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991) and there are no a priori grounds 
for expecting the situation to be any better in New Zealand. The rest of the chapter is 
in four sections. In the next we review briefly the literature on alliance outcomes and 
justifY our particular focus on the 'why' question. Then we explain the particular 
multi-case study design used to address this question. Case analysis follows and the 
chapter ends with our conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
5.2 ALLIANCE OUTCOMES 
It is generally accepted that a large number of successful, well-managed 
companies have great difficulty in maintaining successful international alliances to the 
mutual benefit ofthe partners involved. In their more recent study, Bleeke and Ernst 
(1995, p 97) claim that "the median life span for alliances is about seven years, and 
nearly 80% of joint ventures - one of the more common alliance structures - ultimately 
end with one partner selling out to the remaining partner(s)." Spekman et al. (1995) 
indicate that 60% of all alliances fail. The main cause of this high rate of failure has 
been attributed to a range of asymmetries between partners. In her major study of 
alliance outcomes, Harrigan (1988) studied cross-section data on 895 alliances in 23 
industries and issued a general caution against forming alliances with partners where 
there were marked asymmetries in cultures, asset sizes, and venturing experiences. 
Such findings are then construed into prescriptive advice to managers concerning their 
search criteria for alliance partners. There are two points to be made here. First, if 
asymmetries were so detrimental for alliance outcome, why would so many 
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experienced managers continue to consummate such alliances? It is indeed something 
of a paradox of large cross-section studies such as Harrigan's can only reach their 
prescriptive conclusions because a sufficiently large number of these managers act 
counter to these prescriptions. Second, it is difficult indeed to envisage how 
asymmetries can be removed from international alliances. In the case a the New 
Zealand firm seeking to ally itself with a technologically superior company, the 
desired asymmetry (technology) can only be gained if other asymmetries (e.g., culture, 
asset size, and venturing experience) are accepted. 
This dual role of asymmetries within international alliances has recently been 
developed by Parkhe (1991). The basis of Park he's argument is that there are indeed 
two types of interfirm asymmetry which he labels as Type I and Type II. A Type I 
asymmetry includes those differences international alliances are formed to take 
advantage of. While these positive asymmetries need not be the same for all partners 
to an alliance, it is reasonable to presume that there will be some Type I advantage for 
all partners. On the other hand Type II asymmetries are differences that will have 
some negative effect on alliance outcome but which are accepted in order to gain the 
Type I advantages. Acceptance of competing sets of alliance effects also brings 
aspects of timing and learning into the balancing act. Clearly if Type II effects are 
large and allowed to dominate the Type I effects for an extended period of time, then 
the alliance outcome would be disappointing for at least one of the parties. The key to 
avoiding this outcome centres on the identification of the Type II effects and the 
instigation of an effective learning process which not only transmits the Type I effects 
but also enables two parties to overcome the Type lIs at the same time. 
Lyles (1988) studied four firms with extensive joint venture experience. She 
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found that what the firms learned from their joint venture experiences is both unique 
and at the same time general. It is unique in that each firm has its own unique 
characteristics and histories, and it is general in that there exists some pattern to the 
learning. Lyles (1988) suggests that this pattern is generalizable across the firms. 
The related issues of timing and intra-alliance learning are also dealt with in 
the recent conceptual paper by Khanna et al. (1998). These authors ascribe alliance 
failure to a poor understanding of the learning dynamics taking place within an 
alliance. In effect, Khanna et al. are seeking to shift the focus of alliance failure away 
from Parkhe's Type II asymmetries. The real cause is the different rate oflearning 
that one partner can bring to assimilating the perceived Type I benefits of the alliance. 
Such benefits can be technology-based but could also include the understanding of a 
particular market segment or territory. As these authors point out, "significantly 
greater benefits might accrue to the firm that finishes learning from its partners before 
the latter can do the same" (Khanna et aI., 1998, p 194). The faster learner can then 
quit the alliance and deny its ally the opportunity to learn from it. The incentive to 
learn fast depends on the proportion of a firm's trading activities that are 'private' i.e., 
not included in the activities that are 'common' to the alliance. It follows that the 
greatest likelihood of disappointing outcomes is when parties to an alliance each have 
a high proportion of their business outside of the alliance. Here each partner has the 
scope to apply what they can learn from the alliance: they each have a strong incentive 
to be the faster learner (at the expense of the other). The least likelihood of 
disappointment arises when most of the benefits of an alliance are 'common' to the 
alliance. This means that the benefits can only accrue to all parties once they have 
each learned enough to synthesise their knowledge bases. So learning in pursuit of 
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common benefits is a joint process with the same rewards for all and no special prize 
for the winner. 
This points to learning behaviour being the main determinant of alliance 
outcomes. Those involved must learn how to assimilate Type I effects whilst working 
together to learn how to overcome or circumvent Type II effects. In addition, as we 
have just noted, the incentive to assimilate the Type I effects will itself vary across and 
within alliances. This is the case because the opportunity set of each partner outside 
of a particular alliance does affect its learning behaviour within the alliance and hence 
alliance outcome. All of this bears on the central question of this research: why are so 
many international alliances deemed unsuccessful by at least one of the parties? 
5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study employs a mixed research methodology consisting of survey 
research followed by case study research. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
by combining the more general data from a large number of firms with the more 
detailed data from a few firms, a richer picture of the phenomena under investigation 
can be drawn. Second, by doing the investigation in stages, the first research stage 
assists the second stage. By analysing the data obtained from stage one before 
entering stage two, the results from stage one can be used as a basis for selecting 
information-rich cases relative to the phenomena being studied. 
In order to build maximum partner asymmetry into the study, alliance 
managers were asked in the mail survey to report in detail on two of their current 
international alliances, those with the largest and the smallest (in terms ofturnover) 
foreign partners. Extreme cases (Patton, 1990, p 169) were selected for follow-up 
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study. Extreme cases are cases that are likely to be rich in information because they 
are distinctive in ways consistent with the research question. First we sought to 
include companies with current varied experience with international alliances, i.e., 
they each had contemporaneously at least one alliance performing "better than 
expected" and one "worse than expected" ("success" and "fail" respectively). This 
group of three firms is of interest because they bring variation in alliance outcome 
while controlling for size of the New Zealand partner, composition and experience of 
the senior management, and the form of international alliance (joint venture). A 
second group of firms were selected where neither size, senior management nor 
alliance type would be constant. This group of firms, four in all, comprised two firms 
who have recently formed international alliances with Chinese partners. These 
ventures are in very different industries (cement and brewing) and appear to have 
different outcomes. The final pairing was two firms in the same industry, 
international seeds, where each has a current international agreement (not joint 
venture) but again with different outcomes apparent. In this way we created a mUltiple 
case study design within which there is as much variation as possible in the dependent 
variable (alliance outcome) and a number of controls (firm, management, overseas 
country, alliance type and industry) to help isolate the causes of these different 
outcomes. The firms, none of whom wished to be named in this study, and their 
alliances are described in the table on the next page. (The full case profile of each of 
these firms are in the appendices.) 
Table 20 
Alliance Outcome and Type I and Type II Effects 
Firm Size (NZ Industry Alliance Type I Effects Typell 
Code Employees) Type/Country Effects 
VEl 4,100 Ship repair JVIUK MK,T ~s Auto parts JV/Australia MK Food stuff JV/S'pore MK,T 
VE2 50 Medical JV/Switz. MK,T CC,NC 
Equipment JVIUK. MK, T NC 
VE3 1,500 Fishing and JV/Japan MA NC,S 
Processing JV/Japan MA NC,S 
MFI-A 580 Cement JV/China MK,T NC 
MFI-B 3,600 Brewing JV/China MK, T NC 
MF2-B 23 Agd seeds License/ MK, T 
Holland 
MF2-A 5 Agd seeds R&D/ MK,T INC 
Holland 
~: Type I and Type II effects follow Parke (1991). They are as follows: market 
access (MA), market knowledge (MK), technology (T), corporate culture (CC), 
national culture (NC), partner size (S), business ethics (BE). 
5.4 CASE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this analysis is to provide insights into why some of these 
alliances failed when other contemporary alliances fared better. In addressing this 
question we use the case study evidence in what Yin (1994, p5-6) describes as 
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Alliance 
Outcome 
Fail 
Success 
Success 
Fail 
Success 
Fail 
Success 
Fail 
Success 
Fail 
Success 
explanatory mode, i.e., in producing valid explanations of how and why the different 
outcomes (fail/success) arose in each case. The first point to note is that the alliance 
outcome does not appear to be linked with the number or nature of the Type I and 
Type II effects evidenced during the field interviews. In this sense we cannot 
associate outcome with what we might refer to as the 'content' ofthe individual 
alliances. This means that the main independent variables are those related to the 
learning environment within the alliance and the potential for private opportunistic 
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gain outside of the alliance. Thus, following Yin (1994, p 1 08-1 09) we use a pattern 
match of these independent variables to explain the different lmown alliance 
outcomes. The ultimate objective is to obtain literal replication among multiple cases 
with the same outcome and theoretical replication between cases where the outcomes 
are different. 
VEl alliances 
The New Zealand firm had a 30% stake in the failed JV with the UK-based 
ship repair business but sold this to its partner after only one year of operation. The 
UK company continues to operate the ship repair business in New Zealand on its own. 
There appear to be three aspects to the apparent failure of this alliance. First there 
were marked differences in corporate culture. The New Zealand partner had a history 
of buying and selling companies and had a short-term orientation to performance. 
This style of doing business was not shared by the UK partner. This led in turn to a 
second aspect: disagreement on how the JV should be run on a day-to-day basis, a 
conflict situation which was greatest between the CEO of VEl and the Managing 
Director of the N (on secondment from the UK). The consequent breakdown of trust 
meant that no learning process could get underway that might have resolved the 
differences stemming from the Type II culture differences. The third aspect is the 
rapid rate which the UK partner was able to assimilate the Type I benefit (local market 
lmowledge) and continued to operate on its own in New Zealand. 
In both of its more successful Ns this New Zealand company had at the outset 
at least a 50% interest and a clear 'hands off approach to the daily management of 
these operations. The auto parts venture was with the only Australian firm 
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manufacturing the product (suspension rings). The motivation for two competitors to 
form a N was to increase their bargaining power against large customers and large 
suppliers. In other words there were common benefits available to the alliance which 
would not be available to the individual parties. This mutual dependence held the 
alliance venture together for six years. The New Zealand partner has recently (1997) 
sold its 50% share of the N to a large US auto equipment company. 
The foodstuff N centred on the business supplying all of New Zealand's 
domestic and industrial needs for salt. The New Zealand had been the 50.1 % owner of 
this N since 1981. The minority owner was a large Singaporean company that had 
(a) links to extensive business interests in New Zealand and (b) a separate JV with the 
Australian firm that supplied the NZ operation with about half of its salt. The basis of 
this N seems to be product and market access. The Singaporean company had been 
involved in the salt N since 1961 and can have had little left to learn about either the 
simple technology or the local market. The New Zealand firm recently sold out its 
controlling interest to its Australian supplier. 
The New Zealand manager involved in all three of these Ns sums up his 
experience as follows: 
A joint venture is not the cleanest thing to get involved in. I would rather 
control what I have got myself or get rid of it, and somebody else can worry 
about it. In a joint venture you always have to be diplomatic and communicate 
with your partner. Understand what the partner wants and where he wants to 
go. It is more hard work generally, unless it is [the salt N] which operates 
itself. 
VE2 alliances 
The Managing Director of the New Zealand firm explained why they become 
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involved in international Ns as follows: 
Probably in all our Ns we have tried to find partners who already have a good 
lmowledge in the market. That is probably the primary goal of our IVs, so we 
are: (a) tapping into all that market lmowledge, and (b) hopefully because of 
ownership we are getting commitment from the partner to make this IV 
company go. 
The failed N was set up with a small Swiss partner in 1993. It did not fit with 
this rationale. The Swiss company was owned and operated by one person. Its role 
was to act as agent for the NZ company's products throughout Europe. In this 
capacity the Swiss partner, with 50% control ofthe N, was empowered to support, 
hire and fire distributors. The Swiss partner was not himself involved in distribution. 
There were three problems here. First, the European market knowledge was probably 
over-stated and so the NZ partner did not obtain the learning needed to create the 
common benefits of the alliance. Second, conflicts of interest developed as the Swiss 
partner began to pursue private benefits to the detriment of the NZ firm's sales into 
Europe. Third, since the same Swiss national was in effect owner, managing director 
and employee, there was little the NZ partner could do to correct any wealmesses and 
retain the N. The alliance was terminated in 1995. 
There are a number of clear differences between this Swiss experience and the 
successful UK IV set up in 1992. First, the UK company was already a successful 
distributor and willing to share its market lmowledge to provide benefits to its NZ 
partner. Second, a competent person was hired to manage the IV. Third, even though 
the UK company did have commercial interests in the same field, i.e., scope to exploit 
private benefits from the alliance, this was never allowed to interfere with the 
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development ofthe N. This UK N has recently become a wholly owned subsidiary 
ofthe New Zealand company. 
VE3 alliances 
Both of these Ns centre on fishing access to New Zealand territorial waters 
and to the lucrative Japanese market for quality fish. Access to the New Zealand 
fishery requires quota and it is this that the New Zealand partner contributed to these 
alliances. The Japanese company ensures access to the market and some provision of 
deep-sea trawlers. The main problem with the unsuccessful venture is that the 
Japanese company had much greater scope to extract private benefits through its 
lmowledge of and control over entry into the market. The point at issue was the 
continued lack of openness or understanding of the transfer prices paid by the 
Japanese partner to the N for the fish supplied. 
The second N between the same partners was approached differently by the 
New Zealand company who currently view it as a "major success". In a sense what 
has happened between the two Ns is that in the second one the New Zealand fInn has 
been much more explicit on what it expects as common benefits from the alliance. As 
the New Zealand manager pointed out: 
We spent a lot of time on things like transfer price which was an issue with the 
first one, on feeling the compatibility of our objectives, looking at what would 
happen with the costs in the whole operation, the openness and so on. Spent a 
lot of time before we agreed to formalise that one, to make sure that the rules 
were very very clear and well documented. 
MFI A and B alliances 
Both New Zealand companies entered into Ns with Chinese partners in the 
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same region of China at about the same time. MFlA is in the cement industry and, in 
comparison with MFlb, engaged in a very limited partner selection process. A 
significant problem with this N is that the extent of the learning that the New Zealand 
partner believes to be necessary (to obtain common benefits) is not happening. As the 
Managing Director pointed out: 
We have put in some very modem reporting on quality and production 
controls, and that is completely foreign to them [the Chinese partner]. It is a 
slow process getting the Chinese managers to accept that they are useful tools 
for managing the business. 
Another facet of this problematic situation is that the New Zealand partner 
owns only 25% of the N but it does have responsibility for the day-to-day 
management of the cement plant owned by the N partners. 
In very direct contrast MFIB spent around two years evaluating possible 
brewing partners in China. The company carefully evaluated 45 separate breweries 
including meetings with owners and managers, technical assessment of the facilities, 
and market evaluations of the regions being supplied. This company now controls 
60% of a successful operation: 
We are perceived by our partners to be a good partner, and we see them as a 
good partner. The joint venture is profitable, and we have avoided any conflict 
or we have avoided the need for any conflict. We have good management, we 
are investing in buildings and in the quality of the management. So there are 
few things today we would have changed. 
The final feature to note in MFIB is this reference to the avoidance of conflict. 
Given the size of the Chinese beer market and the difficulties in operating in that due 
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to culture differences, the Chinese partner does have considerable potential for 
extracting private benefits from the N. That this is recognised as a potential problem 
and so far been avoided is testimony to the care applied in the early stages of alliance 
formation. 
MF2BandA 
These alliances involve a failed licensing agreement and a successful R&D 
agreement between New Zealand seed producers (MF2 B and MF2 A respectively) 
and similar firms based in Holland. The failed agreement, set up in 1988, gave the 
Dutch party the right to produce and sell a New Zealand proprietary seed variety 
throughout the whole of Europe. It is now conceded with the benefit of hindsight that 
this was not a wise move. In effect this gave the foreign partner huge potential for 
extracting private benefits from the agreement. In addition it emerged that the Dutch 
party also had some competing product of its own of which the New Zealand firm was 
unaware at the outset. All in all this was one alliance that does appear to have been 
destined to fail. 
The R&D agreement involving the other New Zealand seed firm (MF2 A) has 
so far been judged a success. The two other parties are a scientific agricultural 
research organisation in New Zealand and a Dutch seed distributor. The research 
organisation will develop seed varieties suitable for the climates in northern and 
southern Europe. When complete in several years time, the seed company will 
produce the seeds in New Zealand and the Dutch company will sell them throughout 
Europe. No separate legal entity exists for this agreement. The ownership of the 
jointly developed seed varieties will be covered by international patents held equally 
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by the three parties to the agreement. At the time of the fieldwork, the technical 
development is one year ahead of schedule. The success to date of this agreement has 
much to do with the technical development required. All parties seem to recognise the 
primacy of common benefits at this stage. This is recognised by the Managing 
Director ofMF2 B: 
The product is now in the development stage. Later on the product will be 
available in the market, and probably the cheaper the product is, the easier it 
will be to market. Against that we will be looking to get a price level that can 
ensure that we can get production here with New Zealand farmers in 
competition to other products that those farmers can grow. So perhaps when 
you interview us in five years time some of the answers may be slightly 
different, but right now the single minded [common] objective is to produce a 
clover and sell that in volume. 
The final point here is to note that NIP I Band MFI A are similar in so many 
respects except that they are at very different stages in terms of the market readiness of . 
the product at the centre of the respective agreements. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The purpose of this chapter has been to move beneath the 'content' level of 
cross-section analysis to discover more about the processes associated with the 
success or failure of international strategic alliances. Any alliance will involve some 
combination of the Type I and Type II asymmetries introduced by Parkhe (1991). 
Parkhe (P580) suggests that "Type II differences may be overcome by iterative cycles 
of learning that strengthen the partnership" and we have no argument with this. 
However other authors (e.g., Reich and Mankin, 1986) have pointed to the importance 
that needs to be attached to the rate at which partners can learn and internalise the 
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available Type I benefits. The firms who can learn the fastest may then either neglect 
or terminate the alliance and proceed to compete directly with former partners. This 
emphasis on the rate of learning of Type I effects and the scope for their exploitation 
outside the agreed scope ofthe alliance is the important contribution of Khanna et al. 
(1998). 
The case study evidence we have presented here seeks to isolate factors 
influencing alliance outcomes whilst 'other factors' are held constant. Our fmdings in 
general confirm the dichotomy of asymmetries introduced by Parkhe (1991). They 
also show how ongoing conflict between senior executives from the different sides of 
an alliance can inhibit the learning needed to overcome the Type II asymmetries in an 
alliance. Finally we have presented a number of examples in which the unsatisfactory 
outcome from the New Zealand partner's point of view has been due to the 
predominance of private benefit available to the foreign partner. In this situation the 
foreign partner will seek to maximise that rate of their learning and then neglect the 
alliance. Generally, the rate at which learning occurs with respect to both Type I and 
Type II asymmetries will be influential for the outcome of the alliance. Our research 
has produced many cases in which the New Zealand partner appeared to underestimate 
(a) the rate at which foreign partners could learn from the Type I asymmetries andior 
(b) the scope of the private benefits available to the foreign partners in which to 
exploit their new learning. The successful alliances tended to be those in which the 
attention of the parties was focused on objectives and outcomes common to all 
involved in the alliance. 
Two avenues for further research are suggested by this analysis. The first is to 
expand on the study by Lyles (1988) to investigate why learning may not occur within 
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some strategic alliances and relate this learning dysfunction to alliance outcome. 
Second, given the presence of Type I effects, differential rates of learning, and the 
scope for a predominance of private benefits, there is a clear risk of self-seeking 
opportunism for some parties to an alliance. This lends itself to an agency theory 
formulation and a focus on how best to structure or manage the alliance to minimise 
such behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND CONTRACTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter found that in some cases the failure of an international 
alliance to meet expectations was due to a lack of basic agreement at a senior 
management level on how the alliance should be managed. Two important facets of 
alliance management are the setting of the objectives and, bearing in mind the 
opportunity for self-seeking behaviour by alliance members, the establishment and 
nature of the contracts which underpin the relationship. Neither ofthese has received 
the attention they deserve from academic researchers in part no doubt to the 
difficulties of both access to data and measurement. This chapter compares findings 
from the case studies with recent prescriptive management writing on strategic 
alliances. The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first six recent books on 
strategic alliances, published between 1990 and 1996, are summarised. These books 
are mainly targeted at the strategic alliance practitioner rather than at the academic. 
This is followed by detailed case histories of 3 of the 14 case study firms. The firms 
have been chosen to represent the full range of experience and practice on alliance 
objectives and contracts. The third section develops two general propositions and 
seeks to confirm these in an analysis of other firms involved in the study. The chapter 
concludes with an integrated discussion of the findings of the management literature 
and the multiple case studies evidence on alliance objectives and alliance contracts. 
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6.2 THE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Six books on strategic alliances published between 1990 and 1996 are 
summarised and while we do not claim this to be an exhaustive review, it does provide 
a fair overall picture of the contemporary prescriptive literature on the management of 
strategic alliances. Brief details on each of the six books are set out in Table 21 below. 
Table 21 
Recent Management Literature on Strategic Alliances 
AUTHOR'S 
BOOK TITLE AUTHOR(S) OCCUPATION SAMPLE 
Partnerships for Profit: Structuring and Jordan D. Lewis Management About 36 case 
Managing Strategic Alliances (1990) Consultant studies. 
Strategic Alliances: Fonnation, Peter Lorange and Academics 29 case studies. 
Implementation and Evolution Johan Roos (1992) 
Collaborating to Compete: Using Joel Bleeke and Management Case studies, 
Strategic Alliances and Acquisitions in David Emst Consultants number un-
the Global Marketplace (editors) (1993) known. 
Estimate 5-50. 
Intemational Strategic Alliances: Co- David Faulkner Academic 10 case studies 
operating to Compete (1995) and survey data 
from 57 
alliances. 
Strategic Alliances: An Entrepreneurial Michael Y. Academics Case studies, 
Approach to Globalization Yoshino and U. number 
Srinivasa unknown. 
Rangan (1995) Estimate 25-30. 
The Alliance Revolution: The New Benjamin Gomes- Academic 40 case studies 
Shape of Business Rivalry Casseres (1996) 
Four ofthe books are by academic authors who also do a considerable amount of 
management consulting. The authors ofthe remaining two books are full-time 
management consultants. The book edited by Bleeke and Ernst (1993) is considered to 
represent the well known management consulting company McKinsey & Company's 
"collective best thinking on how to succeed in cross-border alliances and acquisitions" 
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(Bleeke and Ernst 1993, pxiii). The books are mainly based on findings from case 
studies. However, none of the authors set out their analytical procedures in detail. 
The practitioner studies and the academic studies tend to focus on different 
aspects of strategic alliances. As an example, partner asymmetries have received 
considerable attention in the academic literature. but very little is said about it in the 
practitioner studies. The practitioner studies seem to strive for a practical blueprint for 
alliance managers. 
6.2.1 ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES 
Lewis (1990, p21S) stresses that the alliance partners must share a common 
objective. In terms of defining a joint venture, he goes on to say (Lewis 1990, p 129) 
that "it isn't possible or even wise to address each contingency. but every major 
function, policy. and outside relationship should be discussed, as well as issues likely 
to affect venture performance." Lewis' (1990, p21S) view on the importance of a 
common alliance objective is shared by Lorange and Roos (1992. pl06) who use the 
term goal congruence: 
Because a number of firms can participate in an alliance, it is crucial that the 
objective-setting process allows for a sharing of outlooks regarding goals; that 
a common information base is established; and that the process is highly 
interactive, based on broad representation among all the relevant focal parts of 
the organizations. This ensures buy-in regarding the pursued strategy, 
establishes goal congruence and avoids information asymmetry. 
Bleeke and Ernst (1993, p IS) look at the issue of alliance objectives from a 
slightly different angle. They stress that it is important to let alliance objectives 
evolve. The two authors state that "the hallmark of successful alliances that endure is 
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their ability to evolve beyond initial expectations and objectives. This requires 
autonomy for the venture and flexibility on the part of the parents." Furthermore, 
Faulkner (1995, p89) has a view similar to those of Lewis (1990, p218) and Lorange 
and Roos (1992, p106) in saying that: 
The potential problem of conflicting objectives is everpresent in alliances, 
since, perhaps, the partners wish to obtain the advantages of joint activity 
while retaining their individual autonomy. As individual autonomy inevitably 
presents the potential for the development of conflicting objectives, a 
substantial contribution to success must therefore depend upon the quality of 
'mutual forbearance'. 
Furthermore, Faulkner (1995, p90) contributes to the discussion on alliance objectives 
by saying that "congruent goals are indeed important, but the area is frequently left as 
ambiguous between the partners." 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995, p 198) promote what they refer to as boundaryless 
management. Boundaryless management considers the strategic interests of the 
alliance partners, and thereby addresses the issue of alliance objectives. In the words 
of Yoshino and Rangan (1995, p198): 
The boundaryless management Welch [CEO, General Electric] is calling for 
considers the strategic interests of both parties and tries to ensure that alliance 
structures achieve a balance between the needs of cooperation and compe-
tition. It eschews the not-invented-here syndrome, promoting instead a climate 
that fosters organizationalleaming. It permits firms confronted with problems 
to devise win-win strategies and to enjoy the fruits of cooperation without 
compromising core technological and managerial competencies. Boundaryless 
management enables firms to retain their independence even as they leverage 
one another's strengths to compete effectively in their respective markets. 
However, the two authors do not seem to address the issue of how to go about putting 
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boundaryless management into practice. Finally, Gomes-Casseres (1996, p160) is 
primarily concerned about alliance objectives relating to situations where 
multinational and local partners form alliances. However, he recognises that the issue 
of alliance objectives is not unique to those situations alone: 
The role of coordination costs as a constraint on alliance formation surfaced in 
the earliest studies of international joint ventures. Coordination costs expressed 
themselves in these studies as a problem of geographic rationalization - the 
coordination of a firm's global activities to achieve higher total profits. As a 
general matter, multinational firms aim to maximize global profits, while local 
partners aim to maximize local profits. Because these two objectives are not 
always congruent, ... the interests of the partners are often at odds. Local 
alliances and joint ventures may thus effectively block the global firm from 
rationalizing its operations worldwide. This argument is not limited to joint 
ventures between multinationals and local partners. Conflicts of interest can 
occur whenever the objectives of partners differ. 
Gomes-Casseres (1996, p 160) goes on to say that "these coordination problems are 
often difficult to recognize and manage. The problems do not surface in all alliances, 
simply because not all alliances involve serious trade-offs between partner interests." 
However, he makes no attempts to offer any suggestions on how to manage the 
problems he has identified. 
In summary, the six management books on strategic alliances all agree that it is 
important for the alliance partners to agree on alliance objectives. Some authors point 
out that to do so is not easy. However, none ofthe authors seem to offer any 
suggestions on how the problem can be managed. Table 22 on the next page 
summarises the findings from the management literature. 
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Table 22 
Summary of Management Literature Findings on Alliance Objectives 
Author Findings on Alliance Objectives 
Jordan D. Lewis (1990) (p218) You must be sure an arrangement is really an 
alliance - mutual need, shared risks, and a common 
objective. 
(p129) It isn't possible or even wise to address each 
contingency [in terms of defining a j oint venture], but 
every major function, policy, and outside relationship 
should be discussed, as well as issues likely to affect 
venture performance. 
Peter Lorange and (p I 06) Because a number of firms can participate in an 
Johan Roos (1992) alliance, it is crucial that the objective-setting process 
allows for a sharing of outlooks regarding goals; that a 
common information base is established; and that the 
process is highly interactive, based on broad 
representation among all the relevant focal parts of the 
organizations. This ensures buy-in regarding the pursued 
strategy, establishes goal congruence and avoids 
information asymmetry. 
Joel Bleeke and David (p18) (written by Bleeke and Ernst) The hallmark of 
Ernst (editors) (1993) successful alliances that endure is their ability to evolve 
beyond initial expectations and objectives. This requires 
autonomy for the venture and flexibility on the part of the 
parents. 
David Faulkner (1995) (p89) The potential problem of conflicting objectives is 
everpresent in alliances, since, perhaps, the partners wish 
to obtain the advantages of joint activity while retaining 
their individual autonomy. As individual autonomy 
inevitably presents the potential for the development of 
conflicting objectives, a substantial contribution to success 
must therefore depend upon the quality of "mutual 
forbearance. " 
(p90) It may be concluded, then, that congruent goals are 
indeed important, but the area is frequently left as 
ambiguous between the partners. 
continued on the next page 
Author 
Michael Y. Yoshino and 
U. Srinivasa Rangan 
(1995) 
Benjamin Gomes-
Casseres (1996) 
Table 22 
(continued) 
Findings on Alliance Objectives 
(P198) The boundaryless management Welch [CEO, 
General Electric] is calling for considers the strategic 
interests of both parties and tries to ensure that alliance 
structures achieve a balance between the needs of 
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cooperation and competition. It eschews the not-invented-
here syndrome, promoting instead a climate that fosters 
organizational learning. It permits firms confronted with 
problems to devise win-win strategies and to enjoy the 
fruits of cooperation without compromising core 
technological and managerial competencies. Boundaryless 
management enables firms to retain their independence 
even as they leverage one another's strengths to compete 
effectively in their respective markets. 
(P 160) The role of coordination costs as a constraint on 
alliance formation surfaced in the earliest studies of 
intemationaljoint ventures. Coordination costs expressed 
themselves in these studies as a problem of geographic 
rationalization - the coordination of a firm's global 
activities to achieve higher total profits. As a general 
matter, multinational firms aim to maximize global 
profits, while local partners aim to maximize local profits. 
Because these two objectives are not always congruent, ... 
the interests of the partners are often at odds. Local 
alliances and joint ventures may thus effectively block the 
global firm from rationalizing its operations worldwide. 
This argument is not limited to joint ventures between 
multinationals and local partners. Conflicts of interest can 
occur whenever the objectives of partners differ. 
(P161) These coordination problems are often difficult to 
recognize and manage. The problems do not surface in all 
alliances, simply because not all alliances involve serious 
trade-offs between partner interests. 
6.2.2 ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
Lewis (1990, p128) refers extensively to the American company Corning's 
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alliance practices in his book. He holds that Corning "may be the most successful joint 
venturer in the world." According to Lewis (1990, p225) Corning actively uses the 
alliance negotiations process to learn about their potential partner's style. This 
learning process then becomes one element in concluding whether or not they can 
work comfortably with this particular potential partner. From the within-case analysis, 
we remember that VE3, the deep sea fishing, processing and marketing company, also 
actively uses the alliance negotiations process to learn about their potential partner's 
style. 
Lewis (1990, p231) also suggests that "managers who will have day-to-day 
responsibility for an alliance should negotiate it" rather than top level executives or 
legal experts. The reason for this is that these people are more likely to bring up 
relevant issues, and at the same time, partner bonds are formed early among the people 
who will be working together ifthe alliance is formed. From the within-case analysis, 
we remember that VE6, the producer board, also let alliance managers negotiate 
alliance contracts. 
In terms of the contents of the alliance contract, Lewis (1990, p231) referring 
to Corning's practices, suggests that "all issues of concern to either party should be 
included" and that "nothing should be taken on trust that can be reasonably 
formalized." However, the alliance contract should include a clause on termination of 
the alliance so that "each partner can leave if it must" (Lewis 1990, p128). 
Furthermore, according to Lewis (1990, pl28), Corning "wants termination to be 
difficult." By doing so, they hope that their partner is more likely to talk to them about 
any issues which are bothering them rather than to just walle away. 
In contrast to Lewis (1990), Lorange and Roos (1992) spend very little space 
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on alliance contracts in their book. The authors (Lorange and Roos 1992, p183) limit 
themselves to point out that cross cultural differences have an impact on negotiations. 
For example, Japanese companies tend to spend a longer time on contract negotiations 
than do American companies. In terms of time and timing, Ohmae (1993) (as reported 
in Bleeke and Ernst 1993, p45) is concerned about the static dimension of timing and 
alliance contracts. The author points out that a contract only reflects the situation at a 
specific point of time: 
Contracts-even at their best-can only reflect an understanding of costs and 
markets and technologies at the moment companies sign them. When things 
change, as they always do, the partners don't really try to compromise and 
adjust. They look to the contract and start pointing fingers. After all, managers 
are human. They are sweet on their own companies and tolerant of their own 
mistakes. Tolerance goes way down when partners cause mistakes. 
In other words, it is important for the alliance partners to remain flexible and to adjust 
as things change. Furthermore, in line with the findings of Lewis (1990, p231), 
Krubasik and Lautenschlager (1993) (as reported in Bleeke and Ernst 1993, p62) 
suggest that "in successful negotiations, problems do not get swept under the carpet, 
conflicts get addressed early, and balanced solutions get found." Further, Faulkner 
(1995, pI87), along the lines ofLorange and Roos (1992) spend very little space on 
alliance contracts in his book. However, he (Faulkner 1995, pI87), agrees with Lewis 
(1990, p231) in that "alliance negotiations heavily attended by corporate lawyers set a 
bad atmosphere for a subsequent trusting operation." Yoshino and Rangan (1995, p86) 
also spend little effort on alliance contracts by limiting themselves to pointing out that 
negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts can be costly. Finally, Gomes-
Casseres (1996, p33) looks at alliance contracts briefly from a transaction cost 
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perspective by stating that "to the extent that contracts are costly to negotiate, monitor, 
and enforce, transactions will be carried out within firms." Transaction cost theory 
(Williamson 1975, 1985) is discussed in the literature review chapter of this thesis. 
Table 23 below summarises the findings from the management literature on 
alliance contracts. 
Table 23 
Summary of Management Literature Findings on Alliance Contracts 
Author Findings on Alliance Contracts 
Jordan D. Lewis (1990) (P225) Corning learns about a firm's style before and 
during negotiations to conclude whether they can work 
together comfortably. 
(P231) Managers who will have day-to-day responsibility 
for an alliance should negotiate it and write the business 
plan. 
(P231) The contents of an alliance agreement depend on 
firms' lmowledge of each other. Corning believes nothing 
should be taken on trust that can reasonably be formalized. 
All issues of concern to either party should be included. 
But details of implementation, monitoring, penalties, and 
control should be held to a minimum. 
(P128) As with all alliances, plans for joint ventures 
should include understandings about termination. This 
way, each partner can leave if it must. Yet Corning, which 
may be the most successful joint venturer in the world, 
wants termination to be difficult. Corning tries to create 
the attitude: "If you are unhappy, let's sit down and talk 
about it; don't just walle away." 
Peter Lorange and (P183) Cross cultural differences have an impact on 
Johan Roos (1992) negotiations, for example, the Americans and the Japanese 
tend to use time differently. 
continued on the next page 
Author 
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(P45) (written by Ohmae (1993)) Contracts-even at their 
best-can only reflect an understanding of costs and 
markets and technologies at the moment companies sign 
them. When things change, as they always do, the partners 
don't really try to compromise and adjust. They look to 
the contract and start pointing fingers. After all, managers 
are human. They are sweet on their own companies and 
tolerant of their own mistakes. Tolerance goes way down 
when partners cause mistakes. 
(P62) (written by Krubasik and Lautenschlager (1993)) In 
successful negotiations, problems do not get swept under 
the carpet, conflicts get addressed early, and balanced 
solutions get found. 
(P 187) Alliance negotiations heavily attended by corporate 
lawyers set a bad atmosphere for a subsequent trusting 
operation. 
(P86) Among the costs of managing an alliance are those 
associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing 
contracts. Contracts that must cover a multitude of 
contingencies or accommodate disagreements between 
partners regarding relative values of contributions are 
difficult to write and hence costly. 
(P33) To the extent that contracts are costly to negotiate, 
monitor, and enforce, transactions will be carried out 
within firms. 
6.3 WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
This section presents a detailed within-case analysis of three of the 14 case 
study firms. Due to the limited space available, it is not practical to bring more than 
three detailed cases into the main text of the thesis. The firms featured here were 
selected on the basis that they provide considerable insight into the wide variation 
which exists in the degree of formality involved in the setting of alliance objectives 
and the nature of any alliance contract. The first case (VE6) has the most formal 
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systems and procedures in place. The final company (UF1) has the most informal and 
MF2C sits in between the two extremes. 
The within-case analysis is of a descriptive nature, and the purpose is to 
generate insight (Eisenhardt 1989) by demonstrating how the issues of alliance 
contracts and alliance objectives arise in the firms. The three cases form a basis for the 
development of the theoretical propositions used to guide the case study analysis later 
in the chapter. The two main themes to note in the three case descriptions are risk and 
trust. 
Case One - Firm Code VE6 
The New Zealand organisation, a producer board (hereafter referred to as the 
Board), is responsible for the export marketing of all New Zealand dairy products on a 
global basis. It has an annual turnover in excess of NZ$5 billion, and based on 
turnover, it is the second largest company in New Zealand. The Board employs more 
than 6,000 people, and it has established a network of over eighty subsidiary and 
associate companies around the world. Its two major competitors throughout the world 
are Kraft and Nestle. More than 90 percent of all dairy products produced in New 
Zealand are exported. 
The Board is controlled by New Zealand dairy farmers. They own, on a 
cooperative basis, dairy companies which own the Board's total capital ofNZ$750 
million. Each cooperative's ownership share is calculated as the proportion of 
qualifying mi1kfat that it produces. Generally speaking, the Board's net profit is paid 
to the dairy cooperatives that pay their net profit to the dairy farmers. 
The Board is probably the most experienced organisation in New Zealand in 
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tenns of international strategic alliances. All its past and present international strategic 
alliances are joint ventures, and the first was fonned in 1963 with a partner from 
Malaysia. This particular j oint venture is no longer in operation. The Board has 
fonned some 35 international joint ventures in total. Ofthese, 18 are still in operation 
as joint ventures. Of the 17 joint venture relationships which have been tenninated, 
eight have become wholly owned subsidiaries of the Board, six have been sold and the 
remaining three joint ventures have been wound up. The Board's ownership share in 
each joint venture varies, but it is at least 30 percent. The joint ventures have been 
fonned with partners from all over the world. 
The development of most of their joint venture relationships have been done 
incrementally. Explains the Group General Manager Marketing of the Board: 
It is very much like a whole development pattern all around the world, 
we move from a liaison office to small scale trading company, and we 
move to either ingredient operation or food service or consumer 
depending on how that market is developing. We have taken 
incremental exposure right around the world. It depends on the scale 
of the development of the marketplace, infrastructure development, 
government regulations, and what we can and can't do. 
The Board has found that it is important for the alliance partners to agree on 
alliance objectives: 
You have to agree where the joint venture is going. One of the 
things is really definition of individual and mutual objectives. It 
must be clear, don't hide the fact that you want to actually get a 
higher transfer price for your ingredients going in for example. 
You may have to offset some arrangements in markets against that, 
but you are better off with these things out in the open, rather than 
having hidden agendas. So that is pretty critical. Individuals' 
objectives are always different. You can't have a partner who says 
that it is my objective to increase the wealth of the New Zealand 
dairy fanner. It is our objective. Or the other way around, it is his 
objective to increase the wealth of his shareholders, it may be 
himself or his family or a whole group of public shareholders. It is 
our objective to increase the wealth of our shareholders. You need 
to do that right up front rather than say that we will fix it later on, 
none of these things are fixed later on, they fall over. 
As far as alliance contracts are concerned, the Board sees contracts as being 
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important, particularly in tenns of defining tenninations. At the same time, they try to 
keep the contracts simple and to be flexible. In the words ofthe Group General 
Manager Marketing: "if it is in America, it is sky high, right down to a handshake, it 
depends were you are." They also feel that it is important that alliance contracts reflect 
the fact that things change: "you have to build some flexibility into a joint venture in 
case things change, or exit clause which allow you to exit. They [joint ventures] are 
never fixed entities and they can not be because corporations mature at different 
rates." Furthennore, the Board maintains that the strategic alliance managers should 
negotiate alliance contracts rather than lawyers. 
Finally, the Manager stresses the importance of preparing your own draft 
agreement as soon as possible during the negotiation process: 
The other trick is of course to get your agreement done first. Have 
a good legal team and get your understanding down on paper first. 
So everyone is working off your agreement, not off theirs. That is 
a big advantage, it is like a home court advantage. Because of 
familiarity. 
Case Two - Firm Code MF2C 
The company, a seed company, is part of New Zealand's largest agriculture 
servicing company. The agriculture servicing company is listed on the New Zealand 
134 
stock exchange, and it has an annual turnover in the region ofNZ$600 million. The 
seed company, which has been in operation for more than 125 years, is involved in the 
research and development, production and marketing of agricultural, horticultural and 
turf seeds. It has an annual turnover of about NZ$50 million. A substantial portion of 
the company's turnover comes from sales overseas. New Zealand companies have 
long traditions in the research and development, production and marketing of 
agricultural, horticultural and turf seeds, and these companies have been and are 
extensively involved in international strategic alliances. 
The seed company has much experience with international strategic alliances 
dating back to the late 1970's. The first alliances were entered into with partners from 
countries in Europe, and the company has since then teamed up with companies from 
all parts of the world. It has formed 38 international strategic alliances since 1981.· Of 
these, 28 are licensing agreements, 9 are research and development agreements, and 
one is a joint venture. Of the 38 alliances formed, 27 are still in operation. Several of 
the strategic alliances, particularly some of the licensing agreements, are with the 
same partners. Most international strategic alliances have been formed with partners 
from the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands with 12,6 and 4 
alliances respectively. 
Many agricultural plants are proprietary and therefore protected by patents. A 
licensing agreement gives the licensee the right to produce the seeds of a particular 
proprietary plant and to sell them in a certain market. The production of seeds are 
normally done under contract by farmers rather than by the seed company itself. The 
New Zealand company is involved in licensing agreements with international partners 
both as a licensor and as a licensee. 
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Agricultural plants suitable for the southern hemisphere are usually not 
suitable for the northern hemisphere and vice versa. This means that new plant 
varieties developed by the company for New Zealand farmers are usually not suitable 
for European farmers. A new and separate plant variety will therefore have to be 
developed for northern hemisphere conditions, and this fact forms the backbone for 
the research and development agreements. The General Manager explains how it 
works: 
The alliance is that our material at an early age goes to the Dutch 
company [an alliance partner]. They work on it and change it. It 
is like a recipe, they may say that it needs a bit of this or that. Their 
material comes to us, and we see that it does not work particularly 
well in New Zealand, it has got disease and this and that. So we 
fiddle around with it. In the end we may come to varieties that 
work very well in the northern hemisphere and very well in the 
southern hemisphere. We share royalties. The alliance is working 
two ways, we are opening up the southern hemisphere to them, 
and they open up the northern hemisphere to us. 
The development of new plant varieties are long term projects. It may take as long as 
ten to fifteen years from start to finish. 
The company has implemented a system whereby they review the performance 
of each alliance with their partner once or twice a year. They have found that this 
helps to drive the performance of their alliances, particularly the research and 
development agreements which are long term projects. 
The seed company sees a role for alliance contracts, but stresses the 
importance of trust and goodwill: 
It [an alliance contract] is not a very binding agreement, people 
can walk out of the alliance if they want to, because there 
is no point in having an alliance if you have to run the alliance by 
a document. The alliance is to run on trust and goodwill. 
However, the company ensures that they have a clause in their alliance agreements 
giving them the right to terminate the alliance should their partner not perform as 
agreed. They have not terminated any agreements due to non-performance yet, but 
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they think it will happen in the near future. As an example, the company is involved in 
a research and development agreement with a Dutch firm, and this agreement covers 
all the national markets in Europe. The company has some material for the 
development of a new plant variety for the European markets. Upon discussing this 
project with their partner in the Netherlands, their partner responded that they are 
unable, for a number of reasons, to proceed with the project. The New Zealand partner 
therefore has the right, under the agreement, to enter into an agreement with another 
partner in Europe for this particular plant development project, and it is likely that 
they will do so. 
Case Three - Firm Code UFl 
The company is an importer and distributor of electrical equipment. It was 
established in 1912, and it has some 20 employees. The Managing Director of the 
company has extensive business interests outside of the company, and he sits on the 
Board of Directors of several corporations. He is also active in different business 
interest groups. 
The company has experience from four international strategic alliances, and 
these are two joint ventures, one co-marketing agreement and one consortium. All 
alliances are still in operation, and the first was established in 1989. The company's 
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partners are all from countries in Asia including Malaysia and Singapore, and the 
Managing Director was born and grew up in Malaysia. 
In terms of alliance performance, all the strategic alliances are meeting or 
exceeding the company's objectives. The Managing Director contributes the good 
performance of the alliances to two major factors involving the formation and the day 
to day running of the alliances. First of all, the fact that the Managing Director has a 
very good lmowledge of the markets and business practices in Asia, as well as an 
extensive network of business contacts. These contacts are often personal friends of 
the Managing Director. This means that the New Zealand company is able to get 
involved in commercially viable ventures with partners who have got both the 
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resources and the commitment to see the venture through. 
The second factor involves the day to day running of the alliances. The 
alliances are obviously meeting various challenges like any other business venture. 
However, since the Chief Executives involved often are personal friends, there is a 
strong incentive for the parties to address and resolve problems as and when they 
occur. One example is an alliance in Malaysia involving technical expertise from the 
New Zealand company. Whenever the New Zealand engineers encounter any 
problematic situation with regard to their Malaysian colleagues, they will make a 
detailed verbatim report for the Managing Director in New Zealand. He will then 
interpret the situation, particularly with regard to non-verbal or hidden meanings, and 
decide what the appropriate action should be. 
The Managing Director holds that it is important to be flexible to your 
partner's needs and wants. This is how he describes his experiences relating to alliance 
contracts: 
Most of my Asian ... most of my Asian dealings, I do not have any 
agreement at all, you know, but I have a handshake. Whereas, you 
see, my American counterpart and my British counterpart, they 
will send me, you see, half an inch thick of agreement verifying 
you shall do this, I shall do that. 
As far as the strategic alliances between Asians are concerned, there seems to be a 
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connection between the lack of legal contracts and the personal friendships involved. 
Said the Managing Director: 
In Asia, the best reason you see for me to buy from him and do 
business with him is because he's my friend. Because if anything 
goes wrong, he's got to fix it for me, and he's got to give me a 
fair deal, not the cheapest deal, but he's got to give me a fair 
deal because he's my friend. And my friend will also recognize 
that hey, you know, because we are friends we are there, you 
see, to do business. 
Ring and Van De Yen (1992) discuss what effect the level of risk in a deal and 
reliance on trust between organisations which cooperate have on governance structure. 
Varying combinations of risk and reliance on trust will direct the organisations to 
choose different forms of governance structures. In terms of the three cases above, it 
appears that the attitude ofVE6 (case one) reflects high risk and low trust. On the 
other hand, MF2C (case two) seems to have lower risk and higher trust. Finally, UFI 
(case three) is the most 'informal' because it confronts low risk with high trust. 
The management texts are, to some extent, being applied by these three firms. 
It was pointed out earlier that Lewis (1990, p218) stresses that the alliance partners 
must have a common objective. This view is in line with that ofthe first case study 
firm, VE6. VE6's view is also similar to that of Bleeke and Ernst (1993, p18) who 
suggest that it is important to let alliance objectives evolve. Specifically, the two 
authors hold that "the hallmark of successful alliances that endure is their ability to 
evolve beyond initial expectations and objectives. This requires autonomy for the 
venture and flexibility on the part ofthe parents." 
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Lewis (1990, p128) suggests that the alliance contract should include a clause 
on termination of the alliance so that "each partner can leave if it must." This view is 
similar to that of the seed company, MF2C, as seen in the within-case analysis. 
Furthermore, Ohmae (1993) stresses that a contract only reflects the situation at a 
specific point of time. It is therefore important for the alliance partners to remain 
flexible and to adjust as things change. This view is similar to those of both the 
producer board, VE6, and the electrical equipment company, UFl, as seen in the 
within-case analysis. 
6.4 CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
This section presents the findings on alliance objectives and alliance contracts 
from the other case studies. 
6.4.1 ALLIAJ'-rCE OBJECTIVES 
Based on the above discussion, the theoretical proposition used to guide the 
case study analysis (Yin 1994, pl04) on alliance objectives is: 
Strategic alliances formed by partners who agree on alliance objectives will 
perform better than alliances formed by partners who do not agree on alliance 
objectives. 
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Even though the main focus of this chapter is on managerial aspects of 
strategic alliance formation, rather than on theoretical dimensions of strategic alliance 
research, Figure 7 on the next page shows how alliance objectives fit in with the core 
theoretical dimensions of strategic alliance research. 
Figure 7 
Core Theoretical Dimensions of Strategic Alliance Research and 
Alliance Objectives 
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VE2, the designer and manufacturer of technology for people who are visually 
impaired, links the satisfactory perfonnance of one of their international j oint ventures 
to the ability ofthe alliance partners to agree on the objectives of the alliance: 
The UK joint venture was very successful because it was a stand alone entity, 
it was not in any way being influenced or manipulated for any other purpose, it 
had a pretty clear role, and it had complete freedom to act within the scope the 
board gave it. There were no conflicts of interest, even though the partner had 
another business in this field, he was happy to stand back and say you guys 
develop the business as strongly as you can even though at times we would 
take some business away from his other company. Even thought there was a 
potential for conflict, it never happened because of the way our partner chose 
to approach the thing. He never wanted to say, you guys can't go after that, 
this is my other company's domain. There were never any attempts to 
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manipulate the situation. 
Company VB3 
This major fishing company has experience from several international joint 
ventures and other forms of strategic alliance with both domestic and international 
partners. Some of its alliances have performed better than expected while others have 
done worse than expected. The company has found that it is most important for 
alliance partners to agree on alliance objectives: 
That's one of the things that joint ventures have got to spend a lot of 
time on in the early stages to make sure that your objectives are 
compatible 
Company VES 
VES, the multi-disciplinary consulting practice, has similar experiences 
relating to the relationship between alliance partners' objectives and alliance 
performance: 
The primary reason why the [name] joint venture has performed better than the 
other two co-operative relationships is that the parent companies and their 
senior management were aligned. It is important that there was an 
understanding between the Chief Executives. So that when things went wrong 
in the early stages, there could brief, simple, high level discussion that would 
quickly sort out the strategies in the applications that were getting a little bit 
complicated and offthe rails. Certainly both companies' personnel needed 
remainders on occasion what the modus operandi of the joint venture was, and 
the strategic objective ofthe parents. 
CompanyUF2 
Some strategic alliance partners have to address the issue of transfer pricing as 
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part of their alliance activities. One of the case study firms, the sheepskin tanner, code 
UF2, describes such an issue relating to their joint venture in Australia as a head-on 
conflict: 
Well, their [the Australian partner] core business is different from ours, 
significantly different. They are a skin dealer so our business is to take raw 
skin, raw sheep skins and to process, tan them and dye them and then sell them 
to a market. And so the company, this joint venture partner is a skin dealer so 
his core business is to buy skins from the ... from the sale yards and through 
the meat companies. They're a skin dealer, we're a purchaser of skins. He 
wants to sell skins to us at as high a price as he can and we want to buy skins 
at as Iowa price as we can. So there's a head-on conflict there. We lmew there 
was a conflict. And we knew that it was going to be difficult to resolve but we 
did that quite lmowingly and completely with open eyes. We kept the supplier-
customer relationship at arm's length and so that's just the normal negotiating 
that goes on and so we resolve that conflict, I suppose you can say, with 
difficulty but at the end of the day, we come to a final price point just the same 
as we do with any other supplier. 
CompauyUF3 
UF3, the diversified group, has, like UF2, also experienced conflicting alliance 
objectives although the conflict seems to be less severe. This is how the Managing 
Director ofthe New Zealand company describes the conflict and its effect: 
Our objective has been to expand our business in Hungary, to talce the 
expertise which we have developed here into another market where that 
expertise is needed and via that when the base is secured, potentially get an 
opening into the EEC. On the other hand, our partners were looking for a 
passive investment providing a good return, and also growing their banking 
operation being involved with a western company. The state farm partner was 
hoping to get a greater return from their farming operation and their 
investment in the development of the farm. For the state farm it has been a 
long term investment, and for the banks it has been a shorter term investment. 
One bank has pulled out now, the joint venture did not perform as they had 
expected. It may not have resulted in running the operation better, it may have 
resulted in a greater input from the partners, if the partners had felt that their 
objectives were being met because they ended up being passive investors. 
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Companies MFl (A&B) 
The two case study companies with joint ventures in China (MFIA and 
MFIB) seem to have handled the issue of alliance partner objectives somewhat 
differently. The cement company, (MFIA), whose joint venture performance so far 
has been unsatisfactory, seem to have accepted that their own alliance objectives are 
different compared to those held by their Chinese partner. This is how the Managing 
Director of the New Zealand company sees the situation: 
They [the partners' alliance objectives] are not mutually exclusive but they are 
not necessarily parallel. I ... I think that we will ... I think we will come to a 
point where ... where they diverge significantly enough, something will be 
done about it. 
On the other hand, the brewing company, (MFIB), whose joint venture operation in 
China is profitable and meeting their expectations, entered into an extensive partner 
selection process in order to malce sure, among other things, that they formed a joint 
venture with a Chinese partner having compatible alliance objectives: 
The new management is seeing two shareholders who are both profit 
motivated. That is not always the case in China. Quite often in China you see 
[that] they want to keep a large base of employment. For us it was important to 
find a partner who wanted to drive the performance ofthe brewery. They 
wanted to drive it so that they could get cash out and invest it in other 
economic activities in their district. We wanted to drive it to increase market 
share and build volume and brand in the business in the region. 
In summary, this case study evidence tends to provide some literal replication 
in support of the general proposition that strategic alliances formed by partners who 
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can agree on alliance objectives will perform better than alliances formed by partners 
who do not agree on alliance objectives. Table 24 below summarises the findings. 
VES 
Table 24 
Summary of Case Study Findings on Alliance Objectives 
EXPERIENCE WITH ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES 
ement on alliance objectives contributed to alliance success. 
Worth spending time to get compatible objectives 
Agreement on alliance objectives contributed to alliance success. 
alliance objectives made the operation of the alliance more 
ed. 
t alliance objectives resulted in reduced input from some of the 
partners. 
Different alliance objectives seen as a potential source of future conflict. 
Agreement on alliance objectives contributed to alliance success. 
6.4.2 ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
Based on the above discussion, the theoretical proposition used to guide the 
case study analysis (Yin 1994, p104) on alliance contracts is: 
Formal strategic alliance contracts are not necessary for alliance success. 
Even though the main focus of this chapter is on managerial aspects of 
strategic alliance formation, rather than on theoretical dimensions of strategic alliance 
research, Figure 8 on the next page shows how alliance contracts fit in with the core 
theoretical dimensions of strategic alliance research. 
Figure 8 
Core Theoretical Dimensions of Strategic Alliance Research and 
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Companies VEl and VE3 
Alliance 
Contracts 
Both of these companies have had extensive experience in international 
alliances and both place considerable store on the establishing an alliance contract. 
VEl holds that the management should negotiate alliance contracts rather than 
lawyers. The role of lawyers would then be "to translate commercial principles into 
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legal contracts." Furthermore, the company feels that "it is important to put down 10-
12 points on the deal, so you can always come back to it and say this is what we 
agreed you know, we are getting off the rails here." 
For firm VE3, once the objectives of its international fishing ventures are 
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agreed upon, these are then incorporated into a legal contract between the partners. 
The contract is also fulfilling another important function, that of developing a better 
understanding of the partner: 
But, why do we spend so much time on these agreements? Really, not to 
have them sitting on the drawer but to understand what the expectations of 
the other party are, how they will approach things, you know, what is the 
way they think, what are they looking to get out of this, how will they 
approach a problem. That is the real value in it. Because once you have done 
it, hopefully you never pull that out of your drawer again. You have 
understood the party. 
Companies VE4 and VE5 
On the other hand, two other firms with experience of international alliances 
have found little value in alliance contracts. This is how the Chief Executive Officer 
of VE4 puts it: 
If it [a strategic alliance] needs a long contract, then I think you are on the 
wrong track. So my final principle there is that the agreements are almost 
worthless, they [strategic alliances] really only work when both parties have a 
mutual benefit and shal<:e hands and the principals are actively supporting it. 
This sentiment is shared by the multi-disciplinary consulting practice (VE5): 
If you don't have trust between the partners, you can have a whole lot of 
shareholders' agreements, operating agreements and so on, but it is an 
absolutely waste oftime. 
In summary, the companies are divided in their views on the importance of 
contracts to alliance outcome. There is clearly no basis here for any literal replication 
in the case evidence sufficient to challenge the proposition that formal strategic 
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alliance contracts are not necessary for alliance success. Table 25 below summarises 
the findings. 
Table 25 
Summary of Case Study Findings on Alliance Contracts 
FIRM EXPERIENCES WITH ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
VEl Keep lawyers out of negotiations, use lawyers to translate commercial 
principles into legal contracts. It is important to put down 10-12 points on 
the deal, so you can always come back to it and say this is what we agreed 
you know, we are getting off the rails here. 
VE3 The preparation of legal contracts provides an opportunity to learn about 
the other party. The development of understanding is the real value of the 
time spent in producing such agreements. 
VE4 If it [a strategic alliance] needs a long contract, then I think you are on the 
wrong track. So my final principle there is that the agreements are almost 
worthless, they [strategic alliances] really only work when both parties 
have a mutual benefit and shake hands and the principals are actively 
supporting it. 
VE5 If you don't have trust between the partners, you can have a whole lot of 
shareholders' agreements, operating agreements and so on, but it is an 
absolutely waste of time. 
6.5 BEST PRACTICES ON ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND CONTRACTS 
The objective of this section is to develop strategic alliance best practices on 
alliance obj ectives and contracts. Overall, both the management literature and the 
strategic alliance practitioners consider it important for the strategic alliance partners 
to agree on alliance objectives. Some practitioners said that agreement on alliance 
objectives contributed positively to the performance of their strategic alliances. In the 
words of one alliance manager: "the primary reason why the [name] joint venture has 
performed better than the other two co-operative relationships is that the parent 
companies and their senior management were aligned." However, there seems to be 
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some subtle differences between the views of the management literature and the 
strategic alliance practitioners. First of all, the management literature does not touch 
upon how alliance partners can actually go about agreeing on alliance objectives. Why 
is this so? Could it be that the authors consider the answer to be obvious, or is it that 
the answer is complex? From the case study evidence it appears that it is more likely 
to be the latter rather than the former. The alliance practitioners seem to regard the 
issue as complex and therefore not something that can be resolved over a short period 
of time. It takes time and effort from all the partners involved in order to agree on 
alliance objectives which all partners can live with. Nor should the issue be forced 
through. As an example, the brewing company, (MFIB), spent a considerable amount 
oftime, and other resources, on the formation process of its joint venture in China. 
The second subtle difference between the views of the management literature 
and the strategic alliance practitioners is that even though both groups agree that it is 
important for the alliance partners to agree on alliance objectives, the point seems to 
be stressed harder by the alliance practitioners. As an example, one alliance 
practitioner (VES) states: 
The primary reason why the [name] j oint venture has performed better than the 
other two co-operative relationships is that the parent companies and their 
senior management were aligned. 
The above discussion leads us to two best practices on strategic alliance 
objectives. First, obtaining a clear agreement on alliance objectives is very important 
as this does contribute to alliance success. Second, while reaching agreement on 
alliance objectives may often be a lengthy process, it should not be forced. Rather it 
150 
should be regarded as an important period for learning as much as possible about the 
other party. 
Only one of the management books on strategic alliances (Lewis 1990) covers 
the topic of alliance contracts to any extent. It is therefore likely that the other authors 
see alliance contracts as having little impact on alliance success since they pay so little 
attention to the topic. This can be seen as support for the proposition that formal 
strategic alliance contracts have no effect on the success of an alliance. The data from 
two of the three case studies support this proposition. The first best practice on 
strategic alliance contracts will therefore be that formal strategic alliance contracts 
have no effect on the success of an alliance. 
Both Lewis (1990, p22S) and VE3, one ofthe most experienced strategic 
alliance firms, (as established in the within-case analysis) hold that strategic alliance 
contract negotiations should be viewed as a learning process. This is the second best 
practice on strategic alliance contracts. 
The managers who are going to run the strategic alliance on a daily basis 
should negotiate all alliance agreements. The role of lawyers is to translate 
commercial principles into legal contracts. This becomes the third best practice on 
strategic alliance contracts. There is support for this best practice from company VEl 
and from Lewis (1990, p231) and Faulkner (199S, p187). 
Two of the case study firms (VE4 and YES) stress the need for trust among the 
alliance partners. Says the Chief Executive of the multi-disciplinary consulting 
practice, VES: 
If you don't have trust between the partners, you can have a whole lot of 
shareholders' agreements, operating agreements and so on, but it is an 
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absolutely waste of time. 
Two of the management books (Faulkner 1995 and Yoshino and Rangan 1995) deal 
with trust among alliance partners on a general basis, and not specifically related to 
alliance contracts. Faulkner (1995, p37) holds that "it is one thing to set up systems 
and devise organizations, but if mutual trust does not exist there is not likely to be a 
successful alliance." Along similar lines, Yoshino and Rangan (1995, p124) suggest 
that "in the absence of trust, alliance partner's expectations are likely to go unfulfilled, 
exacerbating suspicion and disappointment and leading to a vicious cycle." The fourth 
best practice on strategic alliance contracts is therefore that a strategic alliance can not 
be run by contracts alone. It has to be run on a combination of contractual agreements 
and trust. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Two important facets of alliance management are the setting of the objectives 
and, bearing in mind the opportunity for self-seeking behaviour by alliance members, 
the establishment and nature of the contracts which underpin the relationship. Neither 
of these has received the attention they deserve from academic researchers in part no 
doubt to the difficulties of both access to data and measurement. This chapter 
compares findings from the case studies with recent prescriptive management writing 
on strategic alliances. 
Overall, both the management literature and the strategic alliance practitioners 
consider it important for the strategic alliance partners to agree on alliance objectives. 
Some alliance practitioners said that agreement on alliance objectives contributed 
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positively to the perfOlmance of their strategic alliances. Hence, obtaining a clear 
agreement on alliance objectives is very important as this does contribute to alliance 
success. In addition, while reaching agreement on alliance objectives may often be a 
lengthy process, it should not be forced. It should rather be regarded as an important 
period for learning as much as possible about the other party. 
Only one of the management books on strategic alliances (Lewis 1990) covers 
the topic of alliance contracts to any extent. It is therefore likely that the other authors 
see alliance contracts as having little impact on alliance success since they pay so little 
attention to the topic. This can be seen as support for the proposition that formal 
strategic alliance contracts have no effect on the success of an alliance. Two of the 
three case studies also support this proposition. 
Both Lewis (1990, p225) and VE3, one ofthe most experienced strategic 
alliance firms, (as established in the within-case analysis) hold that strategic alliance 
contract negotiations should be viewed as a learning process. 
The managers who are going to run the strategic alliance on a daily basis 
should negotiate all alliance agreements. The role of lawyers is to translate 
commercial principles into legal contracts. There is support for this view from 
company VEl and from Lewis (1990, p231) and Faullmer (1995, pI87). 
Two of the case study firms (VE4 and VE5) stress the need for trust among the 
alliance partners, and two of the management books (Faullmer 1995 as well as 
Yoshino and Rangan 1995) share this belief. Hence, a strategic alliance can not be run 
by contracts alone. It has to be run on a combination of contractual agreements and 
trust. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
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This study has focused on international strategic alliances involving New 
Zealand companies. A rich and growing literature exists on both international and 
domestic strategic alliances, but most of these studies focus on larger firms from the 
United States, Europe and Japan. Even the largest companies in New Zealand are, by 
United States, European or Japanese standards relatively small. New Zealand is also of 
interest because of its Western culture and close trading relationship with Asia. 
International strategic alliances as a research area offers a high number of interesting 
and relevant research questions, and no study can cover all of these in a proper 
manner. This thesis addresses three research questions, and these are how partner 
asymmetries, alliance objectives and formal alliance contracts influence alliance 
performance. 
This research contributes to the strategic alliance literature in three areas. First, 
it contributes by offering a New Zealand perspective on international strategic 
alliances. Second, the study contributes by employing a mixed research methodology, 
the combination of survey and case studies, to address the issue of partner 
asymmetries. Finally, this research contributes to the strategic alliance literature by 
considering how alliance objectives and formal alliance contracts can affect alliance 
performance. 
There are several implications of the three contributions to the alliance 
literature of this research. First, New Zealand companies have a high level of alliance 
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involvement with licensing agreements being the most common international alliance 
type. Gaining market access tend to be the most important alliance objective, and New 
Zealand international alliances seem to perform, on average, somewhat better than 
other international alliances. These implications are useful for understanding the role 
of New Zealand companies in international trade. 
Contributing factors to the high level of alliance involvement are likely to be 
New Zealand's small domestic market and its geographical isolation from most major 
markets. The high number oflicensing agreements are likely to be a result of New 
Zealand companies' relatively low level of research and development spending. As 
New Zealand's domestic market is small, getting access to international markets 
becomes important and this explains why gaining market access is the most important 
alliance objective. One reason for the relatively high success rate could be that many 
New Zealand companies, due to the small domestic market, are heavily dependent on 
foreign markets. The international strategic alliances therefore become very important 
to these firms, and they are therefore likely to invest considerable resources in the 
international alliances in order to make them work. 
The major implication ofthe contribution to the literature on partner 
asymmetries is that managers cannot talce for granted that an alliance with a firm 
different from their own firm will perform badly, or the other way around, that an 
alliance with a similar firm will perform well. 
Finally, there are two implications of the contribution to the strategic alliance 
literature on alliance objectives and formal alliance contracts. First, the strategic 
alliance partners should as far as possible agree on alliance objectives. Second, the 
managers who will be responsible for an alliance on a daily basis should be involved 
155 
in the negotiation of the alliance agreements. 
This study employs a mixed research methodology consisting of survey 
research followed by case study research. There are two main reasons why this 
methodology was chosen. First, by combining the more general data from a large 
number of firms with the more detailed data from a few firms, allows a more extensive 
picture ofthe phenomena under investigation to be created. Second, by doing the 
investigation in stages, the first research stage assists the second stage. By analysing 
the data obtained from stage one before entering stage two, the results from stage one 
can be used as a basis for selecting information-rich cases relative to the research 
questions being studied. In particular, stage one involved a mail survey of300 New 
Zealand companies, and 140 (47%) useable responses were received. Based on these 
responses, a total of 17 firms were approached and asked to participate in stage two of 
the study, the case studies. Ofthe 17 firms approached, 14 were willing to be 
interviewed. In order to facilitate the data analysis, these 14 firms were divided into 
three separate groups, and these were varied experience firms, unattached firms and 
matched firms. 
7.2 OVERALL FINDINGS 
This section presents the overall findings of this study. The findings on partner 
asymmetries follow first. 
7.2.1 PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
This subsection presents the findings on partner asymmetries. There are seven 
findings on partner asymmetries, and these are set out below. 
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(i) The statistical tests found that partner differences in tenns of partner size has no 
implications for alliance perfonnance. This finding is in contrast with most previous 
strategic alliance research (see for example Killing (1983), Doz (1988) and Harrigan 
(1988)) which has suggested that partner differences in tenns of partner size has 
negative implications for alliance perfonnance. 
(ii) The statistical tests found that partner differences in tenns of partner nationality 
has no implications for alliance perfonnance. This finding is in contrast with most 
previous strategic alliance research (see for example Killing (1983), Doz (1988) and 
Harrigan (1988)) which has suggested that partner differences in tenns of partner 
nationality has negative implications for alliance perfonnance. 
(iii) The statistical tests found that for two or more countries with equal level of total 
trade with New Zealand, the greater the psychic distance with any particular country, 
the fewer the number of international strategic alliances entered into with companies 
from that country will be. 
(iv) The case study evidence suggests that every international strategic alliance 
exhibits both Type I and Type II asymmetries. Type I includes the asymmetries that 
international strategic alliances are specifically fonned to exploit. Type II includes the 
asymmetries that may have a negative effect on strategic alliance perfonnance. This 
finding is in line with that of Park he (1991). 
157 
(v) Generally, the rate at which learning occurs with respect to both Type I and Type 
II asymmetries (Parkhe 1991) will be influential for the outcome of the alliance. Our 
research has produced many cases in which the New Zealand partner appeared to 
underestimate ( a) the rate at which foreign partners could learn from the Type I 
asymmetries and/or (b) the scope of the private benefits available to the foreign 
partners in which to exploit their new learning. 
(vi) We have presented a number of examples in which the unsatisfactory outcome 
from the New Zealand partner's point of view has been due to the predominance of 
private benefits (Khanna et al. 1998) available to the foreign partner. In this situation 
the foreign partner will seek to maximise that rate of their learning and then neglect 
the alliance. 
(vii) The case study evidence suggests that ongoing conflict between senior executives 
from the different sides of an alliance can inhibit the learning needed to overcome the 
Type II asymmetries (Parkhe 1991) in an alliance. 
7.2.2 ALLIANCE OBJECTNES 
This subsection presents the findings on alliance objectives. There are two 
findings on alliance objectives, and these are set out below. 
(i) To agree on alliance objectives is very important as it contributes to alliance 
success. 
(ii) To reach an agreement on alliance objectives is often a lengthy process, and it 
should not be forced. 
7.2.3 ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
This subsection presents the findings on alliance contracts. There are four 
findings on alliance contracts, and these are set out below. 
(i) Fonnal strategic alliance contracts have no effect on the success of an alliance. 
(ii) Strategic alliance contract negotiations should be viewed as a learning process. 
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(iii) The managers who are going to run the strategic alliance on a daily basis should 
negotiate all alliance agreements. The role of lawyers are to translate commercial 
principles into legal contracts. 
(iv) A strategic alliance can not be run by contracts alone. It has to be run on a 
combination of contractual agreements and trust. 
The next section presents the managerial implications which can be drawn 
from this study. 
7.3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This section presents the managerial implications of this study. Managerial 
implications related to the three areas of partner asymmetries, alliance objectives and 
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alliance contracts are proposed: 
(i) Managers cannot take for granted that an alliance with a fInn different from their 
own fInn will perfonn badly, or the other way around, that an alliance with a similar 
fInn will perfonn well. Partners which are different from each other may be able to 
contribute more unique resources to an alliance. However, at the same time, these 
same differences could also have a negative impact on aspects of the alliance 
relationship like trust and communication processes. Awareness of the potential 
problems rooted in partner differences is the fIrst step in the process of addressing 
these problems. 
(ii) The strategic alliance partners should as far as possible agree on alliance objectives 
even though many fInns have experienced that this is easier said than done. This may 
particularly be so in situations were international strategic alliance partners come from 
different national cultures. To be able to agree on alliance objectives, managers should 
plan on spending considerable time with their alliance partners and thereby get to 
understand them and develop trust. Alliance objectives should be addressed early in 
the alliance fonnation process and not left as something to be resolved later on. 
(iii) The managers who will be responsible for an alliance on a daily basis should be 
involved in the negotiation of the alliance agreements. These negotiations should be 
viewed as a learning process, and all issues of concern to either alliance partner should 
be addressed. At the same time, managers must appreciate that strategic alliances can 
not and should not be run by contracts alone. It is not possible or practical to regulate 
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all aspects of an alliance by contracts, and alliance contracts must allow for some 
flexibility as things will always change. Trust between the alliance partners therefore 
plays an important part in strategic alliances alongside contractual arrangements. 
7.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
There are two main research limitations of this study. First of all, data were 
obtained from only one partner in each international strategic alliance. There could be 
situations were one alliance partner considers the alliance to be successful while the 
other, assuming that there are only two alliance partners, considers the alliance to be 
less successful. However, obtaining data from all partners to an international strategic 
alliance may entail some confidentiality concerns as some of the case study 
participants indicated that they were not keen to involve their foreign partners in the 
study. 
The second research limitation involves generalis ability. This study focuses on 
international strategic alliances involving New Zealand companies. Even the largest 
companies in New Zealand are, by United States, European or Japanese standards, 
relatively small. It is therefore possible that the results from this study are less relevant 
to large multinational companies. 
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research on international strategic alliances is very relevant since more and 
more companies are entering into such arrangements, and at the same time, the 
reported success rates for strategic alliances are low (Harrigan 1988, Bleeke and Ernst 
1995). Furthermore, international strategic alliances are particularly relevant to a small 
isolated country like New Zealand with a small domestic market and long physical 
distances to all foreign markets. Here are two suggestions for future research: 
(i) Future research could expand on the study by Lyles (1988) to investigate why 
learning may not occur within some strategic alliances and relate this learning 
dysfunction to alliance outcome. 
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(ii) Given the presence of Type I asymmetry effects, differential rates oflearning, and 
the scope for a predominance of private benefits, there is a clear risk of self-seeking 
opportunism for some parties to an alliance. This lends itself to an agency theory 
formulation and a focus on how best to structure or manage the alliance to minimise 
such behaviour. 
APPENDIX A 
MAIL SURVEY COVER LETTER 
30 October 1995 
«Company» 
Attn.: «Title» «FirstName» «LastName» 
«JobTitle» 
«Address 1» 
«Address2» 
«City» «Postal Code» 
Dear «Title» «LastName» 
Strategic alliances involving New Zealand companies 
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Strategic alliances are becoming more common as a means of conducting international 
business. We are embarked on a study of such alliances involving New Zealand 
companies and seek your help in providing some key data. 
We would be very grateful indeed if you or one of your senior colleagues could spend 
5 or 10 minutes answering the enclosed questions. Note the questionnaires are 
numbered to facilitate any follow-up that may be needed. However, we alone will 
have access to the replies and only aggregate data will be presented in our report. 
Please try to return the survey to us by Friday 10 November. A reply-paid envelope 
is enclosed. If you would like to receive a copy of our report, please attach your 
business card. 
Yours sincerely 
1. N. Berg 
PhD Student 
R. T. Hamilton (Supervisor) 
Professor of Management 
APPENDIXB 
MAIL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
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stnlte:glC alliance is used throughout this questionnaire. By 
"international" we mean that your partner in the alliance is from a country other than 
New Zealand. Strategic alliance is any of the following cooperative arrangements:-
• Joint Venture - A company separate from the parent companies 
(partners) is established. 
• Co-Marketing Agreement - No separate company is established. 
The partners market each others products/services in their respective 
home markets. 
• Licensing Agreement - One frrm sells to another firm the right to use 
the first company's patents or manufacturing processes. 
• Research and Development Agreement - No separate company is 
established. The partners undertake joint research and development. 
• Consortium - A separate company is sometimes established, but not 
always. It usually involves a joint undertaking of a large project, 
often in the construction or public sector. 
1. Is your company currently involved in any strategic alliances (see above 
definitions) with foreign partners? Please tick the appropriate box. 
YesD NoD 
2. Please give the number of each type of international strategic alliance you are 
currently involved in and the year of formation of each alliance:-
Type of international Number Year of formation of each alliance 
strategic alliance of such (state for each one) 
alliances 
Joint Venture 
Co-Marketing Agreement 
Licensing Agreement 
Rand D Agreement 
Consortium 
3. In what country does your partner have their head office? 
Please state country: ..................................................... .. 
4. What is the size of your partner company in tenns of: 
a. Sales per year (in NZ$ millions): ...................................... (Note approximate 
answers will be 
b. Number of employees:......................... sufficient.) 
5. What was your main objective for the international strategic alliance when it 
was fonned? (Ifmore than one objective, please identify the most important.) 
o Risk sharing 
o Cost sharing 
o Skills sharing 
o Market access 
o Others, please specify below 
6. To what extent is the international strategic alliance meeting the most important 
objective (identified in question 5)? Please circle the appropriate number. 
Much better than expected 7 
6 
5 
As expected 4 
3 
2 
Much worse than expected 1 
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7. When were your international strategic alliances formed, and of what type are they? 
Year formed 
Type of alliance 
Joint Venture 
Co-Marketing 
Agreement 
Licensing Agreement 
Rand D Agreement 
Consortium 
Alliance with 
Smallest Partner 
19 
(Please tick) 
Alliance with 
Largest Partner 
119 1 (Insert year) 
(Please tick) 
8. In what countries do your partners have their head offices? Please fill in the table 
below. 
Size of Partner Home Country 
Smallest Partner 
Largest Partner 
9. What are the sizes of your partner companies in terms of sales and number of 
employees? Please fill in the table below. (Note approximate answers will be 
sufficient. ) 
Alliance with Alliance with 
Smallest Partner Largest Partner 
Sales per year (in NZ$ 
millions) 
Number of employees 
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10. What were your main objective for each international strategic alliance when they 
were formed? (If more than one objective, please identify the most important.) Please 
tick. 
Alliance with Objectives Alliance with 
Smallest Partner Largest Partner 
Risk sharing 
Cost sharing 
Skills sharing 
Market access 
Others, please 
specify 
11. To what extent are the international strategic alliances meeting the most important 
objectives (as identified in question 10)? Please tick the appropriate box for each 
partner. 
Alliance with Extent objectives are being met Alliance with 
Smallest Largest Partner 
Partner 
7 Much better than expected 7 
6 6 
5 5 
4 As expected 4 
3 3 
2 2 
1 Much worse than expected 1 
12. How many international strategic alliances has your company terminated in the 
last ten years? Please state the number: ................ .. 
13. Why have you not entered into any strategic alliances with foreign partners? 
o No reasons why we should 
o No suitable foreign partners 
o Lack of money 
o Too busy with other matters 
o Risk of revealing company secrets is too high 
o Other reasons, please specify below 
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14. How many of each type of international strategic alliances, have been terminated 
during the last ten years, and how long were these alliances in operation before being 
terminated? Please complete the table below. 
Type of Number of alliances Age of each alliance 
international terminated during when terminated 
strategic alliance the last ten years 
Joint Venture 
Co-Marketing 
Agreement 
Licensing Agreement 
Rand D Agreement 
Consortium 
15. What were the expectations you had for the international strategic alliances when 
they were formed? Please tick the appropriate boxes. 
Expectations lst Alliance 2nd Alliance 3rd Alliance 4th Alliance 
Risk sharing 
Cost sharing 
Skills sharing 
Market access 
Others, please 
specify 
16. To what extent did the international strategic alliances meet your main objectives 
before they were terminated? Please allocate the number of terminated alliances across 
the range of outcome options given in the table below. 
Number of international Extent objectives were met before the 
strategic alliances being alliance was terminated 
terminated 
7 Much better than expected 
6 
5 
4 As expected 
3 
2 
1 Much worse than expected 
APPENDIXC 
MAIL SURVEY FOLLOW UP LETTER 
20 November 1995 
«Company» 
Attn.: «Title» «FirstName» «LastName» 
«Job Title» 
«Addressl» 
«Address2» 
«City» «PostalCode» 
Dear «Title» «LastName» 
Strategic alliances involving New Zealand companies 
We refer to the questionnaire you have received recently regarding the above. 
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We would be very grateful indeed if you or one of your senior colleagues could spend 
5 or 10 minutes answering the questions, and returning the questionnaire to us. A 
reply-paid envelope was enclosed with the questionnaire. 
Even if you are not involved in any international strategic alliances, we would still be 
very interested in receiving this information as it is valuable data for our research. 
If the questionnaire has been misplaced, we would be pleased to forward another to 
you. We look forward to your response with great interest. 
Yours sincerely 
J. N. Berg 
PhD Student 
APPENDIXD 
SURVEY OF NON-RESPONDENTS TO THE MAIL SURVEY 
12 December 1995 
«Company» 
Attn.: «Title» «FirstName» «LastName» 
«JobTitle» 
«Address 1» 
«Address2» 
«City» «PostaICode» 
Dear «Title» «LastName» 
Strategic alliances involving New Zealand companies 
We refer to the questionnaire you received recently regarding the above. 
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We have not received a response from your company. Could you please let us know 
why you have not responded by ticking the appropriate boxes below and returning this 
letter to us in the enclosed reply-paid envelope. 
Never been involved 
in a strategic alliance D Lackoftime 
Have been involved in Company policy 
alliance( s) in the past, not to take part 
but not at present D III surveys 
Thank you for your help with our research. 
Yours sincerely 
J. N. Berg 
PhD Student 
D 
D 
Other D 
Please describe 
APPENDIXE 
CASE STUDY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS GUIDE 
Date: 
Company name: 
Number of employees: 
When established: 
Interviewee: 
ALLIANCE DATA (EXTRACTED FROM POSTAL SURVEY): 
Type: Formed: Partner nationality: Performance: 
Main alliance objective: Partner size (employees): 
Type: Formed: Partner nationality: Performance: 
Main alliance objective: Partner size (employees): 
I am particularly interested in your experiences with the above ventures (describe 
them), so could you please keep these co-operative ventures in mind during our 
conversation. 
PART 1 - PARTNER ASYMMETRIES 
la.) In which ways do you see yourself as a) similar to and b) different from your 
alliance partner? (one obvious difference is the difference in partner nationalities). 
lb.) In what ways have these differences affected the alliance? 
Probes: 
1.) Different nationalities (national culture)? 
2.) Different business (management) cultures? 
3.) Different sizes (number of employees)? 
4.) Different alliance experience levels? 
5.) Different core (main) businesses? 
6.) Different time (long or short) perspective? 
7.) Difference in financial position (strong vs weak)? 
2.) What kind of relationship did you have with your alliance partner prior to the 
alliance formation? 
Is there anything else you would like to add before we go on to the next topic? 
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PART 2 - TIMING OF ALLIANCE FORMATION 
1.) I am particularly interested in the role that timing plays in the start-up of alliances. 
Could you please share with me any thoughts you may have on how and why timing 
influenced your decisions concerning these joint ventures? 
Probes: 
1.) Age of company when alliance was fonned? 
(NB: Unit of analysis - finn, sbu or product). 
2.) Was the alliance fonned to take advantage of a particular opportunity available 
only at that time (strategic window)? Why was time limited? How long was the 
window? What or who was causing the limit? What about your partner? 
3.) Did you bring a particular product or service into the alliance, and if so, at what 
stage of the product life cycle (introduction, growth, maturity, decline) was the 
product or service when the alliance was fonned? In what way did the product's stage 
in the life cycle influence the decision to enter the alliance? What about your partner? 
4.) How would you describe (growth, maturity, decline) the domestic market for your 
main product or service at the time when the alliance was fonned? What about your 
partner? 
5.) Did you enter into the alliance before or after your main competitors? 
6.) Why did you enter into these alliances at the particular time you did, why not a 
year earlier or a year later? In tenns of alliance perfonnance, do you think it would 
have made any difference ifthe alliance had been fonned earlier or later than it was 
actually fonned? 
7.) At the time when the alliance was fonned, what was your opinion of the general 
business situation in New Zealand? Did this opinion in any way influence the decision 
to go ahead and fonn the alliance? 
8.) Having them draw a timeline and talking through important events in the 
fonnationloperation of the alliance. Draw a timeline ........ ? (see separate notes). 
Is there anything else you would like to add before we go on to the next topic? 
PART 3 - ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
1 a. What did you want from this alliance, and what did your partner want? 
(See next question.) 
lb. Ifwhat you wanted were different (see prior question), why is this so? 
2. Has the alliance performance (relative to your expectations) varied during the 
period the alliance has been in operation? 
Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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APPENDIXF 
COUNTRY TRADE AND CULTURAL DISTANCE DATA 
Trade 
Country 1991-1994 Hofstede's (1984, 1991) Indexes of Culture 
Power Uncertainty Indivi-
(NZ$ mill.) Distance Avoidance dualism Masculinity 
United States 20,767 40 46 91 62 
Australia 28,506 36 51 90 61 
United Kingdom 8,770 35 35 89 66 
South Africa 229 49 49 65 63 
Netherlands 1,215 38 53 80 14 
Germany 4,637 35 65 67 66 
Malaysia 2,399 104 36 26 50 
Japan 21,289 54 92 46 95 
France 2,049 68 86 71 43 
Chile 200 63 86 23 28 
Switzerland 975 34 58 68 70 
South Korea 4,339 60 85 18 39 
Philippines 786 94 44 32 64 
Singapore 2,185 74 8 20 48· 
Canada 2,281 39 48 80 52 
Uruguay 7 61 100 36 38 
Argentina 275 49 86 46 56 
Thailand 1,220 64 64 20 34 
Mexico 915 81 82 30 69 
Egypt 165 80 68 38 53 
Denmark 452 18 23 74 16 
Indonesia 1,322 78 48 14 46 
Hong Kong 2,341 68 29 25 57 
Hungary 17 76 88 27 21 
Papua New Guinea 494 78 48 14 46 
Brazil 450 69 76 38 49 
Norway 361 31 50 69 8 
Ireland 303 28 35 70 68 
Italy 2,510 50 75 76 70 
Saudi Arabia 2,645 80 68 38 53 
United Arab 994 80 68 38 53 
Emirates 
Mauritius 121 77 40 48 56 
Sri Lanka 265 77 40 48 56 
Bangladesh 61 77 40 48 56 
Jamaica 93 45 13 39 68 
continued on next page 
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Trade 
Country 1991-1994 Hofstede's (1984, 1991) Indexes of Culture 
Power Uncertainty Indivi-
V"LJ-ll u..ill.) Distance Avoidance dualism Masculinity 
Venezuela 357 81 76 12 
Malta 21 50 75 76 
Greece 321 60 112 35 
Peru 254 64 87 16 
Guatemala 42 95 101 6 
Taiwan 3,557 58 69 17 
New Zealand 22 49 79 
Notes: 
1) The source for trade figures (value of exports plus imports) is Statistics New 
Zealand (1995a, 1995b) 
73 
70 
57 
42 
37 
45 
58 
2) The following substitutions have been used in terms of Hofstede's (1984, 1991) 
indexes due to lack of data: 
a) Yugoslavia's data has been used for Hungary 
b) Indonesia's data has been used for Papua New Guinea 
c) India's data has been used for Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and 
Mauritius 
d) Italy's data has been used for Malta 
APPENDIXG 
CASE VEl 
The New Zealand partner is a diversified industrial company located in 
Auckland. It was until recently listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Prior to 
being taken private via a management buyout, the company was organised in four 
trading divisions with 11 people employed at the headquarters, and a further 4,100 
people employed throughout the group's divisions. Many of the divisions' business 
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units have well-known names in New Zealand and market high profile brands. Some 
business units can trace their origins back to New Zealand's early industrial days, and 
some were previously listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in their own right. 
Some business units have been sold since the company was delisted. 
The group had a turnover of more than NZ$800 million in the 1995 financial 
year, and the profit exceeded NZ$44 million. Most of the group's revenue is earned in 
New Zealand. 
The group has experience from three joint ventures with foreign partners. The 
joint ventures were in food products, automotive products and ship repair services. All 
the joint ventures operations are located in New Zealand, with the exception of the 
automotive products joint venture which has got one manufacturing plant in New 
Zealand, and one in Australia. 
The food products joint venture sells some 120,000 tonnes of salt annually, 
most for domestic table and industrial consumption while a small proportion is 
exported to Pacific countries. About half of the company's salt requirement is 
produced at the Lake Grassmere salt works on the south island of New Zealand, while 
most of the other half is imported from Australia. The company is the only salt 
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producer in New Zealand. The company was established in 1949 in a joint venture 
between the New Zealand government and a company controlled by the person who 
pioneered salt production in New Zealand. The company is currently owned by the 
New Zealand partner (50.1 %) and a Singapore listed company (49.9%) which again is 
controlled by a large Japanese food conglomerate which extensive business interests 
in New Zealand. The Singapore company became an equity partner in 1965, while the 
New Zealand company invested in the company in 1981. Interestingly, within a week 
of this interview taking place, the New Zealand company sold their share in the 
business to the Australian company which supplies most of the salt which the 
company imports. The other partner in the joint venture, the Singapore company, 
already has a packaging joint venture with the Australian company. The 50.1 % share 
controlled by the New Zealand company was reportedly sold for NZ$36 million. 
The New Zealand partner is very satisfied with the performance of the joint 
venture, and they are not involved in the day to day running of the company. The 
person interviewed with the New Zealand partner held that "it is almost run by itself." 
The automotive products joint venture was formed in 1991 with an Australian 
partner. Each partner owns 50% of the joint venture which has two manufacturing 
plants making automotive suspension springs. The plants are located in Wellington 
and Sydney. The operation in Wellington was established in 1939 and has an annual 
turnover in the region ofNZ$14 million and employing about 70 people. 
The initiative and drive for the joint venture formation was taken by the New 
Zealand partner who saw the need to create a larger entity in order to strengthen their 
position with regard to both their main raw material suppliers and their customers. 
Also, the two companies were the only two competitors in Australia and New 
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Zealand. Both companies exported some of their output. Their customers are the 
automobile manufacturers which are lmown to negotiate hard with their suppliers. On 
the other hand, their main raw material suppliers are the large steel companies like the 
Broken Hill Proprietary Company (BHP) of Australia and Nippon Steel of Japan 
which are also known as hard negotiators. 
The New Zealand partner has been satisfied with the performance of the joint 
venture, and they have come to a point where they feel that they can add little 
additional value to the operation. The 50% share of the joint venture owned by them 
has recently been sold to a large auto equipment company in the United States. 
The third joint venture is a ship repair and engineering facility located in 
Auckland. The shipyard does work for the New Zealand navy as well as for private 
commercial customers. It employs about 500 people, and was established in 1994. The 
venture was owned 30% by the New Zealand partner and 70% by an industrial group 
with extensive ship repair and ship building experience from the United Kingdom. 
The idea behind the joint venture was for the New Zealand partner to provide local 
lmow ledge and for the United Kingdom partner to provide ship repairing skills as well 
as credibility as a ship repair company. The day to day running of the operation was 
left to the United Kingdom partner, and they seconded a Chief Executive and some 
other key people from their United Kingdom operations to lead the shipyard. 
The venture performed much worse than the New Zealand partner had 
expected, and this lead to the New Zealand partner selling their 30% ownership share 
to their partner after about one year. Their partner continued to run the business on 
their own. 
The New Zealand partner contributed the poor performance ofthe joint venture 
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to two main factors. First of all, their own homework was not done well in the sense 
that they relied too much on their partner's knowledge. With homework they meant 
detailed implementation plans, knowledge of the industry and markets, knowledge of 
production processes and knowledge of "what you can do and what you can't do." The 
New Zealand partner had no prior experience from the ship repair industry. Secondly, 
they feel that the Chief Executive seconded from their partner's operation in the 
United Kingdom was not performing well. The New Zealand partner summarised this 
particular joint venture experience as follows: "In retrospect we should not have gone 
in, or not accepted the management they put in." 
In terms of their overall experience with joint ventures with international 
partner, the Manager from the New Zealand company said that: 
Ajoint venture is not the cleanest thing to get involved in. I would 
rather control what I have got myself or get rid it, and somebody else 
can worry about it. In a joint venture you always have to be diplomatic 
and communicate with your partner. Understand what the partner wants 
and where he wants to go. It is more hard work generally, unless it is 
[the salt joint venture] which operates itself. 
APPENDIXH 
CASE VE2 
The New Zealand company is a designer and manufacturer ofleading edge 
179 
technology for people who are visually impaired. The product range includes speech 
synthesisers, computer programs and talking notebook computers for blind individuals 
and closed-circuit (CCTV) reading systems for partially sighted individuals. The 
company is located in Christchurch, and it was established in 1976. It has close 
research links with several universities in New Zealand. About 85 percent of the 
company's revenue comes from overseas sales to over 20 countries. The company has 
roughly a 10 percent share of its international niche markets. It employs about 50 
people in New Zealand. 
The company established its first wholly owned overseas subsidiary in the 
United States in 1980, and it has experience from several international joint ventures, 
the first was established in 1989 with a Dutch partner. It is interesting to note that the 
company's first foreign direct investment was a wholly owned subsidiary rather than a 
joint venture or any other form of international strategic alliance like for example a 
licensing agreement. 
The Managing Director described the rationale for their involvement in 
international joint ventures as follows: 
Probably in all of our joint ventures we have tried to find partners who 
already have a good knowledge in the market. That is probably the 
primary goal of our joint ventures, so we are: a) tapping into all that 
market knowledge, and b) hopefully because of ownership we are getting 
commitment from the partner to malce this joint venture company go. 
I think if we had found the right independent distributor who we believed 
was going to make the commitment and was capable of doing the job, 
that would probably be our first choice because there is far less risk in 
that. But we have found it very very difficult to find that sort of partner. 
So we have really come to a joint venture relationship because that is the 
only way we think we can achieve our objectives. 
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The company have had experiences with both joint ventures which have met or 
exceeded their expectations as well as with joint ventures which have failed to meet 
their expectations. 
Two joint ventures which failed to meet their expectations were established in 
Mexico and Switzerland. Both of these joint ventures were terminated after a short 
period of time. The venture in Switzerland was established with a Swiss individual as 
partner, and this individual also became the Managing Director ofthe company. Each 
of the two partners owned 50 percent of the venture. The company was not a 
distributor as such, but rather set up to manage the overall distribution of the New· 
Zealand partner's products in Europe. In other words, the idea was for this company to 
support, hire and fire distributors in Europe. 
In terms of the performance of the joint venture, the experience of the New 
Zealand partner was as follows: 
The reason it failed was really that we could not control the company 
the way we felt it needed to be controlled. Ifwe were totally satisfied 
with its performance, we would not have been concerned about 
controlling it, but it did not perform well, and we found that it was 
extremely difficult to change things. It was a 50/50 joint venture, and 
the guy we employed had his own priorities in that they did match 
ours. It did not perform well enough in our view to continue it so we 
wound it up. There was no conflict of interest at the outset, but they 
developed and we were not able to keep the focus on the priorities 
which we saw for the company. So it did not work, and we exited 
from it. 
A complicating factor was that the Managing Director and the partner were 
the same person. It was therefore very difficult, if not impossible, to replace 
the Managing Director. In the words of the New Zealand partner: 
We were greatly limited by the fact that the Managing Director 
was the shareholder and employee. When we no longer wanted 
him as an employee, we could not continue to have him as a 
shareholder, so I guess there is a lesson in that. If the 
management ofthe company is completely separate from the 
two partner shareholders, then there is a possibility of fixing 
the company without burning the bridges with the partner. 
The company was established in 1993 and terminated in 1995. 
The venture in Mexico was set up as a distributor for the Mexican market. It 
was established in 1994 and terminated in 1995. According to the New Zealand 
partner: 
The one in Mexico which only lasted very briefly was killed by the 
peso devaluation, it lost 50% of its value during the very early days 
of the company, and it was clear that funding from government 
organisations were going to disappear for a year or two. We decided 
to end the joint venture on mutual agreement. The opportunity 
was killed. 
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The joint venture in the United Kingdom was established with a partner from 
that country in 1992. The United Kingdom partner is a distribution company in the 
same field as the New Zealand company. In terms of performance, it has exceeded the 
New Zealand partner's expectations: 
The United Kingdom joint venture was very successful because it was 
a stand alone entity, it was not in any way being influenced or 
manipulated for any other purpose. It had a pretty clear role, and it had 
complete freedom to act within the scope the board gave it. There were 
no conflicts of interest, even though the partner had another business in 
this field, he was happy to stand back and say you guys develop the 
business as strongly as you can even though at times we would take some 
business away from his other company. So he was able to take a very 
hands off approach and yet be a provider of good market knowledge 
and so on. So that worked well, and probably even more important 
than any of those factors would be that we were able to bring in a very 
competent person to run the company. He is very committed, and we 
also brought him in as a shareholder some time later. We allowed him 
to buy some shares in the company, and that would give him a lot of 
commitment. So we ended up with a company with a very committed 
Managing Director, and a partner who was very committed to making 
the company succeed by informing us of market developments. Ifwe 
were doing it as a wholly owned subsidiary, doing it on our own, it 
would have been much more difficult because a) we are at the other 
side of the world, and b) we would not have that much knowledge 
of the United Kingdom market. 
The United Kingdom partner has recently been bought by one of their 
principals, and that lead the New Zealand partner to buy their share of the joint 
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venture company. The United Kingdom joint venture company has therefore recently 
become a wholly owned subsidiary of the New Zealand company. 
The company is in favour of partner differences in international strategic 
alliances. Their experience is that too much partner similarity can possibly be a source 
of conflict. The Managing Director elaborates on this point: 
The way you described it there with having a closely similar size, culture and 
core also raises the strong possibility that their business interest will 
conflict with yours at some point. That is what happened with the Dutch 
company. We were both manufacturing products, technology type products. 
When we started out there was not really much conflict between the products, 
a little bit, but we could live with that. As time went by, we increased our 
activities in an area which overlapped a lot more with them. That was a move 
we decided we needed to take even though in the joint venture in the United 
States, we could have said it is being provided with adequate products from 
Holland, why do we need to develop it? We felt this was a technological 
direction where new product development were going even though we knew it 
was going to mean an increase in the level of conflict with our partner. We 
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were not only interested in the United States, we were interested in Canada, 
Europe, the United Kingdom, Australia and so on. We ended up in a position 
were there was a very strong conflict of interest, so we proposed that we 
should buy them out. It turned out that they were a lot keener to buy us out 
than we were to buy them, so we sold out our shares and set up a new 
company. 
However, the Managing Director has some reservations on partner differences in 
terms of size, particularly when the difference in size between the partners are 
considerable: 
Like the joint venture we had in the United States with the Dutch company. 
That company was probably twice the size of ours, but I don't think that was 
ever a particular factor, we are not so far apart, but had it been a company that 
was five times the size of ours, then I can imagine that they probably would 
not have wanted to be in a j oint venture, but if they were, they would have had 
a lot more muscle than us and that could have been a problem. 
The Managing Director of the company summed up their experiences with 
international joint ventures as follows: 
Our track record has not been too great in terms of successful joint 
ventures although I still believe that it is a very good formula for 
accessing a market of which you have no great knowledge. I think 
in the instances where we have failed, not where we have failed but 
where we have eventually given up on a joint venture, it has really had 
nothing to do with the structure of the joint venture really. We 
obviously believe that this is a good formula, we have just set up 
another one in Germany. We are not disappointed by occasional 
failure. 
APPENDIX I 
CASE VE3 
The New Zealand company is a deep sea fishing, processing and marketing 
company. It is the largest such company in New Zealand, and it owns 25 percent, or 
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160,000 tonnes, ofthe fishing quota in the New Zealand 200 mile exclusive economic 
zone. This exclusive economic zone is the fourth largest in the world. Over 70,000 
tonnes of the fishing quota is hoki, the most abundant New Zealand deep water 
species. Hold is recognised internationally as a prime white fish. 
The company had sales ofNZ$296 million with a net profit ofNZ$15.5 
million in the 1996 financial year. Over 90 percent of sales comes from exports to 
more than 30 countries. Seafood prices are mainly commodity driven. 
The company has experience from several joint ventures and other types of 
strategic alliances both with domestic and international partners. In terms of 
performance, to what extent these strategic alliances have met their objectives range 
from much better than expected to somewhat less than expected. 
Ajoint venture which has failed to meet expectations so far is ajoint venture 
with a large Japanese seafood company. The Japanese partner has an annual turnover 
of about NZ$2 billion and employs about 20,000 people. The joint venture was 
formed in 1993, and it is still in operation. The Japanese partner has provided a deep 
sea factory stem trawler to the joint venture, and the vessel is fishing in New Zealand 
waters using the New Zealand partner's fishing quota. It is an older vessel, and it has 
earlier been used for the Japanese partner's fishing operations in Japanese waters. 
Prior to the formation of the joint venture, the vessel had become surplus to the 
Japanese partner's requirements for their own fishing operations. It would not be 
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possible for the Japanese company to fish in New Zealand waters without a New 
Zealand partner. The capture from the vessel is bought by the Japanese partner and 
marketed in Japan. At the time when the joint venture was formed, the New Zealand 
partner saw the joint venture as a vehicle for expanding their catching capacity at 
minimal cost. 
The joint venture has not met the performance expectations ofthe New 
Zealand partner for a number of reasons. First of all, the catch productivity of the 
vessel has been less than what was expected at the formation ofthe joint venture, and 
the vessel's operating costs have been higher than initially anticipated since the vessel 
is old. Second, an openness or understanding of the transfer prices paid by the 
Japanese partner to the joint venture for the fish has not been achieved. According to 
the Chief Executive of the New Zealand partner: 
There has not been the openness that we would have expected to verify 
that the prices being paid to the joint venture are fair and reasonable. 
Another factor having a negative impact on the performance of the joint venture has 
been the strengthening ofthe New Zealand dollar against the Japanese yen and other 
major currencies. The risk profile of the venture is relatively low since the availability 
of the fish species concerned is lmown with some certainty, but it is not a high value 
species. In other words, the chance of either a big success or a huge failure was low. 
The New Zealand partner has more recently entered into a second joint venture 
with the same Japanese partner, and this strategic alliance had probably not been 
formed had it not been for the first joint venture. The second joint venture is, 
according to the New Zealand partner, unlike the first, a success: 
By having that venture [the first joint venture with the Japanese partner], 
it has led us into another joint venture with them which is a major success, 
and which has got nothing to do with the first venture. 
Having learned from the first venture with the Japanese partner, the New Zealand 
partner approached the second venture somewhat differently: 
We spent a lot of time on things like transfer price which was an 
issue with the first one, on feeling the compatibility of our objectives, 
looking at what would happen with the costs in the whole operation, the 
openness and so on. Spent a lot of time before we agreed to formalise 
that one, to make sure that the ground rules were very very clear and 
well documented. 
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A joint venture which, in the eyes of the New Zealand partner, has performed 
much better than expected, is a venture with a partner from South Africa. The venture 
is located in Namibia, and the partners also have a similar joint venture in South 
Africa. The South African partner is a very small firm with 2 employees and an annual 
turnover of about NZ$0.5 million. The Namibian joint venture was formed in 1994, 
and it is still in operation. According to the New Zealand partner "it is early days yet." 
The South African partner is providing various fishing licenses as well as some 
engineering expertise to the joint venture as well as obviously local expertise, while 
the New Zealand partner provides expertise in terms of seismographic work, fishing 
skippers and crew, fishing vessel management, fish processing and engineering 
expertise that complement their partner's expertise. The New Zealand partner has a 30 
percent ownership of the joint venture, but they are a much more active partner than 
the ownership share could indicate. They have sold one of their fresh fish trawlers to 
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the venture. The Namibian joint venture company which is involved in fishing and 
processing of the catch employs about 300 people at present, and a processing factory 
has recently been built. The processed fish from the joint venture is sold to the New 
Zealand partner. 
In contrast with the endeavour in New Zealand with the Japanese partner, the 
New Zealand partner describes the venture in Namibia as high risk. No major deep sea 
fishing operations had been undertaken in the country prior to the formation of the 
joint venture, so there were uncertainty with regard to both species and quantities. The 
operation has been able to find commercial quantities of a high value species, orange 
roughy. It was not known that they would find this species prior to the formation of 
the j oint venture. 
As mentioned earlier, the processed catch from the joint venture is being sold 
to the New Zealand partner. These transactions are being made with as much openness 
as possible. Says the New Zealand partner: 
We made very sure that the joint venture partner can see the full 
transparency of the whole transaction trail, what is going on, who it 
is being sold to, why this is happening, why that is happening. 
The New Zealand fishing company prefers to establish international strategic 
alliances with firms that differ from themselves. In other words, they are in favour of 
partner asymmetries in strategic alliances. With particular reference to the size of the 
alliance partner, the Chief Executive of the company says that: 
What I have found that always works quite well in joint ventures is big guy-
little guy and not big guy - big guy or little guy -little guy. I mean, a company 
like us, that has 350 million dollars turnover, can easily have a very successful 
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joint venture with a person, a one to five million dollar organisation. There is 
respect for each other because you both bring skills. But two companies both 
making 50 million dollars getting together often will have a lot of problems 
because you have both got your systems, your bureaucracy, your policies, 
procedures and so on and they will just rub up against each other. And lead to 
all sorts of conflicts. And so I have got more respect for the ones that are 
disproportionate in size, the parties are very different in their magnitudes. 
APPENDIXJ 
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The New Zealand company is a diversified group operating predominantly in 
four business segments. These are processed and packaged foods, seafoods, scientific 
(manufacturing and distribution of scientific equipment and consumables as well as 
wheelchairs) and plastics and brushware. The group had a turnover ofNZ$ 153 
million and a net profit ofNZ$ 2 million for the 1995 financial year. It has recently 
been bought by an investor group from South East Asia and delisted from the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange. Subsequent to this event, the group is being restructured. 
The group has its headquarter in Auckland. 
The group has extensive experience from international strategic alliances. The 
Managing Director considers that they have three different groups of international 
strategic alliances. The first group relates to the manufacturing of plastics and 
brushware. The Managing Director says: 
At the manufacturing level, our plastics and brushware group has 
licenses with overseas affiliates where for a license fee, we get access 
to their technology, to manufacturing-dies, to in fact producing either 
brushwares or plastic goods. 
Those sorts of relationships tend to be very much in favour of the 
original licensee or designer because they can pull it from you any time, 
and they only use you when they see this market as not big enough for 
them to come in on their own. And you always recognise that you are 
building market share, and if you get to a significant volume, they can 
pull it off you and do it themselves and therefore get additional profit 
or margin from it. These are fairly straight forward, and what I would 
call technical relationships. 
The second group relates to the use of more advanced technology than 
described above. The Managing Director declares: 
In the case of advanced technology such as our scientific group and 
salmon companies, at times we have had strategic alliances there 
because we bought technology, paid for it with a lump sum at the 
front end, and then had a royalty stream as we used it. For example, 
[name of company] company who is involved in transgenic research 
using DNA principles to enhance the growth of salmon through 
breeding programs. So we paid for the technology, we had the 
exclusive use in Australasia, and as it is delivered into the marketplace 
we pay a royalty based on each dollar of sales. That works quite well 
because it is locked up long term, and if it is beneficial, both parties 
win from it. And those are the sort oflicense agreements of technology 
that we would tend to look at in the future. The supplier of that 
technology is not actually a competitor, it is a technology based 
company. It is not a retail or consumer driven company. 
The third type of international strategic alliances are being described by the 
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New Zealand company as extensions of agency agreements, and they currently have 
about 10 of these in operation. The Managing Director explains how they recently 
entered into such an alliance with an international partner: 
We paid a royalty and we have exclusive access to the formulas 
[for the production of branded jam] and can manufacture or buy 
from them or relabel. And that is a purely commercial arrangement. 
But in this instance it was long term, unlike the earlier agreements 
that was purely driven just on the supplier side. The company this 
time was smart enough to say we will not go into this unless we 
have a contract which gives us exclusivity for five years, and at the 
end ofthe five year period, there is a formula that if they don't 
renew it, then they have to pay a premium to buy us out of it. That 
is, they have to pay some of the goodwill that we have generated 
by our own marketing activities back to us as a looser of the 
licensing. 
In terms of their overall experience, the Managing Director pronounces: 
We have had a number of joint venture relationships offshore that 
have gone bad, but we have had more that worked out to our positive 
advantage, so we are certainly not adverse to it. The nineteen 
companies in the [name of group] group have about twenty major 
associations. Beyond just sales agreements. At least half of them are 
working very satisfactory. 
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CASE VE5 
The New Zealand company is a major privately owned multi-disciplinary 
consulting practice, and it offers a wide range of engineering, project management, 
planning, surveying, valuation, economics and computer services. The company is 
active all over New Zealand as well as in Australia and in several South East Asian 
countries. It employs some 600 people. The company won a New Zealand export 
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award (the Governor General's supreme award for excellence in export achievement) 
in 1991. 
The company has experience from three international strategic alliances with 
foreign partners. Two of these alliances are joint ventures, while the third is a co-
marketing agreement. The co-marketing agreement was terminated after being in 
operation for six years. According to the New Zealand partner, the relationship was 
terminated due to the unsatisfactory performance of their foreign partner. Says the 
Chief Executive: 
As an example of their performance, we were required to advise them 
if we wished to terminate the agreement, and we never received a 
response to our termination advice. So you can see that the co-
marketing agreement was most unsatisfactory from our point of view. 
The company found the performance of their foreign partner to be more satisfactory 
early on in the relationship. 
The two joint ventures were established in 1984 and in 1990, and both ofthese 
ventures are still in operation. The first venture was established with a partner from 
Canada and the second with a partner from the United States. The Canadian company 
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has some 3,000 employees while the American partner employs more than 16,000 
people. The main objectives behind the formation of both of these joint ventures were 
skills sharing and market knowledge (Type I asymmetries). Both joint ventures are 
equally owned by the partners. 
The performance, in terms of meeting the New Zealand partner's objectives, of 
these two joint ventures have been notably different. In the eyes of the New Zealand 
partner, the venture with the Canadians has consistently performed better than 
expected, while the alliance with the partner from the United States has consistently 
performed worse than expected. The Chief Executive explains why this is so: 
The primary reason why the [name of the joint venture with the 
Canadian partner] joint venture has performed better than the other 
two co-operative relationships is that the parent companies and their 
senior management were aligned. Even though there were some 
initial teething problems, the senior management insisted on the joint 
venture operating in a particular manner, both in [name of New 
Zealand partner] and [name of Canadian partner]. This continues 
throughout the life of the joint venture. There are other reasons, but 
they are secondary. 
In terms of the background to the formation of the joint venture with the 
Canadian partner, the Canadians were fairly wellimown to the New Zealand company 
because the two had already worked together on various projects. As to the selection 
of that particular overseas partner, the Chief Executive elucidates: 
We asked the two principal clients in the [the industry the joint 
venture is targeting] that we perceived as likely to use the services 
of a joint venture company, which overseas organisation they would 
recommend that we approached, that was the first question. And the 
second question was if they would be interested, if we did form a joint 
venture, in using the services of that joint venture. And after that small 
client survey, we were ofthe opinion that we should approach [the 
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name of their Canadian partner]. 
The Chief Executive has the following to say about the motivation behind the 
formation of their international strategic alliances: 
It is very very hard for anyone company to cover the whole range 
of skills, and it is also very hard for a company like [name of company] 
to even try to cover the full range of skills. And we should not do that, 
we should look to add complementary services together rather than 
trying to take things that they have got and then drop them off. Because 
we would rapidly ourselves get out of date. 
In this particular case skills (technology) can be considered as a Type I asymmetry. 
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The New Zealand organisation, a producer board (hereafter referred to as the 
Board), is responsible for the export marketing of all New Zealand dairy products on 
a global basis. It has an annual turnover in excess of NZ$5 billion, and based on 
turnover, it is the second largest company in New Zealand. The Board employs more 
than 6,000 people, and it has established a network of over eighty subsidiary and 
associate companies around the world. Its two major competitors throughout the world 
are Kraft and Nestle. More than 90 percent of all dairy products produced in New 
Zealand are exported. 
The Board is controlled by the New Zealand dairy farmers. They own on a 
cooperative basis dairy companies which own the Board's total capital ofNZ$750 
million. Each cooperative's ownership share is calculated by the proportion of 
qualifying milkfat that it produces. Generally speaking, the Board's net profit is paid 
to the dairy cooperatives which again pay their net profit to the dairy farmers. 
The Board is probably the most experienced organisation in New Zealand in 
terms of international strategic alliances. All its past and present international strategic 
alliances are joint ventures, and the first was formed in 1963 with a partner from 
Malaysia. This particular joint venture is no longer in operation. In total the Board has 
formed some 35 international joint ventures. Of these, 18 are still in operation as joint 
ventures. Of the 17 joint venture relationships which have been terminated, eight have 
become wholly owned subsidiaries of the Board, six have been sold and the remaining 
three joint venture operations have been wound up. The Board's ownership share in 
each joint venture varies, but it is at least 30 percent. The joint ventures have been 
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fonned with partners from all over the world. 
An example of a joint venture where the Board has bought out their partner is a 
joint venture in Hong Kong established in 1982 with a local partner. They bought 
their partner out in 1991, and the Group General Manager Marketing of the Board 
explains why: 
We joint ventured in Hong Kong with a trading organisation and as 
we got into development of China, the big goal, they were not prepared 
to reinvest the profit. They wanted them out year on year. And they kept 
stripping the cash out of the joint venture which meant that there was no 
money to develop the market in China, so we ended up funding the 
development of China externally to the joint venture which became 
ridiculous because the joint venture would then make profits from the 
investments we were making without itself making any investments. So 
we decided that the best thing to do would be to buyout our partner, 
which we did. So we bought them out and took over the management 
ourselves. 
An example of a joint venture where the Board sold their share of the venture 
to their partner is ajoint venture fonned in Singapore in 1989 and subsequently sold to 
their local partner in 1994. The Board also at the same time had other operations in 
Singapore that were not competing with the joint venture. The partner they sold out to 
was not the same partner they fonned the joint venture with, as this company was 
taken over by another joint venture company fonned by a large food company and a 
Singapore brewing company. The brewing company was already involved in the dairy 
industry, although it is not one of their core businesses, and they brought this business 
into the original joint venture between the Board and their local partner. The brewing 
company then took over the day to day operation of the joint venture, and the Board 
became a supplier of raw materials to the venture. In the eyes of the Board, the joint 
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venture was not run well, and they discussed this with their partner. The Board saw 
four options: a) For their partner to continue to manage the business but with close 
guidance ofthe Board, or b) for the Board to manage the business alone, or c) For the 
partner to buyout the Board, or d) For the Board to buyout their partner. Out of the 
four, the Singapore partner preferred to buyout the Board. The Board got a price they 
were satisfied with, they still have their other operations in Singapore, and the two 
former partners remain friends. 
One of their ongoing joint ventures is located in Malaysia, and this particular 
joint venture is very successful. It was formed in 1989, and it is totally umelated to the 
earlier joint venture in Malaysia mentioned earlier. Here is some ofthe background to 
the formation ofthe joint venture in terms of the partner selection process: 
I was introduced to him [the joint venture partner] by a mutual friend, 
we had lunch together, we got on well together, we talked about 
development possibilities and we just developed a relationship. When 
the time came for us to do something, I said to him are you interested, 
and he said sure, I will come in as an investor. And he is very well 
connected so you lmow, the culture thing, ultimately joint ventures are 
about people. 
Based on this statement, both national culture and market knowledge can be 
considered as Type I asymmetries. 
The joint venture company, which is owned 49 percent by the Board, is a 
property owning company which owns the land and buildings where the Board's mille 
powder packing plant is located. Due to the local laws, it would not be possible for the 
Board to own these assets by themselves. The local laws restrict market access which 
is a Type I asymmetry. The mille powder packing plant is owned and operated by a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Board, and they also have another wholly owned 
subsidiary which markets and distributes New Zealand dairy products in Malaysia. 
Their j oint venture partner is the individual person and his wife. He is a successful 
businessman in his own right, but none of his business interests outside ofthe joint 
venture are in the dairy industry. 
The development of most of their joint venture relationships have been done 
incrementally. Explains the Group General Manager Marketing ofthe Board: 
It is very much like a whole development pattern all around the world, 
we move from a liaison office to small scale trading company and we 
move to either ingredient operation or food service or consumer 
depending on how that market is developing. We have taken 
incremental exposure right around the world. It depends on the scale 
of the development of the marketplace, infrastructure development, 
government regulations, and what we can and can't do. 
They also see it as very import not to rush into a joint venture relationship: 
Take the time. Don't take the first bus that comes along, you don't 
know where it is going. Find out the bus route first. Then choose the 
right bus. Take your time, understand the culture. It is very important, 
and once you get to that, understand and learn about each other, only 
then can you start to move towards how you want to structure this. 
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The New Zealand company is an importer and distributor of electrical 
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equipment. The company was established in 1912, and it has some 20 employees. The 
Managing Director of the company has extensive business interests outside of the 
company, and he sits on the Board of Directors of several corporations. He is also 
active in different business interest groups. 
The company has experience from four international strategic alliances, and 
these are two joint ventures, one co-marketing agreement and one consortium. All 
alliances are still in operation, and the first was established in 1989. The company's 
partners are all from countries in Asia including Malaysia and Singapore, and the 
Managing Director ofthe New Zealand company was born and grew up in Malaysia. 
In terms of the performance, the strategic alliances are meeting or exceeding 
all the New Zealand company's objectives. The Managing Director contributes the 
performance of the alliances to two major factors concerning the formation and the 
day to day running of the ventures. First of all, the fact that the Managing Director has 
very strong lmowledge of the markets (a Type I asymmetry) and business practices in 
Asia as well as an extensive network of personal friends and business contacts. This 
means that the New Zealand company is able to get involved in commercially viable 
ventures with partners who have got both the required resources and the required 
commitment to see the venture through. In other words, the New Zealand company is 
able to undertake extensive information gathering and partner selection processes at a 
relative low cost. 
The second factor concerns the day to day running of the strategic alliances. 
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These ventures are obviously meeting various problems or challenges like any other 
business venture. However, since the Chief Executives involved are personal friends, 
there is a strong incentive for the parties to address and resolve problems as and when 
they occur. One example is a project in Malaysia involving technical expertise from 
the New Zealand company. Whenever the New Zealand engineers encounter any 
problematic situation with regard to their Malaysian colleagues, they will make a 
detailed verbatim report for the Managing Director in New Zealand. He will then 
interpret the situation, particularly with regard to non-verbal or hidden meanings, and 
decide what the appropriate action should be. 
The Managing Director holds that it is important to be flexible to your 
partner's needs and wants. This is how he describes his experiences relating to alliance 
contracts: 
Most of my Asian ... most of my Asian dealings, I do not have any 
agreement at all, you know, but I have a handshake. Whereas, you see, 
my American counterpart and my British counterpart, they will send me, 
you see, half an inch thick of agreement verifying you shall do this, I 
shall do that. 
APPENDIXN 
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The New Zealand company is the world's largest sheepskin tanners with 
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tanneries in both New Zealand and Australia. It has sales offices around the world, and 
products include baby and floor rugs, rugs for medical use and car seat covers. The 
company also sells to manufacturers of bedding, interior decorator items, footwear, 
clothing, paint rollers and souvenir items. Tannery operations first started in 1881, and 
the company currently employs some 520 people. It has received two Governor 
General Exporter Awards for export performance. 
The company has experience from one international joint venture. The venture 
was established in Australia in 1981 with a local partner, and it is still in operation. 
The joint venture is a tannery operation, but it only performs part of the whole taniring 
process, and the remaining parts ofthe process are done by the New Zealand 
company's wholly owned tannery in Australia. The local partner is a skin dealer. A 
skin dealer buys sheepskins from sale yards and meat companies, temporarily 
preserves the skins, and then sells the skins to tanners like the New Zealand company. 
The two partners had a trading relationship with each other for about ten years before 
the joint venture was formed. 
The New Zealand company's main motivation behind entering into the joint 
venture with the skin dealer was to gain improved access to raw materials (a Type I 
asymmetry) both in terms of increased supply and increased security of supply. This 
would then form the base for the company to increase their growth internationally. It 
was obvious from the very beginning that the two partners would have some 
conflicting objectives since one partner is a raw materials supplier, and the other 
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partner is a buyer of those raw materials. The Managing Director of the New Zealand 
company explains how this conflict has been resolved: 
We kept the supplier-customer relationship at arm's length. So that is 
just the normal negotiating that goes on and so we resolve that conflict, 
I suppose you can say, with difficulty, but at the end of the day, we come 
to a fmal price point just the same way as we do with any other supplier. 
It is important to note that the joint venture company does not buy all its raw 
materials from the partner who is a skin dealer. 
In terms of the performance of the joint venture, it exceeded the expectations 
of the New Zealand partner for the first four or five years, but it has failed to meet 
expectations over recent years. The Managing Director ofthe New Zealand company 
elucidates: 
It [the performance of the joint venture] has varied, and to an extent 
relating to the personalities involved. Personalities from our side 
haven't changed a lot. The other side has. The previous Manager or 
Managing Director of the company has retired. Someone has taken over, 
and he is a different character from his father, so the performance has 
varied with the differences in these people. 
We can conclude from this statement that corporate culture is a Type II asymmetry. 
The Managing Director summarises their international joint venture experience 
as follows: 
It has been an interesting exercise, one from which we have learned a 
lot. It was the first step of internationalising our production facilities. 
That was very valuable. Ifwe do the same thing again, in another 
country for example, we would do it on our own. I think we would 
anyway, and we would engage outsiders to advise us in the areas 
were we used the joint venture partner to advise us. 
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The New Zealand company is a diversified unlisted company with interests in 
rural servicing, stock and station agency, financial services and electricity. For the 
1995/1996 financial year the group had a turnover ofNZ$228 million and after tax 
profit of NZ$ 16 million. The group has long traditions, particularly in the agricultural 
business. 
The company has experience from one international joint venture in 
agriculture. It was established in Hungary in 1989, and the group currently owns 72 
percent of the venture. 
The background to the joint venture is as follows. The company has for many 
years exported large quantities of seed to various countries in Europe including 
Hungary. This trading relationship enabled the company to become involved as 
consultants to assist in the development of large state owned farms in Hungary. The 
joint venture was established in 1989 as a continuation ofthe consultancy business. 
Beside the New Zealand partner, who would provide agricultural expertise (a Type I 
asymmetry), there were three other partners. These were a state owned farm providing 
market Imowledge (a Type I asymmetry) as well as two banks. Soon after the joint 
venture was established, the communist system was abandoned and a market economy 
gradually introduced in Hungary. This effectively meant that the whole basis for the 
joint venture business was more or less eroded since the funding for the development 
of the large state run farms and agricultural cooperatives dried up. The joint venture 
therefore shifted its focus to the trading of agricultural products and providing services 
204 
to the rural sector similarly to the New Zealand company's agricultural business in 
New Zealand. 
The joint venture company is being managed by an expatriate from New 
Zealand, but the partners are currently considering to let a local person take over this 
role since the venture is close to having developed people locally with the required 
skills and expertise. It is also costly to have an expatriate from New Zealand stationed 
in Hungary. 
As would be expected, the New Zealand company has found that their 
Hungarian partner has a different view of commercial activities than what they have. 
This is how the Managing Director explains this difference and its effect: 
Their attitude to business was, as you would expect from a state bureaucracy, 
totally different from our own. It gave us enormous frustration just getting 
people to look at what we wanted to get done. 
The Hungarian joint venture company is currently trading profitably, and it is 
to some extent meeting the New Zealand partner's expectations. They say the 
following in their annual report for the 1995/1996 financial year: 
We have still to build a business of sufficient scale and stability but 
a profitable operation has been established and opportunities for 
growth are being pursued. 
However, one of the original partners, one of the banks, have sold their share in the 
joint venture because they felt that the business was not growing as fast as they would 
have liked to see happening. 
The Managing Director of the New Zealand partner says the following about 
the future of the joint venture: 
Weare at the stage now where we will have to decide if we will stay 
in this joint venture. One of the disappointments with this joint venture 
is the lack of input from the partners, and the other reason is the distance 
from New Zealand. Despite improved communications it is at the other 
side of the world. It would have been nice if it was closer to home. 
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The New Zealand company is a listed company involved in the production 
and marketing of cement, concrete, aggregates and related products. The group 
operates one of New Zealand's two cement manufacturing plants. Its largest 
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shareholder is an international leader in the cement, concrete and aggregate industries 
with operations in over 35 countries worldwide. The company achieved a turnover of 
NZ$171 million and a net profit after tax ofNZ$ 23 million for the 1995 financial 
year. The major proportion of the turnover is from domestic sales. The group employs 
some 580 people. 
The company has experience from one international joint venture. The venture 
was established at Suzhou in China (lOOkm from Shanghai) in February 1995 witli 
three other partners. These three partners are a Chinese so called town and village 
enterprise with a 50 percent ownership share, a funds manager with 15 percent and a 
large Singaporean industrial group with 10 percent. The New Zealand company owns 
the remaining 25 percent, and they are responsible for the day to day management of 
the joint venture cement plant in Suzhou. The New Zealand company did evaluate a 
few other potential partners in China before they decided to form a joint venture with 
these partners. Both the funds manager and the industrial group has experience from 
other ventures in China, and the New Zealand partner saw this as an advantage since 
they were new to China. The New Zealand company's parent company has had some 
limited exposure in China, but this venture through their New Zealand subsidiary is 
their first major project there. 
The Chinese partner owned and operated the cement plant prior to the 
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fonnation of the joint venture. The plant capacity was expanded soon after the joint 
venture was fonned, and it now stands at 1,700,000 tonnes per annum which makes 
the plant one of China's five largest cement works. The joint venture company has 
embarked on a strategy of becoming a low cost supplier to the markets it services in 
the greater Shanghai area. 
The perfonnance of the j oint venture in China has so far been unsatisfactory to 
the New Zealand partner. Specifically, for the financial year ended 31 December 1995 
the joint venture was unprofitable, and the New Zealand partner's share of the loss 
was NZ$ 2.5 million. This has been contributed to two main reasons: 
• Commissioning and bringing a new one million tonne plant up to 
the desired production perfonnance has taken longer and has been 
more costly than anticipated; 
• Government restrictions on credit in China has resulted in reduced 
demand for cement and therefore increased competition on price. 
The financial perfonnance of the joint venture has also been unprofitable for the first 
six months of the 1996 financial year. The New Zealand partner's share of the loss for 
the period was NZ$ 2.2 million. During this period the joined venture had to face the 
facts that cement prices remained depressed, and raw material and distribution costs 
increased. 
In tenns of the operational aspects of the plant, the New Zealand partner has 
introduced modem production and quality control systems which were not in place 
previously. The Managing Director of the New Zealand company explains: 
We have put in some very modem reporting on quality and production 
controls, and that is completely foreign to them [the Chinese partner]. It 
is a slow process getting the Chinese Managers to accept that they are 
useful tools for managing the business. 
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In general, they have found that their Chinese partner's approach to operating a 
business is substantially different from their own approach. In particular, the most 
marked differences are seen in areas like management structures, production control 
processes and strategic planning processes. The Managing Director explains to what 
extent these differences are seen as a problem: 
I guess that as a problem, it is one that is manageable but it takes time to 
manage it and it ... it detracts ... it pulls away from the focus of where we 
should be. So it is a continual time consumer to deal with and try to get people 
sighted on where we want to be and what are the specific actions we are taking 
over the next period of time. 
The New Zealand company considers the Chinese joint venture to be a long 
term investment, and they do not rule out the possibility that they will increase their 
equity share in the business over time. 
APPENDIXQ 
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and bottling of softdrinks in New Zealand and Australia. For the financial year ended 
31 August 1996, the group achieved a turnover ofNZ$2.6 billion and net earnings of 
NZ$150 million. It has about a 50 percent beer market share in New Zealand and 
Australia. 
The company is involved in several international strategic alliances, including 
a licensing agreement with a Swedish company allowing them to brew the company's 
premium beer in Sweden. Another strategic alliance is a joint venture with a Chinese 
partner established in April 1995. 
After evaluating the Chinese beer market and deciding to enter into ajoint 
venture with a Chinese brewery, the New Zealand company undertook a 
comprehensive partner selection process. The first part of this process involved talking 
to a number of multinational companies operating in China about their experiences. 
These companies were not necessarily in a joint venture in China nor in the brewing 
business. Based on the information gathered, they developed a list of ten essential 
prerequisites for ajoint venture involvement in China. The next step involved 
evaluating potential joint venture partners based on these prerequisites. There is about 
800 breweries in China, and 400 of these are of some size. The New Zealand company 
evaluated 45 breweries before they could find one that met all the ten criteria on the 
list. Each evaluation would include meetings with owners and management of the 
Chinese brewery, a technical evaluation of the brewery itself and market evaluations 
of the region the brewery was trading in. The whole process took about two years and 
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obviously involved considerable expenses. The company reported as follows in their 
1995 annual report:-
In the four months since acquisition in April to 31 August 1995, 
the Wuxi brewery made a profit ofNZ$1.2 million. However, 
NZ$ 4.8 million of costs associated with the Wuxi acquisition and 
the investigation of other brewing opportunities resulted in an 
overall loss ofNZ$3.6 million for [name of company] Chinese 
operations. 
The New Zealand company paid US$21.5 million for a 60 percent share of the 
joint venture when it was established in April 1995, and in January 1996 they bought 
an additional 20 percent share from their Chinese partner. The New Zealand partner 
manages the brewery which is situated at Wuxi. Wuxi is located in the Yangtze river 
delta area, about 120km west of Shanghai. Upon formation of the joint venture the 
brewery has been upgraded and expanded to double its capacity. This has brought 
gains in production efficiency and quality benefits. 
The New Zealand partner is very pleased with the performance of the joint 
venture and with the working relationship with their partner: 
We are perceived by our partners to be a good partner, and we see 
them as a good partner. The joint venture is profitable, and we have 
avoided any conflict or we have avoided the need for any conflict. 
We have good management, we are investing in buildings and in the 
quality of the management. So there are few things today we would 
have changed. 
In terms of financial performance, for the period April to August 1995 the joint 
venture achieved sales ofNZ$8.1 million and earnings from operations ofNZ$1.2 
million. The figures for the period September 1995 to August 1996 were NZ$19.2 
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million and NZ$2.3 million respectively. 
The company is currently building a brewery on a greenfield site in the Wuxi-
Singapore Industrial Park in Suzhou, China (100km from Shanghai). The new brewery 
which will represent an investment of some NZ$ 200 million will be wholly owned by 
the New Zealand company. It will be operational in 1998, and the brewery will be 
capable of producing as much beer as the company sells throughout all of New 
Zealand. 
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established in 1990. It is a seed company, and this means, in a simplified way, that the 
company contracts with farmers to grow certain varieties of agricultural seeds which 
the company markets and sells worldwide. The seeds are all produced in New Zealand 
and mainly exported overseas. The largest markets are found in countries in Europe 
and Asia as well as South Africa. These markets count for more than 75 percent ofthe 
company's turnover. The company sees their location as a strength. They are situated 
on the south island of New Zealand in a location within a 50lon radius of over 60 
percent ofthe country's arable production. New Zealand has long traditions in the 
production and export of agricultural seeds. 
The company has experience from one international strategic alliance fonned 
in 1992. It is a research and development agreement involving two other parties. The 
two other parties are a scientific agricultural research organisation in New Zealand and 
a Dutch agricultural seed distributor. The research organisation will develop (breed) 
white clover seed varieties suitable for the climates in northern and southern Europe. 
Upon completion ofthis work, which will take several years, the seed company will 
produce the seed varieties in New Zealand, and the Dutch company will sell the seeds 
in Europe. Hence, the Type I asymmetries included in this alliance are market 
knowledge and technology, while the Type II asymmetry is national culture. 
No separate legal entity has been established for this venture, and the 
ownership of the jointly bred seed varieties, which will be covered by patents, will be 
held equally by the three partners. 
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The partners in the research and development agreement are very pleased with 
the performance of the strategic alliance so far: 
One year ahead of schedule we have two cultivars presently under 
National List testing in the United Kingdom and in France. To be at 
this stage less than four years from signing the agreement is a 
considerable achievement and augers well for the success of the whole 
programme. 
However, it is still relatively early in the development process of the strategic alliance, 
and this is recognised by the company: 
The product is now in the development stage. Later on the product will be 
available in the market, and probably the cheaper the product is, the easier 
it will be to market. Against that we will be looking to get a price level that 
can ensure that we can get production here with New Zealand farmers in 
competition to other products that those farmers can grow. So perhaps 
when you interview us in five years time some ofthe answers may be 
slightly different, but right now the single minded objective is to produce a 
clover and sell that in volume. 
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established in 1987. It was fonned as a management buyout of a division of a large 
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company. The company is a seed company, and this means, in a simplified way, that 
they are involved in the research and development, production and marketing of 
agricultural seed varieties. A large portion of the company's turnover comes from 
sales overseas. New Zealand companies have long traditions in the research and 
development, production and marketing of agricultural seeds, and these companies 
have been and are extensively involved in international strategic alliances. 
The company has experience from several international strategic alliances 
dating back to the fonnation of the company in 1987. One such international 
strategic alliance is a licensing agreement entered into with a company from Australia 
allowing the Australians to produce and sell one of the company's proprietary seed 
varieties in Australia. After some time the New Zealand company bought an equity 
share in the Australian company, and again after some time they bought the whole 
company. 
An international strategic alliance which have failed to meet the expectations 
of the seed company ever since it was fonned in 1988 is a licensing agreement entered 
into with a Dutch partner. At the same time as the licensing agreement was entered 
into, the two parties also entered into a research and development agreement, and the 
Dutch company bought a 25 percent equity share in the New Zealand company. The 
licensing agreement allows the Dutch company to produce and sell not only in the 
Netherlands, but all over Europe, one of the company's proprietary seed varieties. 
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Furthermore, the Type I asymmetries included in this licensing agreement are market 
knowledge and technology, and the Type II asymmetries are partner size and national 
culture. 
MF2B's Managing Director explains why this international strategic alliance 
has failed to meet their expectations: 
I think there are two reasons. The way they do business in Europe is 
different from the way we do it here, and their ability to sell the benefits 
of the product are much less than what they are in the New Zealand 
system, as the agricultural system is so different. They essentially are 
selling on price based upon the performance on a recommended list 
somewhere. Whereas we are selling on price to some extent, but more 
on the benefits of our product to the farmer. The second point is that 
they had some competing product which we were unaware of at the 
time we entered into the licensing agreement. They malce more money 
out of this product because they don't have to pay us royalty. 
The New Zealand partner also considers in hindsight that it might have been wise not 
to let one partner alone have the rights for the whole of Europe. However, they did not 
have a strong knowledge of other potential partners other than the Dutch at the time. 
The company has recently established a joint venture in Argentina, and they 
are looking at alliance opportunities in Peru and Mexico. The agricultural countries in 
South America are interesting markets for the company since these countries have a 
similar climate to that of New Zealand. 
APPENDIXT 
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The company, a seed company, is part of New Zealand's largest agriculture 
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servicing company. The agriculture servicing company is listed on the New Zealand 
stock exchange, and it has an annual turnover in the region ofNZ$600 million. The 
seed company, which has been in operation for more than 125 years, is involved in the 
research and development, production and marketing of agricultural, horticultural and 
turf seeds. It experiences a turnover of about NZ$50 million per year. A substantial 
portion of the company's turnover comes from sales overseas. New Zealand 
companies have long traditions in the research and development, production and 
marketing of agricultural, horticultural and turf seeds, and these companies have been 
and are extensively involved in international strategic alliances. 
The seed company has very extensive experience from international strategic 
alliances dating back to the late 1970's. The first alliances were entered into with ' 
partners from countries in Europe, and the company has since then teamed up with 
companies from all parts of the world. It has formed 38 international strategic 
alliances since 1981. Ofthese, 28 are licensing agreements, 9 are research and 
development agreements, and one is a joint venture. Of the 38 alliances formed, 27 are 
still in operation. Several ofthe strategic alliances, particularly the licensing 
agreements, are with the same partners. Most strategic alliances have been formed 
with partners from the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands with 
12,6 and 4 international strategic alliances respectively. 
Many agricultural plants are proprietary and therefore protected by patents. 
The licensing agreements give the licensee the right to produce the seeds and market 
217 
them in certain markets. The production of seeds are normally done under contract to 
farmers rather than by the seed company itself The New Zealand company is involved 
in licensing agreements with international partners both as a licensor and as a licensee. 
Agricultural plants suitable for the southern hemisphere are usually not 
suitable for the northern hemisphere and vice versa. This means that new plant 
varieties developed by the New Zealand company for New Zealand farmers are 
generally not suitable for European farmers. In other words, a new and separate plant 
variety will have to be developed for northern hemisphere conditions, and this fact 
forms the backbone for the research and development agreements. The General 
Manager ofthe New Zealand seed company explains how it works: 
The alliance is that our material at an early age goes to the Dutch 
company [their alliance partner]. They work on it and change it. It 
is like a recipe, they may say that it needs a bit of this or that. Their 
material comes to us, and we see that it does not work particularly 
well in New Zealand, it has got disease and this and that. So we 
fiddle around with it. In the end we may come to varieties that work 
very well in the northern hemisphere and very well in the southern 
hemisphere. We share royalties. The alliance is working two ways, 
we are opening up the southern hemisphere to them, and they open 
up the northern hemisphere to us. 
The development of new plant varieties are long term projects. It may talce as long as 
ten to fifteen years from start to finish. 
The New Zealand company has implemented a system whereby they review 
the performance of each alliance with their partner once or twice a year. They have 
found that this helps drive the performance ofthe various alliance relationships, 
particularly with regard to the research and development agreements which tend to be 
long term projects. Furthermore, they ensure that they have a clause in their research 
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and development agreements giving them the right to terminate the alliance should 
their partner not perform as agreed for whatever reason. They have not terminated any 
agreements due to non-performance yet, but they think it will happen in the near 
future. As an example, the company is involved in a research and development 
agreement with a Dutch firm, and this agreement covers all the national markets in 
Europe. The company has some material for the development of a new plant variety 
for the European markets. Upon discussing this project with their partner in the 
Netherlands, their partner responded that they are unable, for a number of reasons, to 
proceed with the project. The New Zealand partner therefore has the right, under the 
agreement, to enter into an agreement with another partner in Europe for this 
particular plant development project, and it is likely that they will do so, 
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